Vietnam War ~ 1964.12 Battle of Binh Gia

admin

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Binh_Gia

Background

In 1964, the political establishment in South Vietnam was still in turmoil. Following the coup
that ousted Ngô Đình Diệm, the military situation quickly worsened as the VC gained
significant ground in the countryside because the Military Revolutionary Council which
governed South Vietnam, lacked direction both in terms of policy and planning, and lacked
political support from the population.[4] Furthermore, General Dương Văn Minh, as the
Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, and his civilian Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc
Thơ favoured a political resolution instead of using military force, which brought them into
conflict with the United States over the best strategy to fight the VC in South Vietnam.
As a result, both men became increasingly unpopular among the military generals who
held real political power in Saigon. On January 30, 1964, General Nguyễn Khánh
successfully ousted Dương Văn Minh from the Military Revolutionary Council without
firing a single shot. For much of the year, Khánh spent most of his efforts on
consolidating political power, instead of fighting the VC.

In contrast to the political unrest in Saigon, the Communist leadership in North Vietnam
and in the VC were far more concerned about the best strategy to fight the South
Vietnamese government and the Americans. While all leaders in Hanoi and in the VC
shared the same goal of eventual reunification of their homeland, different factions
within the Communist Party disagreed on the best method to achieve their desired
goal. Members of North Vietnam's Politburo were divided by the issues surrounding
the Soviet strategy of peaceful co-existence versus the Chinese strategy of
supporting national liberation movements in emerging countries. Despite
their differences of opinion, the Communist Party leadership ultimately made
preparations for armed struggle in South Vietnam. From Hanoi's perspective,
the military regime in Saigon was able to hold out because the Communist main
forces were still not ready to fight a conventional war, so North Vietnam must focus
on the development of its military force in the shortest period of time. In the
meantime, however, the war must be kept at its current level in order to prevent
the full involvement of the United States military.

On October 11, 1964, the VC was ordered to carry out a series of military operations as
part of the Communist winter-spring offensive. The VC Nam Bo (Mekong Delta) Regional
Command established a sub-command under the leadership of Trần Đình Xu,
with Nguyễn Hòa as the deputy commander, and Lê Trọng Tấn as the political
commissar. Their mission was to inflict damage on the regular units of the ARVN and
destroy the strategic hamlets constructed by the former Ngô Đình Diệm regime.
The VC identified the regions of Bình Long-Phước Long and Bà Rịa-Long Khánh,
along Route 14, as the main targets for their offensive. Meanwhile, the Central Military
Commission in Hanoi appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh as the commander of
North Vietnamese military operations in southern Vietnam. Other high-ranking officers
such as Major Generals Lê Trọng Tấn and Trần Độ, and Colonel Hoàng Cầm were
sent to South Vietnam to supervise the military build-up which would commence in
November 1964.

Prelude
In July 1964, the VC 271st and 272nd Regiments began moving into the provinces of Bình
Dương, Bình Long and Phước Long to carry out their mission. During the first phase of their
campaign, the VC regiments overran several strategic hamlets at Xan Sang, Cam Xe, Dong
Xa, and Thai Khai. Between August and September 1964, VC regiments executed deep
thrusts into Bình Dương and Châu Thành to apply additional pressure on South Vietnamese
outposts situated on Route 14. During the second phase of their campaign, the VC ambushed
two ARVN infantry companies and destroyed five armoured vehicles, which consisted of M24
Chaffee light tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers. The VC defeated regular ARVN
units at the strategic hamlets of Bình Mỹ and Bình Co.

Following the completion of the initial stages in their campaign, the VC forces were ordered
to regroup and prepare for the next offensive in the Long Khánh region. VC soldiers from
the two regiments were assembled in War Zone D, where they were trained to attack
well-fortified enemy strongholds. On November 20, 1964, the VC reached the Long
Khánh battlefield, having completed a 200 kilometres march from War Zone D.On the
battlefield the VC 186th Battalion (from Military Region 5), the 500th and 800th Battalions
(from Military Region 7), and the 445th Company also joined the offensive. To kick-start
their offensive in the Ba Ria-Long Khánh region, the VC selected Bình Giã as their next target.
Bình Giã was a small village located in Phước Tuy Province, about 67 kilometres away from
Saigon.

