1961~1975 Vietnam War (USA)

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The text contents is adapted form https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War

Kennedy's escalation, 1961–63

In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, Senator John F. Kennedy defeated incumbent Vice
President Richard Nixon. Although Eisenhower warned Kennedy about Laos and Vietnam,
Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights." In June 1961, he bitterly
disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna to discuss key
U.S.–Soviet issues. Only 16 months later, the Cuban Missile Crisis (16–28 October 1962)
played out on television worldwide. It was the closest the Cold War came to escalating into
a full-scale nuclear war, and the U.S. raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command
(SAC) forces to DEFCON 2.

The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy
inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, the U.S. had 50,000
troops based in South Korea, and Kennedy faced four crisis situations: the failure of the
Bay of Pigs Invasion that he had approved on April 4,[96] settlement negotiations between
the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement in May
("Kennedy sidestepped Laos, whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American
soldiers."), the construction of the Berlin Wall in August, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in
October. These crises made Kennedy believe that another failure on the part of the
United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S.
credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy was thus determined to "draw
a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. He told James Reston
of The New York Times immediately after his Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev,
"Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place."

Kennedy's policy toward South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diệm and his
forces had to ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the
deployment of American combat troops and observed that "to introduce U.S. forces
in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact,
would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military
consequences." The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor.
Poor leadership, corruption, and political promotions all played a part in weakening the
ARVN. The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. While
Hanoi's support for the Viet Cong played a role, South Vietnamese governmental
incompetence was at the core of the crisis.

One major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had
surpassed those of the United States. Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity
with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency
warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Although they
were originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional Soviet invasion of
Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the
Green Berets would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam.

Kennedy advisors Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow recommended that U.S. troops be sent
to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers.[100] Kennedy rejected the idea but
increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned
Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and
bleed as the French did."[101] By November 1963, there were 16,000 American military
personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was initiated in late 1961. This joint U.S.–South Vietnamese
program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. It was implemented
in early 1962 and involved some forced relocation, village internment, and segregation of
rural South Vietnamese into new communities where the peasantry would be isolated from
the Viet Cong. It was hoped these new communities would provide security for the peasants
and strengthen the tie between them and the central government. However, by November
1963 the program had waned, and it officially ended in 1964.

On 23 July 1962, fourteen nations, including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North
Vietnam and the United States, signed an agreement promising to respect the neutrality of
Laos.

Ousting and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm

The inept performance of the ARVN was exemplified by failed actions such as the Battle of
Ap Bac on 2 January 1963, in which a small band of Viet Cong won a battle against a much
larger and better-equipped South Vietnamese force, many of whose officers seemed
reluctant even to engage in combat.[102]:201–6 During the battle the South Vietnamese
had lost 83 soldiers, 5 US war helicopters that had been shot down by Vietcong forces, while
the Vietcong forces had lost only 18 soldiers. The ARVN forces were led by Diệm's most
trusted general, Huỳnh Văn Cao, commander of the IV Corps. Cao was a Catholic who had
been promoted due to religion and fidelity rather than skill, and his main job was to preserve
his forces to stave off coup attempts; he had earlier vomited during a communist attack.
Some policymakers in Washington began to conclude that Diệm was incapable of defeating
the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned
only with fending off coups and had become more paranoid after attempts in 1960 and
1962, which he partly attributed to U.S. encouragement. As Robert F. Kennedy noted,
"Diệm wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with ..."
Historian James Gibson summed up the situation:

Strategic hamlets had failed ... The South Vietnamese regime was incapable of winning the
peasantry because of its class base among landlords. Indeed, there was no longer a
'regime' in the sense of a relatively stable political alliance and functioning bureaucracy.
Instead, civil government and military operations had virtually ceased. The National Liberation
Front had made great progress and was close to declaring provisional revolutionary
governments in large areas.


Discontent with Diệm's policies exploded in May 1963 following the Huế Phật Đản shootings
of nine unarmed Buddhists who were protesting against the ban on displaying the Buddhist
flag on Vesak, the Buddha's birthday. This resulted in mass protests against discriminatory
policies that gave privileges to the Catholic Church and its adherents over the Buddhist
majority. Diệm's elder brother Ngô Đình Thục was the Archbishop of Huế and aggressively
blurred the separation between church and state. Thuc's anniversary celebrations shortly
before Vesak had been bankrolled by the government, and Vatican flags were displayed
prominently. There had also been reports of Buddhist pagodas being demolished by Catholic
paramilitaries throughout Diệm's rule. Diệm refused to make concessions to the Buddhist
majority or take responsibility for the deaths. On 21 August 1963, the ARVN Special Forces
of Colonel Lê Quang Tung, loyal to Diệm's younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu, raided pagodas
across Vietnam, causing widespread damage and destruction and leaving a death toll
estimated to range into the hundreds.

