Vietnam War - 1971.02 Operation Lam Son 719

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The article is adapted from wiki
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lam_Son_719

Background
Between 1959 and 1970, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become the key logistical artery for PAVN
and the Viet Cong (VC), in their effort to conduct military operations to topple the U.S.-
supported government of South Vietnam and create a unified nation. Running from the
southwestern corner of North Vietnam through southeastern Laos and into the western
portions of South Vietnam, the trail system had been the target of continuous U.S. aerial
interdiction efforts that had begun in 1966. Only small-scale covert operations in support
of the air campaigns had, however, been conducted on the ground inside Laos to halt the
flow of men and supplies on the trail.

Since 1966, over 630,000 men, 100,000 tons of foodstuffs, 400,000 weapons, and 50,000
tons of ammunition had traveled through the maze of gravel and dirt roads, paths, and river
transportation systems that crisscrossed southeastern Laos. The trail also linked up with a
similar logistical system in neighboring Cambodia known as the Sihanouk Trail. However,
following the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970, the pro-American Lon Nol
regime had denied the use of the port of Sihanoukville to communist shipping. Strategically,
this was an enormous blow to the North Vietnamese effort, since 70 percent of all military
supplies that supported its effort in the far south had moved through the port.[18] A further
blow to the logistical system in Cambodia had come in the spring and summer of 1970,
when U.S. and ARVN forces had crossed the border and attacked PAVN/VC Base Areas
during the Cambodian Campaign.

With the partial destruction of the North Vietnamese logistical system in Cambodia, the U.S.
headquarters in Saigon determined that the time was propitious for a similar campaign in Laos.
If such an operation were to be carried out, the U.S. command believed, it would be best to
do it quickly, while American military assets were still available in South Vietnam. Such an
operation would create supply shortages that would be felt by PAVN/VC forces 12–18 months
later, as the last U.S. troops were leaving South Vietnam and thereby give the U.S. and its
ally a respite from a possible communist offensive in the northern provinces for one year,
possibly even two.

There were increasing signs of heavy communist logistical activity in southeastern Laos, activity
which heraOn 8 December 1970, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a
highly secret meeting was held at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam's (MACV) Saigon
headquarters to discuss the possibility of an ARVN cross-border attack into southeastern
Laos. According to General Creighton W. Abrams, the American commander in Vietnam, the
main impetus for the offensive came from Colonel Alexander M. Haig, an aide to National
Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger. MACV had been disturbed by intelligence
of a PAVN logistical build-up in southeastern Laos but was reluctant to let the ARVN go it alone
against the North Vietnamese. The group's findings were then sent on to the Joint
Chiefs in Washington, D.C. By mid-December, President Richard M. Nixon had also become
intrigued by possible offensive actions in Laos and had begun efforts to convince both General
Abrams and the members of his cabinet of the efficacy of a cross-border attack.
lded just such a North Vietnamese offensive. Communist offensives usually took
place near the conclusion of the Laotian dry season (from October through March) and, for
PAVN logistical forces, the push to move supplies through the system came during the
height of the season. One U.S. intelligence report estimated that 90 percent of PAVN materiel
coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was being funneled into the three northernmost
provinces of South Vietnam, indicating forward stockpiling in preparation for offensive
action. This build-up was alarming to both Washington and the American command,
and prompted the perceived necessity for a spoiling attack to derail future communist
objectives.

Planning
On 8 December 1970, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a highly secret
meeting was held at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam's (MACV) Saigon headquarters
to discuss the possibility of an ARVN cross-border attack into southeastern Laos. According to
General Creighton W. Abrams, the American commander in Vietnam, the main impetus for the
offensive came from Colonel Alexander M. Haig, an aide to National Security Advisor Dr. Henry
Kissinger. MACV had been disturbed by intelligence of a PAVN logistical build-up in southeastern
Laos but was reluctant to let the ARVN go it alone against the North Vietnamese. The group's
findings were then sent on to the Joint Chiefs in Washington, D.C. By mid-December, President
Richard M. Nixon had also become intrigued by possible offensive actions in Laos and had begun
efforts to convince both General Abrams and the members of his cabinet of the efficacy of a
cross-border attack.