During the war about 6,000 people lived in Bình Giã, most of whom were staunchly anti-
communist. The inhabitants of Bình Giã were Roman Catholic refugees who had fled from
North Vietnam in 1954 during Operation Passage to Freedom because of fears of
Communist persecution.To prepare for their main battle, the VC 272nd Regiment
was ordered to block Inter-provincial Road No. 2 and 15, and destroy any South
Vietnamese units attempting to reach Bình Giã from the south-western flank of the
battlefield. In the days leading up to the battle, the VC often came out to harass the
local militia forces. On December 9, 1964, the 272nd Regiment destroyed an entire
ARVN mechanised rifle company along Inter-provincial Road No. 2, destroying 16
M-113 APCs. On December 17, the 272nd Regiment destroyed another six armoured
vehicles on Inter-provincial Road No. 15.







Battle
During the early hours of December 28, 1964, elements of the VC 271st Regiment and the
445th Company signaled their main attack on Bình Giã by penetrating the village's eastern
perimeter. There, they clashed with members of the South Vietnamese Popular Force
militiamen, which numbered about 65 personnel. The militia fighters proved no match for
the VC and their overwhelming firepower, so they quickly retreated into underground
bunkers, and called for help.Once the village was captured, Colonel Ta Minh Kham,
the VC regimental commander, established his command post in the main village church
and waited for fresh reinforcements, which came in the form of heavy mortars, machine
guns and recoilless rifles. To counter South Vietnamese helicopter assaults, Colonel
Kham's troops set up a network of defensive fortifications around the village, with trenches
and bunkers protected by land mines and barbed wire. The local Catholic priest, who was
also the village chief, sent a bicycle messenger out to the Bà Rịa district headquarters to
ask for a relief force.In response, the Bà Rịa district chief sent out elements of two
Ranger battalions to retake Bình Giã. On December 29, two companies of the ARVN 33rd
Ranger Battalion and a company from the 30th Ranger Battalion were airlifted into area
located west of Bình Giã, by helicopters from the U.S. 118th Aviation Company to face
an enemy force of unknown size.

As soon as the soldiers from the 30th and 33rd Ranger Battalions arrived at the landing zone,
they were quickly overwhelmed by the VC in a deadly ambush.





The entire 30th Ranger Battalion was then committed to join the attack, but they too did
not initially succeed in penetrating the strong VC defensive lines. Several more companies
of the Rangers then arrived for an attack from multiple directions. Two companies of the
33rd Ranger Battalion advanced from the northeast. One of them came to the outskirts
of the village, but was unable to break through the VC defenses. The other one, trying to
outflank the enemy,had been lured into a kill zone in open terrain and were quickly
obliterated in an ambush by the three VC battalions using heavy weapons. The two
companies suffered a 70 percent casualty rate, and survivors were forced to retreat to
the nearby Catholic church. The 30th Rangers had more success by assaulting from the
western direction and succeeded in fighting their way into the village, aided by local
residents. It however also suffered heavy losses, with the battalion commander and his
American adviser severely wounded.

The local civilians in Bình Giã retrieved weapons and ammunition from the dead Rangers,
and hid the wounded government soldiers from the VC. The 38th Ranger Battalion, on the
other hand, landed on the battlefield unopposed by the VC, and they immediately advanced
on Bình Giã from the south. Soldiers from the 38th Rangers spent the whole day fighting,
but they could not break through the VC defences to link up with the survivors hiding in the
church, and fell back after calling in mortar fire to decimate VC fighters moving to encircle them.











The morning of December 30, the 4th South Vietnamese Marine Battalion moved out to
Bien Hoa Air Base, waiting to be airlifted into the battlefield.[16] The 1/4th Marine Battalion
was the first unit to arrive on the outskirts of Bình Giã, but the 1st Company commander
decided to secure the landing zone, to wait for the rest of the battalion to arrive instead of
moving on to their objective. After the rest of the 4th Marine Battalion had arrived, they
marched towards the Catholic church to relieve the besieged Rangers. About one and a
half hours later, the 4th Marine Battalion linked up with the 30th, 33rd and 38th Ranger
Battalions, as the VC began withdrawing to the northeast. That afternoon the 4th Marine
Battalion recaptured the village,[16] but the VC was nowhere to be seen, as all their units
had withdrawn from the village during the previous night, linking with other VC elements in
the forest to attack the government relief forces. On the evening of December 30, the VC
returned to Bình Giã and attacked from the south-eastern perimeter of the village. The local
villagers, who discovered the approaching VC, immediately sounded the alarm to alert the
ARVN soldiers defending the village. The South Vietnamese were able to repel the VC, with
support from U.S. Army helicopter gunships flown out from Vung Tau airbase.






