1990.08~1991.2 Gulf War

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Background

Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history
of friction between Iraq and the United States. The US was concerned with Iraq's position on
Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for many Arab and Palestinian
militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of
State Sponsors of Terrorism on 29 December 1979.

The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, which became the
Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some "non-military"
aircraft to Iraq.In March 1982, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation
Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing
a surrender. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was
removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because
of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary
Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement
in terrorism ... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July,
arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration
sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time
the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions
within society were rising. Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14 billion. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive
the debts, but they refused.

The Iraq–Kuwait dispute also involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait had been
a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait
rightful Iraqi territory. Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a
protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign affairs to
the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and Iraq in 1922, making
Iraq almost entirely landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further
provisions in the region.

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the
cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per barrel, discipline was required. The United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to
repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses
of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as $10 per
barrel ($63/m3) – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989
balance of payments deficit. Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's
basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked
for more discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government described it as a form
of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling
across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field. At the same time, Saddam looked
for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move
was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states
would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.

In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be
maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the
countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for
drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was
rejected. Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large
debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase
arms production so as to become an exporter, although the success of these projects
was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls
mounted.

Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting
violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by
unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice
outside the Arab world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of
Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's human
rights record, including the well-known use of torture. The UK also condemned
the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaper The
Observer. Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would
be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its
funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted
in Palestinian deaths, was vetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US
foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle
Eastern energy reserves.

In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their
quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that
Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the
Persian Gulf was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing
– Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt.
Upon review by the Secretary of Defense, it was found that Syria indeed planned a strike
against Iraq in the coming days. Saddam immediately used funding to incorporate central
intelligence into Syria and ultimately prevented the impending air strike. On 15 July 1990,
Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that
policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila
oil field, that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its
"Arab brothers". He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies
of some Arab rulers are American ... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab
interests and security." The US sent aerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the
Persian Gulf in response to these threats.Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held
on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.

On the 25th, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad.
The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:

So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean
prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made
has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights ... If you use pressure, we
will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten
you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their
size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may
reach you ... We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want
our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year
made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.

Glaspie replied:

I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the
opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts,
like your border disagreement with Kuwait ... Frankly, we can only see that you have
deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business.
But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when
we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi
point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis,
parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be
concerned.

Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq
"would not accept death."

According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to the precise border
between Kuwait and Iraq, "...  that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before;
'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs'." Glaspie similarly
believed that war was not imminent.

Invasion of Kuwait
The result of the Jeddah talks was an Iraqi demand for $10 billion to cover the lost
revenues from Rumaila; Kuwait offered $500 million. The Iraqi response was to
immediately order an invasion, which started on 2 August 1990 with the bombing
of Kuwait's capital, Kuwait City.

Before the invasion, the Kuwaiti military was believed to have numbered 16,000 men,
arranged into three armored, one mechanised infantry and one under-strength artillery
brigade. The pre-war strength of the Kuwait Air Force was around 2,200 Kuwaiti
personnel, with 80 fixed-wing aircraft and 40 helicopters. In spite of Iraqi saber
rattling,[clarification needed] Kuwait did not mobilize its force; the army had been
stood-down on 19 July, and during the Iraqi invasion many Kuwaiti military
personnel were on leave.

By 1988, at the end of the Iran–Iraq war, the Iraqi Army was the world's fourth largest
army, consisting of 955,000 standing soldiers and 650,000 paramilitary forces in the
Popular Army. According to John Childs and André Corvisier, a low estimate shows the
Iraqi Army capable of fielding 4,500 tanks, 484 combat aircraft and 232 combat helicopters.
According to Michael Knights, a high estimate shows the Iraqi Army capable of fielding one
million men and 850,000 reservists, 5,500 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, 700 combat aircraft
and helicopters; it held 53 divisions, 20 special-forces brigades, and several regional militias,
and had a strong air defense.

Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units, which
began the attack at midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with the primary attack
force driving south straight for Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting
attack force entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving east, cutting off
Kuwait City from the country's southern half. The commander of a Kuwaiti armored
battalion, 35th Armoured Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqi attack and conducted
a robust defense at the Battle of the Bridges near Al Jahra, west of Kuwait City.

Kuwaiti aircraft scrambled to meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were
lost or captured. A few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces.

The main Iraqi thrust into Kuwait City was conducted by commandos deployed by
helicopters and boats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seized the
airports and two airbases. The Iraqis attacked the Dasman Palace, the Royal Residence
of Kuwait's Emir, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, which was defended by the Emiri
Guard supported with M-84 tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed Fahad Al-Ahmed
Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir's youngest brother.

Within 12 hours, most resistance had ended within Kuwait, and the royal family had fled,
allowing Iraq to control most of Kuwait. After two days of intense combat, most of the
Kuwaiti military were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard, or had escaped to
Saudi Arabia. The Emir and key ministers fled south along the highway for refuge in
Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated their control of Kuwait City, then headed
south and redeployed along the Saudi border. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam
initially installed a puppet regime known as the "rovisional Government of Free Kuwait"
before installing his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as Kuwait's governor on 8 August.