U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime change during the middle of 1963.
The United States Department of State was generally in favor of encouraging a coup, while
the Defense Department favored Diệm. Chief among the proposed changes was the removal
of Diệm's younger brother Nhu, who controlled the secret police and special forces, and was
seen as the man behind the Buddhist repression and more generally the architect of the Ngô
family's rule. This proposal was conveyed to the U.S. embassy in Saigon in Cable 243.

The CIA was in contact with generals planning to remove Diệm. They were told that the
United States would not oppose such a move nor punish the generals by cutting off aid.
President Diệm was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on 2 November
1963. When Kennedy was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that he "rushed from
the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face."[81]:326 Kennedy had not
anticipated Diệm's murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge,
invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge
informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war". Kennedy wrote
Lodge a letter congratulating him for "a fine job".

Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its
support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as
one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime
was viewed by the communists as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diệm,
his credentials as a nationalist (as Robert McNamara later reflected) had been impeccable.

U.S. military advisors were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces.
They were however criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency. The
Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification- which in this case was
defined as countering the growing threat of insurgency- and "winning over the
hearts and minds" of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was
hostile to any role for U.S. advisors other than conventional troop training.General
Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory
by Christmas 1963. The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet
Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily
increased the overall intensity of the effort".

Paramilitary officers from the CIA's Special Activities Division trained and led Hmong
tribesmen in Laos and into Vietnam. The indigenous forces numbered in the tens of
thousands and they conducted direct action missions, led by paramilitary officers,
against the Communist Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese supporters.
The CIA also ran the Phoenix Program and participated in Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MAC-V SOG), which was originally named
the Special Operations Group, but was changed for cover purposes.

Johnson's escalation, 1963–69
President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. Vice President Lyndon B.
Johnson had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam;[113][114] however,
upon becoming president, Johnson immediately focused on the war. On 24 November
1963, he said, "the battle against communism ... must be joined ... with strength and
determination."Johnson knew he had inherited a rapidly deteriorating situation in
South Vietnam, but he adhered to the widely accepted domino theory argument
for defending the South: Should they retreat or appease, either action would imperil
other nations beyond the conflict.

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader,
was made up of 12 members. This council was headed by General Dương Văn Minh,
whom Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy".
Lodge, frustrated by the end of the year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be
strong enough to get on top of things?" Minh's regime was overthrown in January 1964
by General Nguyễn Khánh. There was also persistent instability in the military,
however, as several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.

In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh
warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war
for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to
afternoon tea." Some have argued that the policy of North Vietnam was not to
topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.

Gulf of Tonkin incident
On 2 August 1964, USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast,
allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the
Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was reported two days later on USS Turner Joy
and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attacks were murky.
Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors
out there may have been shooting at flying fish."

An undated NSA publication declassified in 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4
August.

The second "attack" led to retaliatory air strikes, and prompted Congress to approve the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964. The resolution granted the president
power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression" and Johnson would rely on this as giving
him authority to expand the war. In the same month, Johnson pledged that he
was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by
the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".
A U.S. B-66 Destroyer and four F-105 Thunderchiefs dropping bombs on North Vietnam
during Operation Rolling Thunder

The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of
North Vietnam. Following an attack on a U.S. Army base in Pleiku on 7 February 1965,
a series of air strikes was initiated, Operation Flaming Dart, while Soviet Premier
Alexei Kosygin was on a state visit to North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder and
Operation Arc Light expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.
The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to
force North Vietnam to cease its support for the Viet Cong by threatening to destroy
North Vietnamese air defenses and industrial infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at
bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese. Between March 1965 and November
1968, Rolling Thunder deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.

Bombing of Laos
Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation
Barrel Roll, targeted different parts of the Viet Cong and PAVN infrastructure. These included
the Ho Chi Minh trail supply route, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The ostensibly
neutral Laos had become the scene of a civil war, pitting the Laotian government backed
by the US against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies.

Massive aerial bombardment against the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces were carried out by
the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and to deny the use of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs
on Laos, nearly equal to the 2.1 million tons of bombs the U.S. dropped on Europe and Asia
during all of World War II, making Laos the most heavily bombed country in history relative
to the size of its population.

The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the Viet Cong was never reached. The Chief
of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation
bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that "we're going to bomb them back into
the Stone Age".