While pursuing the VC, a helicopter gunship from the U.S. 68th Assault Helicopter Company
was shot down and crashed in the Quảng Giao rubber plantation, about four kilometres away
from Bình Giã, killing four of its crewmen. On December 31, the U.S. Marines Advisory Group
sent a team of four personnel, led by Captain Donald Cook, to Bình Giã to observe conditions
on the battlefield. At the same time, the 4th Marine Battalion was ordered to locate the
crashed helicopter and recover the bodies of the dead American crewmen. Acting against
the advice of his American advisor, Major Nguyễn Văn Nho, commander of the 4th Marine
Battalion, sent his 2/4th Marine Battalion company out to the Quảng Giao rubber plantation.
Unknown to the 4th Marine Battalion, the VC 271st Regiment had assembled in the
plantation. About one hour after they had departed from the village of Bình Giã, the
commander of the 2/4th Marine Battalion reported via radio that his troops had found
the helicopter wreckage, and the bodies of four American crewmen.[16] Shortly
afterwards, the VC opened fire and the 2/4th Marine Battalion was forced to pull
back. In an attempt to save the 2nd Company, the entire 4th Marine Battalion was
sent out to confront the VC. As the lead element of the 4th Marine Battalion closed
in on the Quảng Giao plantation, they were hit by accurate VC artillery fire, which
was soon followed by repeated human wave attacks.[16] Having absorbed heavy
casualties from the VC's ambush, the 2/4th Marine Battalion had to fight their way
out of the plantation with their bayonets fixed. During the entire ordeal, the
company did not receive artillery support because the plantation was beyond the
range of 105mm artillery guns based in Phước Tuy and Bà Rịa. They however
escaped with the crucial support of the U.S. aircraft and helicopters whose rocket attacks
forced the enemy to pull back and halted their attempt at pursuit.







In the morning of December 31, the 4th Marine Battalion returned to the crash site with
the entire force and the American graves were located and their corpses were dug up. At
about 3 pm, a single U.S. helicopter arrived on the battlefield to evacuate the casualties, but
they only picked up the bodies of the four American crewmen, while South Vietnamese
casualties were forced to wait for another helicopter to arrive. At 4 pm, Major Nguyễn Văn
Nho ordered the 4th Marine Battalion to carry their casualties back to the village, instead of
continuing to wait for the helicopters. As the 4th Marine Battalion began their return march,
three VC battalions, with artillery support, suddenly attacked them from three directions.
The battalion's commanding and executive officers were immediately killed and air support
was not available. Two Marine companies managed to fight their way out of the ambush
and back to Bình Giã, but the third was overrun and almost completely wiped out. The
fourth company desperately held out at a hilltop against VC artillery barrages and large
infantry charges, before slipping out through the enemy positions at dawn. The 4th Marine
Battalion of 426 men lost a total of 117 soldiers killed, 71 wounded and 13 missing.
Among the casualties were 35 officers of the 4th Marine Battalion killed in action, and the
four American advisers attached to the unit were also wounded. Backed by U.S. Air
Force bombers, on January 1 three battalions of ARVN Airborne reinforcements arrived,
they were too late as most of the VC had already withdrawn from the battlefield.







Aftermath
The battle of Bình Giã reflected the VC's growing military strength and influence, especially
in the Mekong Delta region. It was the first time the VC launched a large-scale operation,
holding its ground and fighting for four days against government troops equipped with
armor, artillery and helicopters, and aided by U.S. air support and military advisers. The
VC demonstrated that, when well-supplied with military supplies from North Vietnam,
they had the ability to fight and inflict damage even on the best ARVN units.

The VC apparently suffered light casualties with only 32 soldiers officially confirmed killed,
and they did not leave a single casualty on the battlefield. In recognition of the 271st
Regiment's performance during the Bình Giã campaign, the VC High Command bestowed
the title 'Bình Giã Regiment' on the unit to honour their achievement. Following the Bình
Giã campaign, the VC went on to occupy Hoài Đức District and the strategic hamlets of
Đất Đỏ, Long Thành and Nhơn Trạch along Inter-provincial Road No. 2 and 15. They also
expanded the Hát Dịch base area, which was located in Bà Rịa and Bình Thuận Provinces,
to protect the important sea transportation routes used by the Vietnam People's Navy to
supply VC units around the regions of the Mekong River.

Unlike their adversaries, the South Vietnamese military suffered heavily in their attempts
to recapture the village of Bình Giã and secure the surrounding areas. The South
Vietnamese and their American allies lost the total of about 201 personnel killed in action,
192 wounded and 68 missing. In just four days of fighting, two of South Vietnam's elite
Ranger companies were destroyed and several others suffered heavy losses, while the 4th
Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting force. At that stage of the war,
Bình Giã was the worst defeat experienced by the South Vietnamese. Despite their losses,
the ARVN considered the battle as their victory and erected a monument at the site of the
battle to acknowledge the sacrifices of the soldiers who had fallen to retake Bình Giã.