After the invasion, the Iraqi military looted over $1,000,000,000 in banknotes from Kuwait's
Central Bank. At the same time, Saddam Hussein made the Kuwaiti dinar equal to the
Iraqi dinar, thereby lowering the Kuwaiti currency to one-twelfth of its original value. In
response, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah ruled the banknotes as invalid and refused to
reimburse stolen notes, which became worthless because of a UN embargo. After the
conflict ended, many of the stolen banknotes made their way back into circulation. Today,
the stolen banknotes are a collectible for numismatists.

Kuwaiti resistance movement
Kuwaitis founded a local armed resistance movement following the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait. The Kuwaiti resistance's casualty rate far exceeded that of the coalition
military forces and Western hostages. The resistance predominantly consisted of
ordinary citizens who lacked any form of training and supervision.

Run-up to the war

Diplomatic means
A key element of US political, military and energy economic planning occurred in early
1984. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for five years by that time and both sides
sustained significant casualties, reaching into the hundreds of thousands. Within
President Ronald Reagan's National Security Council concern was growing that the war
could spread beyond the boundaries of the two belligerents. A National Security Planning
Group meeting was formed, chaired by then Vice President George Bush, to review US
options. It was determined that the conflict would likely spread into Saudi Arabia and other
Persian Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region.
Furthermore, it was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much
higher oil prices and threaten the fragile recovery of the world economy, which was just
beginning to gain momentum. On 22 May 1984, President Reagan was briefed on the
project conclusions in the Oval Office by William Flynn Martin who had served as the
head of the NSC staff that organized the study. (The full declassified presentation can
be seen here The conclusions were threefold: first, oil stocks needed to be
increased among members of the International Energy Agency and, if necessary,
released early if the oil market was disrupted; second, the United States needed
to beef up the security of friendly Arab states in the region; and third, an embargo
should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was
approved by President Reagan and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by
the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in the London Summit
of 1984. The plan was implemented and became the basis for US preparedness
to respond to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991.

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwait and US delegations requested a meeting of the UN
Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding
a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August 1990, the Arab League passed its own
resolution, which called for a solution to the conflict from within the league, and warned
against outside intervention. Iraq and Libya were the only two Arab League states that
opposed the resolution for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait; the PLO opposed it as well.
The Arab states of Yemen and Jordan – a Western ally which bordered Iraq and relied
on the country for economic support – opposed military intervention from non-Arab
states. The Arab state of Sudan aligned itself with Saddam.

On 6 August, Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq. Resolution 665
followed soon after, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions. It said the
"use of measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to
halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes
and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661."

The US administration had at first been indecisive with an "undertone ... of resignation to
the invasion and even adaptation to it as a fait accompli" until the UK's prime minister
Margaret Thatcher played a powerful role, reminding the President that appeasement
in the 1930s had led to war, that Saddam would have the whole Gulf at his mercy along
with 65 percent of the world's oil supply, and famously urging President Bush "not to go
wobbly".

Once persuaded, US officials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without any
linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, accepting the British view that any concessions
would strengthen Iraqi influence in the region for years to come.

On 12 August 1990, Saddam "propose[d] that all cases of occupation, and those cases that
have been portrayed as occupation, in the region, be resolved simultaneously". Specifically,
he called for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon,
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and "mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iran and arrangement
for the situation in Kuwait." He also called for a replacement of US troops that mobilized in
Saudi Arabia in response to Kuwait's invasion with "an Arab force", as long as that force did
not involve Egypt. Additionally, he requested an "immediate freeze of all boycott and siege
decisions" and a general normalization of relations with Iraq. From the beginning of the
crisis, President Bush was strongly opposed to any "linkage" between Iraq's occupation of
Kuwait and the Palestinian issue.

On 23 August, Saddam appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had
refused exit visas. In the video, he asks a young British boy, Stuart Lockwood, whether he
is getting his milk, and goes on to say, through his interpreter, "We hope your presence as
guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to
prevent the scourge of war."

Another Iraqi proposal communicated in August 1990 was delivered to US National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft by an unidentified Iraqi official. The official communicated to the
White House that Iraq would "withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave" provided
that the UN lifted sanctions, allowed "guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf through the
Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah", and allowed Iraq to "gain full control of the Rumaila
oil field that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory". The proposal also "include[d] offers
to negotiate an oil agreement with the United States 'satisfactory to both nations' national
security interests,' develop a joint plan 'to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems'
and 'jointly work on the stability of the gulf.'"

On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, which gave Iraq until
15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait, and empowered states to use "all necessary
means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline.

In December 1990, Iraq made a proposal to withdraw from Kuwait provided that foreign
troops left the region and that an agreement was reached regarding the Palestinian problem
and the dismantlement of both Israel's and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The White
House rejected the proposal. The PLO's Yasser Arafat expressed that neither he nor
Saddam insisted that solving the Israel–Palestine issues should be a precondition to solving
the issues in Kuwait, though he did acknowledge a "strong link" between these problems.

Ultimately, the US and UK stuck to their position that there would be no negotiations until
Iraq withdrew from Kuwait and that they should not grant Iraq concessions, lest they give
the impression that Iraq benefited from its military campaign. Also, when US
Secretary of State James Baker met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland, for last
minute peace talks in early 1991, Aziz reportedly made no concrete proposals and did
not outline any hypothetical Iraqi moves.