Abrams felt that undue pressure was being exerted on Nixon by Haig, but Haig later wrote
that the military was lacking in enthusiasm for such an operation and that "prodded
remorselessly by Nixon and Kissinger, the Pentagon finally devised a plan" for the Laotian
operation. Other possible benefits which might accrue from such an operation were also
being discussed. Admiral John S. McCain Jr (CINCPAC) communicated with Admiral Thomas
Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that an offensive against the Ho Chi Minh Trail might
compel Prince Souvanna Phouma, prime minister of Laos, "to abandon the guise of neutrality
and enter the war openly." Although technically neutral, the Laotian government had allowed
the CIA and U.S. Air Force to conduct a covert war against an indigenous guerrilla insurgency
(the Pathet Lao), that was, in turn, heavily supported by regular North Vietnamese forces.

On 7 January 1971 MACV was authorized to begin detailed planning for an attack against
PAVN Base Areas 604 and 611. The task was given to the commander of XXIV Corps,
Lieutenant General James W. Sutherland, who had only nine days to submit it to MACV for
approval. The operation would consist of four phases. During the first phase U.S.
forces inside South Vietnam would seize the border approaches and conduct diversionary
operations. Next would come an ARVN armored/infantry attack along Route 9 toward the
Laotian town of Tchepone, the perceived nexus of Base Area 604. The village was estimated
to have had about 1,500 inhabitants in 1960; five years later, half of the residents had fled
due to war; Operation Lam Son 719 then destroyed the village and left it deserted.
This advance would be protected by a series of leap-frogging aerial infantry assaults to
cover the northern and southern flanks of the main column. During the third phase, search
and destroy operations within Base Area 604 would be carried out and finally, the South
Vietnamese force would retire either back along Route 9 or through Base Area 611 and exit
through the A Shau Valley.[20]:304 It was hoped that the force could remain in Laos until
the rainy season was underway at the beginning of May. U.S. planners had previously
estimated that such an operation would require the commitment of four U.S. divisions
(60,000 men), while Saigon would only commit a force half that size.

Because of the notorious laxity of the South Vietnamese military when it came to security
precautions and the uncanny ability of communist agents to uncover operational information,
the planning phase lasted only a few weeks and was divided between the American and
Vietnamese high commands. At the lower levels, it was limited to the intelligence
and operational staffs of ARVN's I Corps, under Lieutenant General Hoàng Xuân Lãm, who
was to command the operation, and the XXIV Corps, headed by General Sutherland. When
Lãm was finally briefed by MACV and the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff in Saigon,
his chief of operations was forbidden to attend the meeting, even though he had helped
to write the very plan under discussion. At this meeting, Lãm's operational area
was restricted to a corridor no wider than 15 miles (24 km) on either side of Route 9 and
a penetration no deeper than Tchepone.

Command, control, and coordination of the operation was going to be problematic, especially
in the highly politicized South Vietnamese command structure, where the support of key
political figures was of paramount importance in promotion to and retention of command
positions. Lieutenant General Lê Nguyên Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Corps commander
and protege of Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, whose troops were scheduled to participate
in the operation, actually outranked General Lãm, who had the support of President Nguyễn
Văn Thiệu. The same situation applied to Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống, commander of
ARVN Airborne forces also scheduled to participate in the operation. After the incursion began
, both men remained in Saigon and delegated their command authority to junior officers rather
than take orders from Lãm.This did not bode well for the success of the operation.

Individual units did not learn about their planned participation until 17 January. The Airborne
Division that was to lead the operation received no detailed plans until 2 February, less than
a week before the campaign was to begin. This was of crucial importance, since many
of the units, particularly the Airborne and the Marines, had worked as separate battalions and
brigades and had no experience maneuvering or cooperating in adjoining areas. According to
the assistant commander of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division, "Planning was rushed, handicapped
by security restrictions, and conducted separately and in isolation by the Vietnamese and the
Americans."