The 1964 Offensive
Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Hanoi anticipated the arrival of US troops and began
expanding the Viet Cong, as well as sending increasing numbers of North Vietnamese
personnel southwards. At this phase they were outfitting the Viet Cong forces and standardising
their equipment with AK-47 rifles and other supplies, as well as forming the 9th Division.
"From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew
to about 100,000 at the end of 1964 ... Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose
from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."[106] The numbers for U.S. troops deployed
to Vietnam during the same period were much lower: 2,000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16,500
in 1964.[126] During this phase, the use of captured equipment decreased, while greater
numbers of ammunition and supplies were required to maintained regular units. Group 559
was tasked with expanding the Ho Chi Minh trail, in light of the near constant bombardment
by US warplanes. The war had begun to shift into the final, conventional warfare phase of
Hanoi's three-stage protracted warfare model. The Viet Cong was now tasked with destroying
the ARVN and capturing and holding areas; however, the Viet Cong was not yet strong
enough to assault major towns and cities.

In December 1964, ARVN forces had suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Bình Giã, in a battle
that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, the VC had utilised hit-and-run guerrilla tactics.
At Binh Gia, however, they had defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle and
remained in the field for four days.[128]:58 Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again
defeated in June 1965 at the Battle of Đồng Xoài.

American ground war
On 8 March 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were landed near Da Nang, South Vietnam.
This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly
supported the deployment. The Marines' initial assignment was the defense of Da Nang
Air Base. The first deployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200,000 by
December. The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare.
Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited
to a defensive mission.

General William Westmoreland informed Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., commander of U.S.
Pacific forces, that the situation was critical. He said, "I am convinced that U.S.
troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF
(Viet Cong)". With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive
departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By
ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended. Westmoreland
outlined a three-point plan to win the war:

    Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing
                  trend by the end of 1965.
    Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to
                  destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the
                  enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from
                  major populated areas.
    Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase
                  2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote
                  base areas.

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous
administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for
defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.
Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead
he emphasized continuity. The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were
locked in a cycle of escalation. The idea that the government of South Vietnam
could manage its own affairs was shelved. Westmoreland and McNamara
furthermore touted the body count system for gauging victory, a metric that would
later prove to be flawed.

Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand
and the Philippines6 all agreed to send troops. South Korea would later ask to join the
Many Flags program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably NATO
nations Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex search and destroy operations, designed to find enemy
forces, destroy them, and then withdraw, typically using helicopters. In November 1965, the
U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the Battle of Ia Drang.[137] The operation
was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ Boeing B-52
Stratofortress strategic bombers in a tactical support role.[32]:284–5 These tactics continued in
1966–67 with operations such as Masher, Thayer, Attleboro, Cedar Falls and Junction City.
However, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility.
By 1967, these operations had generated large-scale internal refugees, numbering nearly 2.1
million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during Operation
Masher alone, which was the largest search and destroy operation in the war up to that point.
Operation Masher would have negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the
province just four months after the operation ended.[139]:153–6 Despite the continual
conductance of major operations, which the Viet Cong and PAVN would typically evade, the
war was characterised by smaller-unit contacts or engagements.[140] Up to the war's end,
the Viet Cong and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, of which 80% were clear and
well-planned operations, and thus the PAVN/Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative despite
overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.[140] The PAVN/Viet Cong had furthermore
developed strategies capable of countering U.S. military doctrines and tactics (see NLF and
PAVN battle tactics).

The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound
effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Stanley Karnow
noted that "the main PX [Post Exchange], located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only
slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale's ..." A huge surge in corruption was
witnessed. Meanwhile, the one-year tour of duty of American soldiers deprived units of
experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for
one year 10 times." As a result, training programs were shortened.

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilise with the coming to power
of prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead chief of state, General Nguyễn Văn
Thiệu, in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. This ended a series of coups that had
happened more than once a year. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy,
after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Ky was supposed
to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thieu
outmanoeuvred and sidelined Ky by filling the ranks with generals from his faction.
Thieu was also accused of murdering Ky loyalists through contrived military accidents.
Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975, having won a one-candidate
election in 1971.

The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor" in its dealings
with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing
stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in
official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged,
a so-called credibility gap developed.espite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly
proclaiming victory was being achieved, with Westmoreland divulging that the "end is coming
into view", internal reports in the Pentagon Papers indicate that Viet Cong forces still
retained strategic initiative, and were able to control their losses widely, with 30% of all
engagements being Viet Cong attacks against static US positions, 23% being a VC/PAVN
ambush and encirclement, and just 5% of engagements being US forces attacking a Viet
Cong emplacement and 9% being a US ambush against Viet Cong/PAVN forces.