On 14 January 1991, France proposed that the UN Security Council call for "a rapid and
massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a statement to Iraq that Council members
would bring their "active contribution" to a settlement of the region's other problems,
"in particular, of the Arab–Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem
by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference" to assure "the
security, stability and development of this region of the world." The French proposal
was supported by Belgium (at the moment one of the rotating Council members),
Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations.
The US, the UK, and the Soviet Union rejected it; US Ambassador to the UN Thomas
Pickering stated that the French proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond
previous Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion. France dropped this
proposal when it found "no tangible sign of interest" from Baghdad.

Military means
One of the West's main concerns was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia.
Following Kuwait's conquest, the Iraqi Army was within easy striking distance of Saudi
oil fields. Control of these fields, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have
given Saddam control over the majority of the world's oil reserves. Iraq also had a
number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq some 26 billion
dollars during its war with Iran. The Saudis had backed Iraq in that war, as they
feared the influence of Shia Iran's Islamic revolution on its own Shia minority.
After the war, Saddam felt he should not have to repay the loans due to the help
he had given the Saudis by fighting Iran.

Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudis. He
argued that the US-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy guardian
of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He combined the language of the Islamist
groups that had recently fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used
to attack the Saudis.

Acting on the Carter Doctrine policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an
invasion of Saudi Arabia, US President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the
US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi
Arabia, under the codename Operation Desert Shield. The operation began on 7
August 1990, when US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to the request of
its monarch, King Fahd, who had earlier called for US military assistance. This
"wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared
Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid,
as its military-governor.

The US Navy dispatched two naval battle groups built around the aircraft carriers USS
Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence to the Persian Gulf, where they were ready
by 8 August. The US also sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the
region. A total of 48 US Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force
Base, Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia and immediately commenced round-the-clock
air patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraq border to discourage further Iraqi military advances.
They were joined by 36 F-15 A-Ds from the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing at Bitburg, Germany.
The Bitburg contingent was based at Al Kharj Air Base, approximately an hour south east
of Riyadh. The 36th TFW would be responsible for 11 confirmed Iraqi Air Force aircraft
shot down during the war. Two Air National Guard units were stationed at Al Kharj Air
Base, the South Carolina Air National Guard's 169th Fighter Wing flew bombing missions
with 24 F-16s flying 2,000 combat missions and dropping four million pounds (1,800,000
kilograms; 1,800 metric tons) of munitions, and the New York Air National Guard's 174th
Fighter Wing from Syracuse flew 24 F-16s on bombing missions. Military buildup continued
from there, eventually reaching 543,000 troops, twice the number used in the 2003 invasion
of Iraq. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift
ships, allowing a quick buildup. As part of the buildup, amphibious exercises were carried
out in the Gulf, including Operation Imminent Thunder, which involved the USS Midway
and 15 other ships, 1,100 aircraft, and a thousand Marines. In a press conference,
General Schwarzkopf stated that these exercises were intended to decieve the Iraqi forces,
forcing them to continue their defense of the Kuwaiti coastline.

Creating a coalition
A series of UN Security Council resolutions and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990 gave Iraq a withdrawal
deadline until 15 January 1991, and authorized "all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660", and a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.

To ensure that the US received economic backing, James Baker went on an 11-day journey
to nine countries in September 1990, which the press dubbed "The Tin Cup Trip". The first
stop was Saudi Arabia, which a month before had already granted permission to the United
States to use its facilities. However, Baker believed that Saudi Arabia should assume some
of the cost of the military efforts to defend it. When Baker asked King Fahd for 15 billion dollars,
the King readily agreed, with the promise that Baker ask Kuwait for the same amount.

The next day, 7 September, he did just that, and the Emir of Kuwait, displaced in a Sheraton
hotel outside his invaded country, easily agreed. Baker then moved to enter talks with Egypt,
whose leadership he considered "the moderate voice of the Middle East". President Mubarak
of Egypt was furious with Saddam for his invasion of Kuwait, and for the fact that Saddam
had assured Mubarak that an invasion was not his intention. Egypt received approximately $7
billion in debt forgiveness for its providing of support and troops for the US-led intervention.

After stops in Helsinki and Moscow to smooth out Iraqi demands for a Middle-Eastern peace
conference with the Soviet Union, Baker traveled to Syria to discuss its role in the crisis with its
President Hafez Assad. Assad had a deep personal enmity towards Saddam, which was defined
by the fact that "Saddam had been trying to kill him [Assad] for years." Harboring this animosity
and impressed with Baker's diplomatic initiative to visit Damascus (relations had been severed
since the 1983 bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut), Assad agreed to pledge up to 100,000
Syrian troops to the coalition effort. This was a vital step in ensuring Arab states were represented
in the coalition. In exchange, Washington gave Syrian dictator President Hafez al-Assad the green
light to wipe out forces opposing Syria's rule in Lebanon and arranged for weapons valued at a
billion dollars to be provided to Syria, mostly through Gulf states. In exchange for Iran's
support for the US-led intervention, the US government promised the Iranian government to end
US opposition to World Bank loans to Iran. On the day before the ground invasion began, the
World Bank gave Iran the first loan of $250m.