The U.S. portion of the operation was to bear the title Dewey Canyon II, named for Operation
Dewey Canyon conducted by U.S. Marines in the northwestern South Vietnam in 1969. It
was hoped that the reference to the previous operation would confuse Hanoi as to the actual
target of the proposed incursion. The ARVN's portion was given the title Lam Son 719, after
the village of Lam Son, birthplace of the legendary Vietnamese patriot Lê Lợi, who had
defeated an invading Chinese army in 1427. The numerical designation came from the
year, 1971, and the main axis of the attack, Route 9.

The decisions had been made at the highest levels and planning had been completed, but
valuable time had been lost. The South Vietnamese were about to begin their largest,
most complex, and most important operation of the war. The lack of time for adequate
planning and preparation, as well as the absence of any real questioning about military
realities and the capabilities of the ARVN were going to prove decisive.[4]:66 On 29 January
President Nixon gave his final approval for the operation. On the following day, Operation
Dewey Canyon II was under way.

Operations
Dewey Canyon II

Any offensive planning by the U.S. was, however, limited by the passage on 29 December
1970 of the Cooper-Church Amendment, which prohibited U.S. ground forces and advisors
from entering Laos. Dewey Canyon II would, therefore, be conducted within territorial South
Vietnam in order to reopen Route 9 all the way to the old Khe Sanh Combat Base, which had
been abandoned by U.S. forces in 1968. The base would be reopened and would then serve
as the logistical hub and airhead of the ARVN incursion. U.S. combat engineers were tasked
with clearing Route 9 and rehabilitating Khe Sanh while infantry and mechanized units secured
a line of communications along the length of the road. American artillery units would support
the ARVN effort within Laos from the South Vietnamese side of the border while Army l
ogisticians coordinated the entire supply effort for the South Vietnamese. Air support for
the incursion would be provided by the aircraft of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps, and U.S. Army aviation units were tasked with providing complete helicopter
support for the ARVN operation.

U.S. forces earmarked for these missions included: four battalions of the 108th Artillery Group;
two battalions of the 45th Engineer Group; the 101st Airborne Division; six battalions of the
101st Aviation Group; the 1st Brigade of the 5th (Mechanized) Infantry Division (reinforced b
y two mechanized, one cavalry, one tank, and one airmobile infantry battalions; and the two
battalions of the 11th Infantry Brigade of the 23rd Infantry Division.

On the morning of 30 January, armor/engineer elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
headed west on Route 9 while the brigade's infantry elements were helilifted directly into the Khe
Sanh area. By 5 February, Route 9 had been secured up to the Laotian frontier. Simultaneously,
the 101st Airborne Division began a feint into the A Shau Valley in order to draw PAVN attention
away from Khe Sanh. At the combat base, poor weather, obstacles, land mines, and unexploded
ordnance pushed the rehabilitation of the airstrip (estimated by U.S. engineers at four days) a
week behind schedule. As a response, a completely new airstrip had to be built and the first
aircraft arrived on 15 February.[20]:306 PAVN resistance was almost nonexistent and American
casualties were light; with no previous allied presence around Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese
had seen no need to maintain large forces in the area.[3]:82 However, General Sutherland
believed that the advance to Khe Sanh had been a race between American and PAVN forces,
and the U.S. had won.

In order to preserve the security of the upcoming South Vietnamese operation, General
Abrams had imposed a rare press embargo on the reporting of troop movements, but it
was to no avail. Communist and non-American news agencies released reports of the
build-up and even before the lifting of the embargo on 4 February, speculation concerning
the offensive was front page news in the U.S. As had been the case during the
Cambodian campaign, the government of Laos was not notified in advance of the intended
operation. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would learn of the invasion of the PAVN occupied
portions of his supposedly "neutral" nation only after it was under way.