Types of Engagements, From Department of Defence Study 1967

TYPE OF ENGAGEMENTS IN COMBAT NARRATIVES	Percentage ofTotal Engagements	Notes
Hot Landing Zone. VC/PAVN Attacks U.S. Troops As They Deploy	12.5%	Planned VC/PAVN AttacksAre 66.2% Of All Engagements
Planned VC/PAVN Attack Against US Defensive Perimeter	30.4%
VC/PAVN Ambushes or Encircles A Moving US Unit	23.3%
Unplanned US Attacks On A VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter,Engagement A Virtual Surprise To US Commanders	12.5%	Defensive Posts Being Well Concealedor VC/PAVN Alerted or Anticipated
Planned US Attack Against KnownVC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter	5.4%	Planned US Attacks AgainstVC/PAVN Represent 14.3% Of All Engagements
US Forces Ambushes Moving VC/PAVN Units	8.9%
Chance Engagement, Neither Side Planned	7.1%

Tet Offensive

In late 1967, the PAVN lured American forces into the hinterlands at Đắk Tô and at the
Marine Khe Sanh combat base in Quảng Trị Province, where the U.S. engaged in a series
of battles known as The Hill Fights. These actions were part of a diversionary strategy
meant to draw US forces towards the Central Highlands. Preparations were
underway for the General Offensive, General Uprising, known as Tet Mau Than, or the
Tet Offensive, with the intention of Văn Tiến Dũng for forces to launch "direct attacks on
the American and puppet nerve centers—Saigon, Huế, Danang, all the cities, towns and
main bases..." Le Duan sought to placate critics of the ongoing stalemate by
planning a decisive victory.He reasoned that this could be achieved through
sparking a general uprising within the towns and citiesalong with mass defections
among ARVN units, who were on holiday leave during the truce period.

The Tet Offensive began on 30 January 1968, as over 100 cities were attacked by over
85,000 VC/PAVN troops, including assaults on key military installations, headquarters,
and government buildings and offices, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were initially shocked by the scale, intensity and
deliberative planning of the urban offensive, as infiltration of personnel and weapons
into the cities was accomplished covertly; the offensive constituted an intelligence
failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor. Most cities were recaptured within
weeks, except the former imperial capital of Huế in which PAVN/Viet Cong troops
captured most of the city and citadel except the headquarters of the 1st Division
and held on in the fighting for 26 days. During that time, they had
executed approximately 2,800 unarmed Huế civilians and foreigners they considered
to be enemy's spies.In the following Battle of Huế American forces
employed massive firepower that left 80 percent of the city in ruins. Further
north, at Quảng Trị City, the ARVN Airborne Division, the 1st Division and a regiment
of the US 1st Cavalry Division had managed to hold out and overcome an assault
intended to capture the city.[148]:[149]:104 In Saigon, Viet Cong/PAVN fighters
had captured areas in and around the city, attacking key installations and the
neighbourhood of Cholon before US and ARVN forces dislodged them after three weeks.
During one battle, Peter Arnett reported an infantry commander saying of the Battle
of Bến Tre (laid to rubble by U.S. attacks) that "it became necessary to destroy the
village in order to save it."

During the first month of the offensive, 1,100 Americans and other allied troops, 2,100
ARVN and 14,000 civilians were killed. By the end of the first offensive, after two
months, nearly 5,000 ARVN and over 4,000 U.S. forces had been killed, with total
wounded of 45,820, with the U.S. claiming the PAVN and Viet Cong suffered 17,000
killed and 32,000 total casualties including wounded. A month later a
second offensive known as the May Offensive was launched; although less widespread, it
demonstrated the Viet Cong were still capable of carrying out orchestrated nationwide
offensives.Two months later a third offensive was launched, the Phase III
Offensive. The PAVN's own official records of their losses across all three offensives was
45,267 killed and 111,179 total casualties. By then it had become the bloodiest
year of the war up to that point. The failure to spark a general uprising, and the fact
that no units within the ARVN defected, meant both war goals of Hanoi had fallen flat at
enormous costs.

Prior to Tet, in November 1967, Westmoreland had spearheaded a public relations
drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.
In a speech before the National Press Club he said a point in the war had been
reached "where the end comes into view."[156] Thus, the public was shocked and
confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by the Tet Offensive.
Public approval of his overall performance dropped from 48 percent to 36 percent,
and endorsement for the war effort fell from 40 percent to 26 percent."
The American public and media began to turn against Johnson as the three offensives
contradicted claims of progress made by the Johnson administration and the military.

On 10 May 1968, peace talks began between the United States and North Vietnam in
Paris. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the
bombing of North Vietnam. At the same time, Hanoi realized it could not achieve a
"total victory" and employed a strategy known as "talking while fighting, fighting
while talking", in which military offensives would occur concurrently with negotiations.


Johnson declined to run for re-election as his approval rating slumped from 48 to 36
percent. His escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps,
cost 30,000 American lives by that point and was regarded to have destroyed his
presidency. Refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was also seen as Johnson's
admission that the war was lost.[160] As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."