Baker flew to Rome for a brief visit with the Italians in which he was promised the use of
some military equipment, before journeying to Germany to meet with American ally
Chancellor Kohl. Although Germany's constitution (which was brokered essentially by
the United States) prohibited military involvement in outside nations, Kohl committed
a two billion dollar contribution to the coalition's war effort, as well as further economic
and military support of coalition ally Turkey, and the transportation of Egyptian soldiers
and ships to the Persian Gulf.

A coalition of forces opposing Iraq's aggression was formed, consisting of forces from 39 countries:
Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom and the United States. It was the largest coalition since World War II.
US Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. was designated to be the commander of the coalition
forces in the Persian Gulf area. The Soviet Union condemned Baghdad's aggression against
Kuwait, but did not support the United States and allied intervention in Iraq and tried to avert
it.

Although they did not contribute any forces, Japan and Germany made financial contributions
totaling $10 billion and $6.6 billion respectively. US troops represented 73% of the coalition's
956,600 troops in Iraq.

Many of the coalition countries were reluctant to commit military forces. Some felt that the war
was an internal Arab affair or did not want to increase US influence in the Middle East. In the
end, however, many nations were persuaded by Iraq's belligerence towards other Arab states
, offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats to withhold aid.

Justification for intervention
The US and the UN gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict, the most
prominent being the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti territorial integrity. In addition, the US moved
to support its ally Saudi Arabia, whose importance in the region, and as a key supplier of oil,
made it of considerable geopolitical importance. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, US Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney made the first of several visits to Saudi Arabia where King Fahd
requested US military assistance. During a speech in a special joint session of the US Congress
given on 11 September 1990, US President George Bush summed up the reasons with the
following remarks: "Within three days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into
Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check
that aggression."

The Pentagon stated that satellite photos showing a buildup of Iraqi forces along the border
were this information's source, but this was later alleged to be false. A reporter for the St.
Petersburg Times acquired two commercial Soviet satellite images made at the time, which
showed nothing but empty desert.

Other justifications for foreign involvement included Iraq's history of human rights abuses under
Saddam. Iraq was also known to possess biological weapons and chemical weapons, which
Saddam had used against Iranian troops during the Iran–Iraq War and against his own country's
Kurdish population in the Al-Anfal campaign. Iraq was also known to have a nuclear weapons
program, but the report about it from January 1991 was partially declassified by the CIA on 26
May 2001.

Public relations campaign targeting the public
Although the Iraqi military committed human rights abuses during the invasion, the alleged
incidents that received the most publicity in the US were fabrications of the public relations
firm hired by the government of Kuwait to persuade Americans to support military
intervention. Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizens for a Free
Kuwait was formed in the US. It hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton for about
$11 million, paid by Kuwait's government.

Among many other means of influencing US opinion, such as distributing books on Iraqi
atrocities to US soldiers deployed in the region, "Free Kuwait" T-shirts and speakers to
college campuses, and dozens of video news releases to television stations, the firm
arranged for an appearance before a group of members of the US Congress in which
a young woman identifying herself as a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital
described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the
floor.

The story helped tip both the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen
said the testimony was enough for them to support military action against Iraq and seven
Senators referenced the testimony in debate. The Senate supported the military actions
in a 52–47 vote. However, a year after the war, this allegation was revealed to be a
fabrication. The young woman who had testified was found to be a member of
Kuwait's Royal Family and the daughter of Kuwait's ambassador to the US.
She hadn't lived in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.

The details of the Hill & Knowlton public relations campaign, including the incubator testimony,
were published in John R. MacArthur's Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf
War, and came to wide public attention when an Op-ed by MacArthur was published in
The New York Times. This prompted a reexamination by Amnesty International, which had
originally promoted an account alleging even greater numbers of babies torn from incubators
than the original fake testimony. After finding no evidence to support it, the organization
issued a retraction. President Bush then repeated the incubator allegations on television.

In reality, the Iraqi Army did commit various well-documented crimes during its occupation
of Kuwait, such as the summary execution without trial of three brothers, after which their
bodies were stacked and left to decay in a public street. Iraqi troops also ransacked
and looted private Kuwaiti homes; one residence was repeatedly defecated in. A
resident later commented: "The whole thing was violence for the sake of violence,
destruction for the sake of destruction ... Imagine a surrealistic painting by Salvador
Dalí".

US President Bush repeatedly compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler.

Early battles
Air campaign
The Gulf War began with an extensive aerial bombing campaign on 16 January 1991. For
42 consecutive days and nights, the coalition forces subjected Iraq to one of the most
intensive air bombardments in military history. The coalition flew over 100,000 sorties,
dropping 88,500 tonnes of bombs, which widely destroyed military and civilian
infrastructure. The air campaign was commanded by USAF Lieutenant General
Chuck Horner, who briefly served as US Central Command's Commander-in-Chief –
Forward while General Schwarzkopf was still in the US.

A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678, the coalition launched a massive air
campaign, which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert Storm.
The priority was the destruction of Iraq's Air Force and anti-aircraft facilities. The
sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six carrier battle groups
(CVBG) in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.