Offensive
By early 1971, North Vietnamese troop strength in the Base Area 604 area was estimated by
U.S. intelligence at 22,000 men: 7,000 combat troops, 10,000 personnel in logistical and
support units, and 5,000 Pathet Lao, all under the command of the newly created 70th Front.
There were differing views on what the expected reaction of PAVN to the offensive might be.
General Abrams believed that unlike Cambodia, the North Vietnamese would stand and fight
for the Laotian Base Areas. As early as 11 December he had reported to Admiral McCain that:
strong infantry, armor, and artillery formations were in southern Laos...formidable air defenses
were deployed...the mountainous, jungle-covered terrain was an added liability. Natural clearings
for helicopter landing zones were scarce and likely to be heavily defended. The bulk of the
enemy's combat units were in the vicinity of Tchepone and PAVN could be expected to
defend his base areas and logistics centers against any allied operation.

A prescient CIA study released in December 1970 echoed Abrams' concerns and was supported
by a 21 January memorandum which "was remarkably accurate with respect to the nature,
pattern, and all-out intensity of [PAVN] reactions."

MACV intelligence, on the other hand was convinced that the incursion would be only lightly
opposed. Tactical air strikes and artillery preparations would neutralize the estimated 170 to
200 anti-aircraft artillery weapons believed to be in the area, and the threat posed by PAVN
armored units was considered minimal. North Vietnamese reinforcement capability was set at
14 days by two divisions north of the DMZ, and it was hoped that diversionary operations
would occupy them for the duration of the operation.[4]:72 Unfortunately, when North
Vietnamese reinforcements did arrive, they did not come from the north as expected, but
from Base Area 611 and the A Shau Valley to the south, where eight regiments, all
supported by organic artillery units, were within two weeks marching range.

The North Vietnamese were expecting some sort of operation as early as 26 January when
the text of an intercepted radio message read "It has been determined that the enemy may
strike into our cargo carrier system in order to cut it off...Prepare to mobilize and strike the
enemy hard. Be vigilant."

The tactical air strikes that were to precede the incursion and suppress known anti-aircraft
positions were suspended two days prior to the operation due to poor flying weather. After
a massive preliminary artillery bombardment and 11 B-52 Stratofortress missions, the
incursion began on 8 February, when a 4,000-man ARVN armor/infantry task force
consisting of the 3rd Armored Brigade and the 1st and 8th Airborne Battalions, advanced
west unopposed along Route 9. To cover the northern flank, ARVN Airborne and Ranger
elements were deployed to the north of the main advance. The 39th Ranger Battalion was
helilifted into a Landing Zone (LZ) known as Ranger North (16.744°N 106.493°E) while the
21st Ranger Battalion moved into Ranger South (16.736°N 106.472°E). These outposts
were to serve as tripwires for any communist advance into the zone of the ARVN incursion.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Airborne Battalion occupied Fire Support Base (FSB) 30 (16.696°N
106.486°E) while the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarters and the 3rd Airborne Battalion
went into FSB 31 (16.715°N 106.426°E). Troops of the 1st Infantry Division simultaneously
combat assaulted into LZs Blue, Don, White, and Brown and FSBs Hotel, Delta, and Delta 1,
covering the southern flank of the main advance.

The mission of the ARVN central column was to advance down the valley of the Se Pone
River, a relatively flat area of brush interspersed with patches of jungle and dominated by
heights to its north and the river and more mountains to the south. Almost immediately,
supporting helicopters began to take fire from the heights, which allowed PAVN gunners to
fire down on the aircraft from pre-registered machine gun and mortar positions. Making
matters worse for the advance, Route 9 was in poor condition, so poor in fact that only
tracked vehicles and jeeps could make the westward journey. This threw the burden of
reinforcement and resupply onto the aviation assets. The helicopter units then became
the essential mode of logistical support, a role that was made increasingly more
dangerous due to low cloud cover and incessant anti-aircraft fire.

The armored task force secured Route 9 all the way to Ban Dong (known to the Americans
as A Luoi), 20 kilometers inside Laos and approximately halfway to Tchepone. By 11
February A Luoi had become the central fire base and command center for the operation.
The plan then called for a quick ground thrust to secure the main objective, but South
Vietnamese forces had stalled at A Loui while awaiting orders to proceed from General Lãm.
Two days later, Generals Abrams and Sutherland flew to Lam's forward command post at
Đông Hà in order to speed up the timetable. At the meeting of the generals, it was instead
decided to extend the 1st Division's line of outposts south of Route 9 westward to cover
the projected advance. This would take an additional five days.