Vietnam was a major political issue during the United States presidential election in
1968. The election was won by Republican party candidate Richard Nixon who
claimed to have a secret plan to end the war.


At one point in 1968, Westmoreland considered the use of nuclear weapons in
Vietnam in a contingency plan codenamed Fracture Jaw, which was abandoned
when it became known to the White House. Westmoreland requested
200,000 additional troops, which was leaked to the media, and the subsequent
fallout combined with intelligence failures caused him to be removed from command
in March 1968, succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams.

Vietnamization, 1969–72

Nuclear threats and diplomacy
U.S. president Richard Nixon began troop withdrawals in 1969. His plan to build up the
ARVN so that it could take over the defense of South Vietnam became known as
"Vietnamization". As the PAVN/VC recovered from their 1968 losses and generally
avoided contact, Creighton Abrams conducted operations aimed at disrupting logistics,
with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. On 27 October
1969, Nixon had ordered a squadron of 18 B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons to race to
the border of Soviet airspace to convince the Soviet Union, in accord with the madman
theory, that he was capable of anything to end the Vietnam War. Nixon had
also sought détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China, which decreased
global tensions and led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers;
however, there was disappointment when both sides continued to supply the North
Vietnamese with aid.

Hanoi's war strategy
In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine. The failure of Tet in
sparking a popular uprising caused a shift in Hanoi's war strategy, and the Giáp-Chinh
"Northern-First" faction regained control over military affairs from the Lê Duẩn-Hoàng
Văn Thái "Southern-First" faction. An unconventional victory was sidelined
in favor of a strategy built on conventional victory through conquest.
Large-scale offensives were rolled back in favour of small-unit and sapper attacks as well
as targeting the pacification and Vietnamization strategy. In the two-year period
following Tet, the PAVN had begun its transformation from a fine light-infantry, limited
mobility force into a high-mobile and mechanised combined arms force.

U.S. domestic controversies
The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the United States. Nixon appealed to the
"silent majority" of Americans who he said supported the war without showing it in public.
But revelations of the My Lai Massacre,[32]:518–21 in which a U.S. Army unit raped and
killed civilians and the 1969 "Green Beret Affair", where eight Special Forces soldiers,
including the 5th Special Forces Group Commander, were arrested for the murder
of a suspected double agent,[166] provoked national and international outrage.

In 1971, the Pentagon Papers were leaked to The New York Times. The top-secret history
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a
long series of public deceptions on the part of the U.S. government. The Supreme Court
ruled that its publication was legal.

Collapsing U.S. morale
Following the Tet Offensive and the decreasing support among the U.S. public for the
war, U.S. forces began a period of morale collapse, disillusionment and disobedience.
At home, desertion rates quadrupled from 1966 levels. Among the enlisted, only
2.5% chose infantry combat positions in 1969–1970. ROTC enrollment decreased
from 191,749 in 1966 to 72,459 by 1971, and reached an all-time low of 33,220
in 1974, depriving U.S. forces of much-needed military leadership.

Open refusal to engage in patrols or carry out orders and disobedience began to emerge
during this period, with one notable case of an entire company refusing orders to engage
or carry out operations.[173] Unit cohesion began to dissipate and focused on minimising
contact with Viet Cong and PAVN.[169]: A practice known as "sand-bagging" started
occurring, where units ordered to go on patrol would go into the country-side, find a site
out of view from superiors and rest while radioing in false coordinates and unit reports.
Drug usage increased rapidly among U.S. forces during this period, as 30% of U.S.
troops engaged in regular usage of marijuana,[139]:407 while a House subcommittee
found 10-15% of U.S. troops in Vietnam regularly used high-grade heroin. From 1969
on, search-and-destroy operations became referred to as "search and evade" or "search
and avoid" operations, falsifying battle reports while avoiding guerrilla fighters. A total of
900 fragging an incidents were investigated, most occurring between 1969 and 1971.
In 1969 field-performance of the U.S. Forces was characterised by lowered morale, lack of
motivation, and poor leadership. The significant decline in U.S. morale was demonstrated
by the Battle of FSB Mary Ann, in which a sapper attack inflicted serious losses on the U.S.
defenders. William Westmoreland, no longer in command but tasked with investigation
of the failure, cited a clear dereliction of duty, lax defensive postures and lack of officers
in charge as its cause.

On the collapse of U.S. morale, historian Shelby Stanton wrote:

    In the last years of the Army's retreat, its remaining forces were relegated to static
security. The American Army's decline was readily apparent in this final stage. Racial
incidents, drug abuse, combat disobedience, and crime reflected growing idleness,
resentment, and frustration... the fatal handicaps of faulty campaign strategy,
incomplete wartime preparation, and the tardy, superficial attempts at Vietnamization.
An entire American army was sacrificed on the battlefield of Vietnam.