The next targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely
micromanaged Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative at lower levels was
discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived
of command and control.

The air campaign's third and largest phase targeted military targets throughout Iraq and
Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons research facilities, and naval forces. About a
third of the coalition's air power was devoted to attacking Scuds, some of which were
on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. US and British special operations forces had
been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search for and destruction of
Scuds.

Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses, including man-portable air-defense systems, were surprisingly
ineffective against enemy aircraft, and the coalition suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over
100,000 sorties, 44 due to Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding
with the ground while evading Iraqi ground-fired weapons. One of these losses
is a confirmed air-air victory.

Iraqi Scud missile strikes on Israel and Saudi Arabia

Iraq's government made no secret that it would attack if invaded. Prior to the war's start,
in the aftermath of the failed US–Iraq peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, a reporter asked
Iraq's English-speaking Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz: "Mr. Foreign
Minister, if war starts ... will you attack?" His response was: "Yes, absolutely, yes."


Five hours after the first attacks, Iraq's state radio broadcast declared that "The dawn of
victory nears as this great showdown begins." Iraq fired eight missiles the next day. These
missile attacks were to continue throughout the war. Iraq fired 88 Scud missiles during
the war's seven weeks.

Iraq hoped to provoke a military response from Israel. The Iraqi government hoped that
many Arab states would withdraw from the Coalition, as they would be reluctant to fight
alongside Israel. Following the first attacks, Israeli Air Force jets were deployed to
patrol the northern airspace with Iraq. Israel prepared to militarily retaliate, as its policy
for the previous 40 years had always been retaliation. However, President Bush
pressured Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to retaliate and withdraw Israeli
jets, fearing that if Israel attacked Iraq, the other Arab nations would either desert the
coalition or join Iraq. It was also feared that if Israel used Syrian or Jordanian airspace
to attack Iraq, they would intervene in the war on Iraq's side or attack Israel. The coalition
promised to deploy Patriot missiles to defend Israel if it refrained from responding to the
Scud attacks.

The Scud missiles targeting Israel were relatively ineffective, as firing at extreme range
resulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. According to the Jewish Virtual
Library, Iraqi attacks killed 74 Israelis: two directly and the rest from suffocation and heart
attacks. Approximately 230 Israelis were injured. Extensive property damage
was also caused, and, according to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Damage to general
property consisted of 1,302 houses, 6,142 apartments, 23 public buildings, 200 shops and
50 cars." It was feared that Iraq would fire missiles filled with nerve agents such as
sarin. As a result, Israel's government issued gas masks to its citizens. When the first Iraqi
missiles hit Israel, some people injected themselves with an antidote for nerve gas. It has
been suggested that the sturdy construction techniques used in Israeli cities, coupled with
the fact that Scuds were only launched at night, played an important role in limiting the
number of casualties from Scud attacks.

In response to the threat of Scuds on Israel, the US rapidly sent a Patriot missile air defense
artillery battalion to Israel along with two batteries of MIM-104 Patriot missiles for the
protection of civilians. The Royal Netherlands Air Force also deployed a Patriot missile
squadron to Israel and Turkey. The Dutch Defense Ministry later stated that the military
use of the Patriot missile system was largely ineffective, but its psychological value for
the affected populations was high.

Coalition air forces were also extensively exercised in "Scud hunts" in the Iraqi desert,
trying to locate the camouflaged trucks before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi
Arabia. On the ground, special operations forces also infiltrated Iraq, tasked with
locating and destroying Scuds - including the ill-fated Bravo Two Zero patrol of the
SAS. Once special operations were combined with air patrols, the number of attacks
fell sharply, then increased slightly as Iraqi forces adjusted to coalition tactics.

As the Scud attacks continued, the Israelis grew increasingly impatient, and considered
taking unilateral military action against Iraq. On 22 January 1991, a Scud missile hit the
Israeli city of Ramat Gan, after two coalition Patriots failed to intercept it. Three elderly
people suffered fatal heart attacks, another 96 people were injured, and 20 apartment
buildings were damaged. After this attack, the Israelis warned that if the US
failed to stop the attacks, they would. At one point, Israeli commandos boarded
helicopters prepared to fly into Iraq, but the mission was called off after a phone
call from US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, reporting on the extent of coalition
efforts to destroy Scuds and emphasizing that Israeli intervention could endanger
US forces.

In addition to the attacks on Israel, 47 Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia, and one
missile was fired at Bahrain and another at Qatar. The missiles were fired at both military
and civilian targets. One Saudi civilian was killed, and 78 others were injured. No casualties
were reported in Bahrain or Qatar. The Saudi government issued all its citizens and
expatriates with gas masks in the event of Iraq using missiles with warheads containing
chemical weapons. The government broadcast alerts and 'all clear' messages over
television to warn citizens during Scud attacks.

On 25 February 1991, a Scud missile hit a US Army barracks of the 14th Quartermaster
Detachment, out of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
killing 28 soldiers and injuring over 100.

Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (Battle of Khafji)

On 29 January, Iraqi forces attacked and occupied the lightly defended Saudi city of Khafji
with tanks and infantry. The Battle of Khafji ended two days later when the Iraqis were
driven back by the Saudi Arabian National Guard, supported by Qatari forces and US
Marines. The allied forces used extensive artillery fire.