Back in Washington, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs tried to refute
claims by reporters that the South Vietnamese advance had stalled. At a press conference,
Laird claimed that the halt at A Luoi was simply a "pause" that was giving ARVN commanders
a chance to "watch and assess enemy movements...The operation is going according to
plan."

Response
Counteroffensive
The North Vietnamese response to the incursion was gradual. Hanoi's attention was riveted on
another diversionary maneuver being conducted by a U.S. naval task force off the coast of
the North Vietnam. This force conducted all of the maneuvers necessary for the carrying out
of an amphibious landing only 20 kilometers off the city of Vinh. Hanoi's preoccupation
with a possible invasion did not last long. Its B-70 Corps commanded three divisions in the
incursion area, the 304th, 308th and 320th. The 2nd Division had also moved up from the
south to the Tchepone area and then began to move east to meet the ARVN threat. By early
March, Hanoi had massed 36,000 troops in the area, outnumbering the South Vietnamese force
by two-to-one.

The method chosen by PAVN to defeat the invasion was to first isolate the northern firebases
by utilizing anti-aircraft artillery. The outposts would then be pounded by round-the-clock
mortar, artillery, and rocket fire. Although the ARVN firebases were themselves equipped with
artillery, their guns were quickly outranged by PAVN's Soviet-supplied 122mm and 130mm
pieces, which simply stood off and pounded the positions at will. The defensive edge that could
have been provided by the utilization of tactical B-52 bomber strikes was nullified by the close-in
tactics of the PAVN. Massed ground attacks, supported by artillery and armor, would
then finish the job.

As early as 18 February, PAVN forces had begun attacks by fire on bases Ranger North and
South. A UH-1H medevac helicopter from the 237th Medical Detachment was hit by PAVN fire
and crash-landed at Ranger North: two of its crew were rescued by another helicopter while
the crew chief Sp4c. Dennis J. Fuji was unable to reach the rescue helicopter due to fire and
stayed at the base to assist the Rangers, providing medical assistance and directing US airstrikes.
On 19 February, the attacks commenced against Ranger North conducted by the 102nd
Regiment, 308th Division, supported by Soviet-built PT-76 and T-54 tanks.The ARVN held
on tenaciously throughout the night. President Thieu, oblivious to the previous nights
attacks, and who was visiting I Corps headquarters at the time, advised General Lãm to
postpone the advance on Tchepone and to shift the focus of the operation toward the
southwest. By the afternoon of the 20th, the 39th Ranger Battalion had been reduced
from 500 to 323 men and its commander ordered a retreat toward Ranger South, six
kilometers away.[30] Fuji and several Rangers were evacuated by helicopter but it was
hit by PAVN fire and autorotated onto Ranger South. The crew was rescued but Fuji
was again stranded on the ground.[14]:133 Only 109 survivors reached Ranger South
by nightfall. Although more than 600 PAVN troops were estimated as killed during the
action, casualties in the three-day fight totaled 75 percent of the ARVN battalion.

North Vietnamese attention then shifted to Ranger South, where 400 ARVN troops, including
the 109 survivors of Ranger North, held the outpost for another two days before General
Lãm ordered them to fight their way five kilometers southeast to FSB 30. Fuji was e
vacuated from Ranger South on 22 February together with 122 wounded Rangers:
he would later be awarded the Silver Star, later upgraded to a Distinguished Service Cross.
Another casualty of the battle, although an indirect one, was South Vietnamese General
Đỗ Cao Trí, commander of III Corps and hero of the Cambodian campaign. Ordered by
President Thieu to take over for the outclassed Lãm, Trí died in a helicopter crash on 23
February while en route to his new command.