ARVN taking the lead and U.S. ground-force withdrawal
Beginning in 1970, American troops were withdrawn from border areas where most of
the fighting took place and instead redeployed along the coast and interior. US casualties
in 1970 were less than half of 1969 casualties after being relegated to less active combat.
At the same time that US forces were redeployed, the ARVN took over combat operations
throughout the country, with casualties double US casualties in 1969, and more than triple
US ones in 1970. In the post-Tet environment, membership in the South Vietnamese
Regional Force and Popular Force militias grew, and they were now more capable of
providing village security, which the Americans had not accomplished under Westmoreland.
In 1970 Nixon announced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops,
reducing the number of Americans to 265,500. By 1970 Viet Cong forces were
no longer southern-majority, as nearly 70% of units were northerners. Between
1969 and 1971 the Viet Cong and some PAVN units had reverted to small unit
tactics typical of 1967 and prior instead of nationwide grand offensives.: In 1971
Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers and U.S. troop count was further
reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February
1972. The United States also reduced support troops, and in March 1971 the 5th
Special Forces Group, the first American unit deployed to South Vietnam, withdrew to
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Cambodia
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed Cambodia neutral since 1955, but permitted
the PAVN/Viet Cong to use the port of Sihanoukville and the Sihanouk Trail. In March
1969 Nixon launched a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu,
against communist sanctuaries along the Cambodia/Vietnam border. Only five high-ranking
congressional officials were informed of Operation Menu.

In March 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by his pro-American prime minister
Lon Nol, who demanded that North Vietnamese troops leave Cambodia or face
military action. Lon Nol began rounding up Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia into
internment camps and massacring them, provoking harsh reactions from both
the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese government. North Vietnam
invaded Cambodia at the request of the Khmer Rouge following negotiations
with deputy leader Nuon Chea. In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese
forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam
by Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: "Nuon Chea has asked for help and
we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days." U.S. and ARVN force
s launched the Cambodian Campaign to attack PAVN and Viet Cong bases. A
counter-offensive later that year as part of Operation Chenla II by the PAVN
would recapture most of the border areas and decimate most of Lon Nol's forces.

The invasion of Cambodia sparked nationwide U.S. protests as Nixon had promised
to deescalate the American involvement. Four students were killed by National
Guardsmen in May 1970 during a protest at Kent State University in Ohio, which
provoked further public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident
by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, reinvigorating the
declining anti-war movement. The U.S. Air Force continued to heavily
bomb Cambodia in support of the Cambodian government as part of Operation
Freedom Deal.

Laos
Building up on the success of ARVN units in Cambodia, and further testing the Vietnamization
program, the ARVN were tasked to launch Operation Lam Son 719 in February 1971, the
first major ogroundperation aimed directly at attacking the Ho Chi Minh trail by attacking
the major crossroad of Tchepone. This offensive would also be the first time the PAVN
would field-test its combined arms force.: The first few days were considered a
success but the momentum had slowed after fierce resistance. Thiệu had halted the
general advance, leaving armoured divisions able to surround them.[187] Thieu had
ordered air assault troops to capture Tchepone and withdraw, despite facing
four-times larger numbers. During the withdrawal the PAVN counterattack had
forced a panicked rout. Half of the ARVN troops involved were either captured or
killed, half of the ARVN/US support helicopters were downed by anti-aircraft fire
and the operation was considered a fiasco, demonstrating operational deficiencies
still present within the ARVN. Nixon and Thieu had sought to use this
event to show-case victory simply by capturing Tchepone, and it was spun off
as an "operational success".

Easter Offensive and Paris Peace Accords, 1972
Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Offensive of 1972, a massive conventional
PAVN invasion of South Vietnam. The PAVN quickly overran the northern provinces and
in coordination with other forces attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country
in half. U.S. troop withdrawals continued, but American airpower responded, beginning
Operation Linebacker, and the offensive was halted.

The war was central to the 1972 U.S. presidential election as Nixon's opponent, George
McGovern, campaigned on immediate withdrawal. Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry
Kissinger, had continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's Lê Đức Thọ and on
October 1972 reached an agreement. President Thieu demanded changes to the peace
accord upon its discovery, and when North Vietnam went public with the agreement's
details, the Nixon administration claimed they were attempting to embarrass the
president. The negotiations became deadlocked when Hanoi demanded new changes.
To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table,
Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II, a massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
18–29 December 1972.[32]:649–63 Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the terms
of the agreement, threatening to conclude a bilateral peace deal and cut off American
aid while promising an air-response in case of invasion.