Both sides suffered casualties, although Iraqi forces sustained substantially more dead and
captured than the allied forces. Eleven Americans were killed in two separate friendly fire
incidents, an additional 14 US airmen were killed when their AC-130 gunship was shot
down by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile, and two US soldiers were captured during
the battle. Saudi and Qatari forces had a total of 18 dead. Iraqi forces in Khafji had
60–300 dead and 400 captured.

The Battle of Khafji was an example of how air power could single-handedly hinder the
advance of enemy ground forces. Upon learning of Iraqi troop movements, 140 coalition
aircraft were diverted to attack an advancing column consisting of two armored divisions
in battalion-sized units. Precision stand-off attacks were conducted during the night and
through to the next day. Iraqi vehicle losses included 357 tanks, 147 armored personnel
carriers, and 89 mobile artillery pieces. Some crews simply abandoned their vehicles upon
realizing that they could be destroyed by guided bombs, stopping the divisions from
massing for an organized attack on the town. One Iraqi soldier, who had fought in the
Iran–Iraq War, remarked that his brigade "had sustained more punishment from allied
airpower in 30 minutes at Khafji than in eight years of fighting against Iran."

Counter reconnaissance
Task Force 1-41 Infantry was the first coalition force to breach the Saudi Arabian border on
15 February 1991 and conduct ground combat operations in Iraq engaging in direct and
indirect fire fights with the enemy on 17 February 1991. Prior to this action the Task
Force's primary fire support battalion, 4th Battalion of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment,
participated in a massive artillery preparation. Around 300 guns from multiple nations
participated in the artillery barrage. Over 14,000 rounds were fired during these missions.
M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems contributed an additional 4,900 rockets fired at Iraqi
targets. Iraq lost close to 22 artillery battalions during the initial stages of this barrage,
including the destruction of approximately 396 Iraqi artillery pieces.

By the end of these raids Iraqi artillery assets had all but ceased to exist. One Iraqi unit that
was totally destroyed during the preparation was the Iraqi 48th Infantry Division Artillery
Group. The group's commander stated his unit lost 83 of its 100 guns to the artillery
preparation. This artillery prep was supplemented by air attacks by B-52 bombers and
Lockheed AC-130 fixed wing gunships. 1st Infantry Division Apache helicopters and
B-52 bombers conducted raids against Iraq's 110th Infantry Brigade. The 1st Engineer
Battalion and 9th Engineer Battalion marked and proofed assault lanes under direct and
indirect enemy fire to secure a foothold in enemy territory and pass the 1st Infantry Division
and the British 1st Armored Division forward.

On 24 February 1991 the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a couple artillery missions against
Iraqi artillery units. One artillery mission struck a series of Iraqi bunkers, reinforced
by Iraqi T-55 tanks, in the sector of the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. The same day the
2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division with the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Battalion, 32nd
Armor, and the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry destroyed Iraqi bunkers and combat vehicles in
the sector of the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. On 24 February 2nd Brigade, 1st
Infantry Division rolled through the breach in the Iraqi defense west of Wadi Al-Batin and
also cleared the northeastern sector of the breach site of enemy resistance. Task
Force 3-37th Armor breached the Iraqi defense clearing four passage lanes and expanding
the gap under direct enemy fire. Also on 24 February the 1st Infantry Division along
with the 1st Cavalry Division destroyed Iraqi outposts and patrols belonging to the Iraqi
26th Infantry Division. The two divisions also began capturing prisoners. The
1st Infantry Division cleared a zone between Phase Line Vermont and Phase Line Kansas.
Once the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor reached the Iraqi rear
defensive positions it destroyed an Iraqi D-30 artillery battery and many trucks and
bunkers.

Task Force 1-41 Infantry was given the task of breaching Iraq's initial defensive positions
along the Iraq–Saudi Arabia border. The 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment
handled similar responsibilities in its sector of operations. The 1st Infantry Division's
5th Battalion, 16th Infantry also played a significant role clearing the trenches and captured
160 Iraqi soldiers in the process. Once into Iraqi territory Task Force 1-41 Infantry
encountered multiple Iraqi defensive positions and bunkers. These defensive positions
were occupied by a brigade-sized element. Task Force 1-41 Infantry elements
dismounted and prepared to engage the enemy soldiers who occupied these well-prepared
and heavily fortified bunkers. The Task Force found itself engaged in six hours of
combat in order to clear the extensive bunker complex. The Iraqis engaged the
Task Force with small arms fire, RPGs, mortar fire, and what was left of Iraqi artillery
assets. A series of battles unfolded resulting in heavy Iraqi casualties and the Iraqis
being removed from their defensive positions with many becoming prisoners of war.
Some escaped to be killed or captured by other coalition forces. In the process
of clearing the bunkers, Task Force 1-41 captured two brigade command posts and
the command post of the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. The Task Force also
captured a brigade commander, several battalion commanders, company commanders,
and staff officers. As combat operations progressed Task Force 1-41 Infantry
engaged at short range multiple dug in enemy tanks in ambush positions. For a
few hours, bypassed Iraqi RPG-equipped anti-tank teams, T-55 tanks, and dismounted
Iraqi infantry fired at passing American vehicles, only to be destroyed by other US tanks
and fighting vehicles following the initial forces.