That same day FSB Hotel 2 (16.472°N 106.585°E), south of Route 9, also came under an
intense artillery/infantry attack. It was evacuated on the following day. FSB 31 was the next
ARVN position to fall under the hammer. Airborne Division commander General Đống had
opposed stationing his elite paratroopers in static defensive positions and felt that his men's
usual aggressiveness had been stifled.[4]:82 Vicious PAVN anti-aircraft fire made reinforcement
and resupply of the firebase impossible. General Đống then ordered elements of the 17th
Armored Squadron to advance north from A Luoi to reinforce the base. The armored force
never arrived, due to conflicting orders from Generals Lãm and Đống that halted the armored
advance several kilometers south of FSB 31.

On 25 February the PAVN deluged the base with artillery fire and then launched a
conventional armored/infantry assault. Smoke, dust and haze precluded observation by
an American forward air control (FAC) aircraft, which was flying above 4,000 feet (1,200 m)
to avoid anti-aircraft fire. When a U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom jet was shot down in the area,
the FAC left the area of the battle to direct a rescue effort for the downed aircraft crew, sealing
the fate of the base. Ironically, the two pilots were not recovered by the search and rescue
effort that had abandoned the firebase; instead, they wandered in the jungle for two more
days before being picked up.[3]:150 At a meeting held at Đông Hà between Generals
Sutherland and Đống, the Airborne commander railed against Lãm and the Americans for
not supporting his forces adequately. He was supported in his allegations by Colonel Arthur
Pence, the senior U.S. advisor to the Airborne Division. Sutherland, infuriated by Pence's
open support of Đống, relieved him of his duties. [3]:145–150 PAVN troops and tanks
then overran the position, capturing the ARVN brigade commander in the process.
FSB 31 was secured by the PAVN at an estimated cost of 250 killed, and 11 PT-76 and
T-54 tanks destroyed. The Airborne had suffered 155 killed and over 100 captured.

FSB 30 lasted only about one week longer. Although the steepness of the hill on which the
base was situated precluded armored attack, the PAVN artillery bombardment was very
effective. By 3 March, the base's six 105mm and six 155mm howitzers had been put out
of action. In an attempt to relieve the firebase, ARVN armor and infantry of the 17th Cavalry
moved out to save their comrades.

In the five days between 25 February, the day FSB 31 fell, and 1 March, three major
engagements took place. With the help of air strikes, ARVN destroyed 17 PT-76 and six
T-54 tanks at a loss of three of its five M41 tanks and 25 armored personnel carriers
(APC)s. On 3 March, the South Vietnamese column encountered a
PAVN battalion without supporting armor and, with the assistance of B-52 strikes,
killed 400 PAVN.

During each of the above mentioned attacks on the firebases and relief column, PAVN
forces suffered horrendous numbers of casualties from aircraft and armed helicopter
attacks, artillery bombardment, and small arms fire. In each instance, however, the
attacks were pressed home with a professional competence and determination that
both impressed and shocked those that observed them. William D. Morrow, Jr., an
advisor with the ARVN Airborne Division during the incursion, was succinct in his
appraisal of North Vietnamese forces – "they would have defeated any army that
tried the invasion."[21]:361 According to the official PAVN history, by March the
North Vietnamese had managed to amass three infantry divisions (2nd, 304th,
308th), the 64th Regiment of the 320th Division and two independent infantry
regiments (27th and 28th), eight regiments of artillery, three engineer regiments,
three tank battalions, six anti-aircraft battalions, and eight sapper battalions –
approximately 35,000 troops, in the battle area.

On to Tchepone
While the main South Vietnamese column stalled at A Luoi for three weeks and the Ranger
and Airborne elements were fighting for their lives, President Thieu and General Lãm decided
to launch a face-saving airborne assault on Tchepone itself. Although American leaders and
news correspondents had focused on the town as one of Lam Son 719's main objectives,
the PAVN logistical network actually bypassed the ruined town to the west. If South Vietnamese
forces could at least occupy Tchepone, however, Thieu would have a political excuse for
declaring "victory" and withdrawing his forces to South Vietnam.