On 15 January 1973, all U.S. combat activities were suspended. Lê Đức Thọ and Henry
Kissinger, along with the PRG Foreign Minister Nguyễn Thị Bình and a reluctant President
Thiệu, signed the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973. This officially
ended direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, created a ceasefire between North
Vietnam/PRG and South Vietnam, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam under
the Geneva Conference of 1954, called for elections or a political settlement between
the PRG and South Vietnam, allowed 200,000 communist troops to remain in the
south, and agreed to a POW exchange. There was a sixty-day period for the total
withdrawal of U.S. forces. "This article", noted Peter Church, "proved… to be the only
one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out." All US forces personnel
were completely withdrawn by March 1973.

U.S. exit and final campaigns, 1973–75
In the lead-up to the ceasefire on 28 January, both sides attempted to maximize the
land and population under their control in a campaign known as the War of the flags,
fighting continued after the ceasefire, this time without US participation and continued
throughout the year. North Vietnam was allowed to continue supplying
troops in the South but only to the extent of replacing expended material. Later that
year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Kissinger and Thọ, but the North Vietnamese
negotiator declined it saying that a true peace did not yet exist.

On 15 March 1973, Nixon implied the US would intervene again militarily if the North
launched a full offensive and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger re-affirmed this
position during his June 1973 confirmation hearings. Public and congressional reaction
to Nixon's statement was unfavorable, prompting the U.S. Senate to pass the
Case–Church Amendment to prohibit any intervention.

PAVN/VC leaders expected the ceasefire terms would favor their side, but Saigon,
bolstered by a surge of U.S. aid received just before the ceasefire went into effect,
began to roll back the Viet Cong. The PAVN/VC responded with a new strategy
hammered out in a series of meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the
memoirs of Trần Văn Trà. With U.S. bombings suspended, work on
the Ho Chi Minh trail and other logistical structures could proceed unimpeded.
Logistics would be upgraded until the North was in a position to launch a massive
invasion of the South, projected for the 1975–76 dry season. Tra calculated that
this date would be Hanoi's last opportunity to strike before Saigon's army could
be fully trained. The PAVN/VC resumed offensive operations when the
dry season began in 1973, and by January 1974 had recaptured territory it lost
during the previous dry season.

Within South Vietnam, there was increasing chaos as the departure of the US military
and the global recession that followed the 1973 oil crisis compromised an economy
partly dependent on U.S. financial support and troop presence. After two clashes that
left 55 ARVN soldiers dead, President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974, that the
war had restarted and that the Paris Peace Accords were no longer in effect. This was
despite there being over 25,000 South Vietnamese casualties during the ceasefire
period.

The success of the 1973–74 dry season offensive inspired Trà to return to Hanoi in
October 1974 and plead for a larger offensive the next dry season. This time, Trà
could travel on a drivable highway with regular fueling stops, a vast change from the
days when the Ho Chi Minh trail was a dangerous mountain trek. Giáp, the
North Vietnamese defence minister, was reluctant to approve of Trà's plan since a
larger offensive might provoke U.S. reaction and interfere with the big push planned
for 1976. Trà appealed over Giáp's head to first secretary Lê Duẩn, who approved
of the operation. Trà's plan called for a limited offensive from Cambodia into Phước
Long Province. The strike was designed to solve local logistical problems, gauge the
reaction of South Vietnamese forces, and determine whether U.S. would return.

At the start of 1975, the South Vietnamese had three times as much artillery and twice
the number of tanks and armoured cars as the PAVN. They also had 1,400 aircraft and
a two-to-one numerical superiority in combat troops over the PAVN/VC.[190] However,
the rising oil prices meant that much of this could not be used, and the rushed nature of
Vietnamization, intended to cover the US retreat, saw a lack of spare parts, ground-crew
and maintenance personnel, rendering most of the equipment given inoperable.
Gerald Ford took over as U.S. president on 9 August 1974 after President Nixon
resigned due to the Watergate scandal and Congress cut financial aid to South
Vietnam from $1 billion a year to $700 million. Congress also voted in further restrictions
on funding to be phased in through 1975 and to culminate in a total cutoff in 1976.

On 13 December 1974, North Vietnamese forces attacked Phước Long. Phuoc Binh,
the provincial capital, fell on 6 January 1975. Ford desperately asked Congress for
funds to assist and re-supply the South before it was overrun. Congress refused.
The fall of Phuoc Binh and the lack of an American response left the South Vietnamese
elite demoralized.

The speed of this success led the Politburo to reassess its strategy. It was decided that
operations in the Central Highlands would be turned over to General Văn Tiến Dũng
and that Pleiku should be seized, if possible. Before he left for the South, Dũng was
addressed by Lê Duẩn: "Never have we had military and political conditions so
perfect or a strategic advantage as great as we have now."