The 1st Infantry Division's Task Force 2-16 Infantry cleared four lanes simultaneously through
an enemy fortified trench system while inflicting heavy casualties on Iraqi forces. Task
Force 2-16 continued the attack clearing over 21 km (13 mi) of entrenched enemy positions
resulting in the capture and destruction of numerous enemy vehicles, equipment, personnel
and command bunkers.


Ground campaign

The ground campaign consisted of three or possibly four of the largest tank battles in
American military history. The battles at 73 Easting, Norfolk, and Medina Ridge
are well noted for their historic significance. Some consider the battle of Medina Ridge
the largest tank battle of the war. The US Marine Corps also fought the biggest tank
battle in its history at Kuwait International Airport. The US 3rd Armored Division also
fought a significant battle at Objective Dorset not far from where the battle of Norfolk was
taking place. The US 3rd Armored Division destroyed approximately 300 enemy combat
vehicles during this particular encounter with Iraqi forces. The Iraqis suffered the
loss of over 3,000 tanks and over 2,000 other combat vehicles during these battles against
the American-led coalition.

Kuwait's liberation
US decoy attacks by air attacks and naval gunfire the night before Kuwait's liberation were
designed to make the Iraqis believe the main coalition ground attack would focus on central
Kuwait.

For months, American units in Saudi Arabia had been under almost constant Iraqi artillery
fire, as well as threats from Scud missiles and chemical attacks. On 24 February 1991, the
1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion crossed into Kuwait
and headed toward Kuwait City. They encountered trenches, barbed wire, and minefields.
However, these positions were poorly defended, and were overrun in the first few hours. Several
tank battles took place, but otherwise coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most
Iraqi troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before
surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine US aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab
states advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few
casualties.

Despite the successes of coalition forces, it was feared that the Iraqi Republican Guard
would escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British
armored forces into Kuwait 15 hours ahead of schedule, and to send US forces after
the Republican Guard. The coalition advance was preceded by a heavy artillery and
rocket barrage, after which 150,000 troops and 1,500 tanks began their advance. Iraqi
forces in Kuwait counterattacked against US troops, acting on a direct order from Saddam
Hussein himself. Despite the intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and
continued to advance towards Kuwait City.[citation needed]

Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only light resistance.
The Kuwaitis quickly liberated the city despite losing one soldier and having one plane shot
down. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and President Bush declared
it liberated. However, an Iraqi unit at Kuwait International Airport appeared not to have
received the message and fiercely resisted. US Marines had to fight for hours before securing
the airport, after which Kuwait was declared secure. After four days of fighting, Iraqi forces
were expelled from Kuwait. As part of a scorched earth policy, they set fire to nearly 700
oil wells and placed land mines around the wells to make extinguishing the fires more difficult.

Initial moves into Iraq
The war's ground phase was officially designated Operation Desert Saber. The first
units to move into Iraq were three patrols of the British Special Air Service's B squadron,
call signs Bravo One Zero, Bravo Two Zero, and Bravo Three Zero, in late January. These
eight-man patrols landed behind Iraqi lines to gather intelligence on the movements of
Scud mobile missile launchers, which could not be detected from the air, as they were
hidden under bridges and camouflage netting during the day. Other objectives
included the destruction of the launchers and their fiber-optic communications arrays
that lay in pipelines and relayed coordinates to the TEL operators launching attacks
against Israel. The operations were designed to prevent any possible Israeli intervention.
Due to lack of sufficient ground cover to carry out their assignment, One Zero and Three
Zero abandoned their operations, while Two Zero remained, and was later compromised,
with only Sergeant Chris Ryan escaping to Syria.

Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US
Army performed a direct attack into Iraq on 15 February 1991, followed by one in force on
20 February that led directly through seven Iraqi divisions which were caught off guard.
On 17 January 1991 the 101st Airborne Division Aviation Regiment fired the first shots of
the war when eight AH-64 helicopters successfully destroyed two Iraqi early warning radar
sites. From 15 to 20 February, the Battle of Wadi Al-Batin took place inside Iraq; this
was the first of two attacks by 1 Battalion 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division. It was a
feint attack, designed to make the Iraqis think that a coalition invasion would take place
from the south. The Iraqis fiercely resisted, and the Americans eventually withdrew as
planned back into the Wadi Al-Batin. Three US soldiers were killed and nine wounded,
with one M2 Bradley IFV turret destroyed, but they had taken 40 prisoners and destroyed
five tanks, and successfully deceived the Iraqis. This attack led the way for the XVIII Airborne
Corps to sweep around behind the 1st Cav and attack Iraqi forces to the west. On 22
February 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed ceasefire agreement. The agreement
called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within six weeks following a
total ceasefire, and called for monitoring of the ceasefire and withdrawal to be overseen
by the UN Security Council.