There has been some historical speculation as to Thieu's original intentions for Lam Son 719.
Some believed that he may have originally ordered his commanders to halt the operation
when casualties reached 3,000 and that he had always wanted to pull out at the moment
of "victory", presumably the taking of Tchepone, in order to gain political capital for the
upcoming fall general and presidential elections. Regardless, the decision was
made to conduct the assault not with the armored task force, but with elements of the
1st Division. That meant that the occupation of the firebases south of Route 9 had to
be taken over by Marine Corps forces, which lost even more valuable time.

Both Abrams and Sutherland wanted the South Vietnamese to remain in Laos, reinforce the
embattled units, and fight a major battle then and there. General Alexander Haig, Nixon's
personal military adviser, visited Sutherland in the field and noted Washington's agreement
on this point as American fire support might not be available in some later battle, but the
Vietnamese were hesitant.

The assault began on 3 March, when elements of the 1st Division were helilifted into two
firebases (Lolo and Sophia) and LZ Liz, all south of Route 9. Eleven helicopters were shot
down and another 44 were damaged as they carried one battalion into FSB Lolo (16.615°N
106.338°E) Three days later, 276 UH-1 helicopters protected by Cobra gunships
and fighter aircraft, lifted the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Regiment from Khe Sanh
to Tchepone – the largest helicopter assault of the Vietnam War. Only one
helicopter was downed by anti-aircraft fire as the troops combat assaulted into LZ Hope,
four kilometers northeast of Tchepone. For two days the two battalions searched
Tchepone and the immediate vicinity, but found little but the bodies of PAVN soldiers
killed by air strikes. PAVN responded by increasing its daily artillery bombardments of the
firebases, notably Lolo and Hope.

Retreat

Their goal in Laos seemingly achieved, President Thieu and General Lãm ordered a
withdrawal of ARVN forces beginning on 9 March that was to continue through the
rest of the month, destroying Base Area 604 and any supplies discovered in their
path. General Abrams implored Thieu to reinforce the troops in Laos and that they
keep disrupting the area until the beginning of the rainy season. By the time this
request was made, South Vietnam possessed only one Marine brigade in its entire
national reserve. Thieu responded to Abrams by requesting that U.S. forces be
deployed to Laos, knowing that such an option was impossible.  The
battle was shifting to Hanoi's advantage. Anti-aircraft fire remained devastating
and the PAVN had no trouble resupplying or reinforcing their troops in the battle
area. As soon as it became evident that ARVN forces had begun a withdrawal, the
PAVN increased its efforts to destroy them before they could reach South Vietnam.
Anti-aircraft fire was increased to halt or slow helicopter resupply or evacuation efforts
, the undermanned firebases were attacked, and ARVN ground forces had to run a
gauntlet of ambushes along Route 9.

Only a well-disciplined and coordinated army could have executed an orderly withdrawal
in the face of such a determined enemy and the South Vietnamese force in Laos was
neither. The retreat quickly devolved into a rout. One by one, the isolated firebases
were closed out or overrun by the PAVN and each withdrawal was costly. On 21 March,
South Vietnamese Marines at FSB Delta (16.550°N 106.539°E), south of Route 9, came
under intense ground and artillery attacks. During an attempted extraction of the force,
seven helicopters were shot down and another 50 were damaged, ending the evacuation
attempt. The Marines finally broke out of the encirclement and marched to the
safety of FSB Hotel, which was then hastily abandoned. During the extraction of the 2nd
ARVN Regiment, 28 of the 40 helicopters participating were damaged.

The armored task force fared little better, losing many of its vehicles to breakdowns or
ambushes. During the retreat, the task force lost 60 percent of its tanks and half of its
APCs. It also abandoned 54 105mm and 28 155mm howitzers.[8]:271 This equipment
then had to be destroyed by U.S. aircraft in order to prevent its capture and reuse by
the PAVN. Covering the retreat on Route 9 was the 1st Armored Brigade, which had
been assigned to the ARVN Airborne Division. When informed by a prisoner that two
PAVN regiments waited in ambush ahead, the commander of the brigade, Colonel
Nguyen Trong Luat, notified General Đống of the situation. The Airborne commander
airmobiled forces in and cleared the road, but never bothered to inform Colonel Luat.
In order to avoid destruction on Route 9, Luat then ordered the column to abandon
the road only 5 miles (8.0 km) from the South Vietnamese border and plunged onto
a jungle trail looking for an unguarded way back.