Campaign 275

On 10 March 1975, General Dung launched Campaign 275, a limited offensive into the
Central Highlands, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. The target was Buôn Ma
Thuột, in Đắk Lắk Province. If the town could be taken, the provincial capital of Pleiku
and the road to the coast would be exposed for a planned campaign in 1976. The ARVN
proved incapable of resisting the onslaught, and its forces collapsed on 11 March. Once
again, Hanoi was surprised by the speed of their success. Dung now urged the Politburo
to allow him to seize Pleiku immediately and then turn his attention to Kon Tum. He
argued that with two months of good weather remaining until the onset of the monsoon,
it would be irresponsible to not take advantage of the situation.

President Thiệu, a former general, was fearful that his forces would be cut off in the
north by the attacking communists; Thieu ordered a retreat, which soon turned into
a bloody rout. While the bulk of ARVN forces attempted to flee, isolated units fought
desperately. ARVN general Phu abandoned Pleiku and Kon Tum and retreated toward
the coast, in what became known as the "column of tears".

On 20 March, Thieu reversed himself and ordered Huế, Vietnam's third-largest city,
be held at all costs, and then changed his policy several times. As the PAVN launched
their attack, panic set in, and ARVN resistance withered. On 22 March, the PAVN
opened the siege of Huế. Civilians flooded the airport and the docks hoping for any
mode of escape. As resistance in Huế collapsed, PAVN rockets rained down on Da
Nang and its airport. By 28 March 35,000 PAVN troops were poised to attack the
suburbs. By 30 March 100,000 leaderless ARVN troops surrendered as the PAVN
marched victoriously through Da Nang. With the fall of the city, the defense of
the Central Highlands and Northern provinces came to an end.

Final North Vietnamese offensive
With the northern half of the country under their control, the Politburo ordered General
Dung to launch the final offensive against Saigon. The operational plan for the Ho Chi
Minh Campaign called for the capture of Saigon before 1 May. Hanoi wished to avoid
the coming monsoon and prevent any redeployment of ARVN forces defending the
capital. Northern forces, their morale boosted by their recent victories, rolled on,
taking Nha Trang, Cam Ranh and Da Lat.

On 7 April, three PAVN divisions attacked Xuân Lộc, 40 miles (64 km) east of Saigon.
For two bloody weeks, severe fighting raged as the ARVN defenders made a last stand
to try to block the PAVN advance. On 21 April, however, the exhausted garrison was
ordered to withdraw towards Saigon. An embittered and tearful president
Thieu resigned on the same day, declaring that the United States had betrayed South
Vietnam. In a scathing attack, he suggested that Kissinger had tricked him into signing
the Paris peace agreement two years earlier, promising military aid that failed to
materialize. Having transferred power to Trần Văn Hương, he left for Taiwan on 25 April.
After having appealed unsuccessfully to Congress for $700 million in emergency aid for
South Vietnam President Ford had given a televised speech on 23 April, declaring an
end to the Vietnam War and all U.S. aid.

By the end of April, the ARVN had collapsed on all fronts except in the Mekong
Delta. Thousands of refugees streamed southward, ahead of the main communist
onslaught. On 27 April 100,000 PAVN troops encircled Saigon. The city was
defended by about 30,000 ARVN troops. To hasten a collapse and foment
panic, the PAVN shelled Tan Son Nhut Airport and forced its closure. With the
air exit closed, large numbers of civilians found that they had no way out.

Fall of Saigon
Chaos, unrest, and panic broke out as hysterical South Vietnamese officials and civilians
scrambled to leave Saigon. Martial law was declared. American helicopters began evacuating
South Vietnamese, U.S. and foreign nationals from various parts of the city and from the
U.S. embassy compound. Operation Frequent Wind had been delayed until the last possible
moment, because of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin's belief that Saigon could be held
and that a political settlement could be reached. Frequent Wind was the largest helicopter
evacuation in history. It began on 29 April, in an atmosphere of desperation, as hysterical
crowds of Vietnamese vied for limited space. Frequent Wind continued around the clock,
as PAVN tanks breached defenses on the outskirts of Saigon. In the early morning hours
of 30 April, the last U.S. Marines evacuated the embassy by helicopter, as civilians swamped
the perimeter and poured into the grounds.
Reunification parade following the Fall of Saigon, with the city being renamed Ho Chi Minh City

On 30 April 1975, PAVN troops entered the city of Saigon and quickly overcame all
resistance, capturing key buildings and installations. A tank from the 304th Division
crashed through the gates of the Independence Palace at 11:30 am local time and
the Viet Cong flag was raised above it. President Dương Văn Minh, who had succeeded
Huong two days earlier, surrendered to Colonel Bùi Tín.