The coalition rejected the proposal, but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be
attacked,[citation needed] and gave 24 hours for Iraq to withdraw its forces. On 23 February,
fighting resulted in the capture of 500 Iraqi soldiers. On 24 February, British and American
armored forces crossed the Iraq–Kuwait border and entered Iraq in large numbers, taking
hundreds of prisoners. Iraqi resistance was light, and four Americans were killed.

Coalition forces enter Iraq
Shortly afterwards, the US VII Corps, in full strength and spearheaded by the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment, launched an armored attack into Iraq early on 24 February, just to the
west of Kuwait, surprising Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, the US XVIII Airborne Corps
launched a sweeping "left-hook" attack across southern Iraq's largely undefended desert,
led by the US 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).
This movement's left flank was protected by the French Division Daguet. The 101st
Airborne Division conducted a combat air assault into enemy territory. The 101st
Airborne Division had struck 249 km (155 mi) behind enemy lines. It was the
deepest air assault operation in history. Approximately 400 helicopters transported
2,000 soldiers into Iraq where they destroyed Iraqi columns trying to flee westward and
prevented the escape of Iraqi forces. The 101st Airborne Division travelled a further
80 to 100 km (50 to 60 mi) into Iraq. By nightfall, the 101st cut off Highway 8
which was a vital supply line running between Basra and the Iraqi forces.
The 101st had lost 16 soldiers in action during the 100-hour war and captured thousands
of enemy prisoners of war.

The French force quickly overcame Iraq's 45th Infantry Division, suffering light casualties
and taking a large number of prisoners, and took up blocking positions to prevent an
Iraqi counterattack on the coalition's flank. The movement's right flank was protected
by the United Kingdom's 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated deep
into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank attack against the elite
Republican Guard before it could escape. The Iraqis resisted fiercely from dug-in
positions and stationary vehicles, and even mounted armored charges.

Unlike many previous engagements, the destruction of the first Iraqi tanks did not result
in a mass surrender. The Iraqis suffered massive losses and lost dozens of tanks and
vehicles, while US casualties were comparatively low, with a single Bradley knocked out.
Coalition forces pressed another 10 km into Iraqi territory, and captured their objective
within three hours. They took 500 prisoners and inflicted heavy losses, defeating Iraq's
26th Infantry Division. A US soldier was killed by an Iraqi land mine, another five by
friendly fire, and 30 wounded during the battle. Meanwhile, British forces attacked
Iraq's Medina Division and a major Republican Guard logistics base. In nearly two
days of some of the war's most intense fighting, the British destroyed 40 enemy
tanks and captured a division commander.

Meanwhile, US forces attacked the village of Al Busayyah, meeting fierce resistance. The US
force destroyed military hardware and took prisoners, while suffering no casualties.

On 25 February 1991, Iraqi forces fired a Scud missile at an American barracks in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. The missile attack killed 28 US military personnel.

The coalition's advance was much swifter than US generals had expected. On 26 February,
Iraqi troops began retreating from Kuwait, after they had set 737 of its oil wells on fire.
A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq–Kuwait highway.
Although they were retreating, this convoy was bombed so extensively by coalition air
forces that it came to be known as the Highway of Death. Thousands of Iraqi troops were
killed. American, British, and French forces  continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces
over the border and back into Iraq,  eventually moving to within 240 km (150 mi) of
Baghdad, before withdrawing back to Iraq's border with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, on 28 February, President Bush
declared a ceasefire, and he also declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

End of active hostilities
In coalition-occupied Iraqi territory, a peace conference was held where a ceasefire agreement
was negotiated and signed by both sides. At the conference, Iraq was authorized to fly armed
helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the
damage done to civilian infrastructure. Soon after, these helicopters and much of Iraq's military
were used to fight an uprising in the south. The rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The
Voice of Free Iraq" on 2 February 1991, which was broadcast from a CIA-run radio station out
of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that
the rebellion was well supported, and that they would soon be liberated from Saddam.


In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they would support an uprising
to heart, and began fighting, hoping to trigger a coup d'état. However, when no US support
came, Iraqi generals remained loyal to Saddam and brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising.
Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Turkey and Kurdish areas of Iran. These events
later resulted in no-fly zones being established in northern and southern Iraq. In Kuwait, the
Emir was restored, and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000
people were expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians, because of PLO
support of Saddam. Yasser Arafat didn't apologize for his support of Iraq, but after his death,
the Fatah under Mahmoud Abbas' authority formally apologized in 2004.

There was some criticism of the Bush administration, as they chose to allow Saddam to remain
in power instead of pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their
co-written 1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft argued that such a
course would have fractured the alliance, and would have had many unnecessary political and
human costs associated with it.

In 1992, the US Defense Secretary during the war, Dick Cheney, made the same point:
I would guess if we had gone in there, we would still have forces in Baghdad today.
We'd be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out
and bring everybody home.

And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don't
think you could have done all of that without significant additional US casualties, and while
everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the
146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a cheap war.

And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam
[Hussein] worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right,
both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the
decision that we'd achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged
down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.

On 10 March 1991, 540,000 US troops began moving out of the Persian Gulf.

On 15 March 1991, the US-led coalition restored to power Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah,
the unelected authoritarian ruler of Kuwait. Kuwaiti democracy advocates had been calling
for restoration of Parliament that the Emir had suspended in 1986.