The trail came to a dead end at the steep banks of the Se Pone River and the force was
trapped. The PAVN closed in and savage rearguard actions ensued. Two bulldozers were
finally helilifted into the ARVN perimeter to create a ford, and the survivors of the force
crossed into South Vietnam on 23 March. On the night of 23 March, a PAVN
sapper attack on Khe Sanh resulted in 3 Americans killed and several aircraft and 2
ammunition dumps destroyed, PAVN losses were 14 killed and 1 captured.[4]:96 By the
25th, 45 days after the beginning of the operation, the remainder of the South
Vietnamese force that had survived had left Laos. The forward base at Khe Sanh had
also come under increasing artillery bombardment and, by 6 April, it was abandoned
and Operation Lam Son 719 was over.

Aftermath
During a 7 April televised speech, President Nixon claimed that "Tonight I can report that
Vietnamization has succeeded." At Đông Hà, South Vietnam, President Thieu
addressed the survivors of the incursion and claimed that the operation in Laos was "the
biggest victory ever." Although Lam Son 719 had set back North Vietnamese logistical
operations in southeastern Laos, truck traffic on the trail system increased immediately
after the conclusion of the operation. Truck sightings in the Route 9 area reached 2,500 per
month post the offensive, numbers usually seen only during peak periods. The
American command's claims of success were more limited in scope: MACV claimed that 88
PAVN tanks had been destroyed during the operation (59 by tactical air power),
plus 670 anti-aircraft guns and 600 trucks. It also fully understood that the
operation had exposed grave deficiencies in South Vietnamese "planning, organization,
leadership, motivation, and operational expertise."

For the North Vietnamese, the Route 9 – Southern Laos Victory, was viewed as a complete
success. The military expansion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the west which had begun in 1970
at the expense of Laotian forces, was quickly accelerated. Laotian troops were soon
withdrawing toward the Mekong River and a logistical artery 60 miles (97 km) in width
was soon expanded to 90 miles (140 km). Another result of the operation was a firm
decision by the Politburo to launch a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam in
early 1972, paving the way for the Nguyễn Huệ Offensive, known in the west as the
Easter Offensive.

During Lam Son 719, the U.S. planners had believed that any North Vietnamese forces
that opposed the incursion would be caught in the open and decimated by the application
of American aerial might, either in the form of tactical airstrikes or airmobility, which would
provide ARVN troops with superior battlefield maneuvering capability. Firepower, as it
turned out, was decisive, but "it went in favor of the enemy... Airpower played an
important, but not decisive role, in that it prevented a defeat from becoming a disaster
that might have been so complete as to encourage the North Vietnamese army to
keep moving right into Quang Tri Province."

The number of helicopters destroyed or damaged during the operation shocked the
proponents of U.S. Army aviation and prompted a reevaluation of basic airmobile doctrine.
The 101st Airborne Division alone, for example, had 84 of its aircraft destroyed and another
430 damaged. During Lam Son 719 American helicopters had flown more than 160,000
sorties and 19 U.S. Army aviators had been killed, 59 were wounded, and 11 were missing
at its conclusion. South Vietnamese helicopters had flown an additional 5,500
missions. U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft had flown more than 8,000 sorties during the
incursion and had dropped 20,000 tons of bombs and napalm. B-52 bombers
had flown another 1,358 sorties and dropped 32,000 tons of ordnance. Seven U.S.
fixed-wing aircraft were shot down over southern Laos: six from the Air Force
(two dead/two missing) and one from the Navy (one aviator killed).

To supplement the withdraw phase
You can reference the article of
" LAM SON 719
by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh
Published by U.S. Army Center Of Military History "
Withdraw Phase
http://doanket.orgfree.com/lamso719/vsc-lamson6.html