1982 Falklands War

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1982 Falklands War
The text is adapted from wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War

British task force

The British government had no contingency plan for an invasion of the islands, and the
task force was rapidly put together from whatever vessels were available. The nuclear-
powered submarine Conqueror set sail from France on 4 April, whilst the two aircraft
carriers Invincible and Hermes, in the company of escort vessels, left Portsmouth only
a day later. On its return to Southampton from a world cruise on 7 April, the ocean liner
SS Canberra was requisitioned and set sail two days later with 3 Commando Brigade
aboard. The ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 2 was also requisitioned and left Southampton
on 12 May with 5th Infantry Brigade on board. The whole task force eventually comprised
127 ships: 43 Royal Navy vessels, 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and 62 merchant ships.


The retaking of the Falkland Islands was considered extremely difficult. The chances of
a British counter-invasion succeeding were assessed by the US Navy, according to historian
Arthur Herman, as "a military impossibility". Firstly, the British were significantly constrained
by the disparity in deployable air cover. The British had 42 aircraft (28 Sea Harriers and
14 Harrier GR.3s) available for air combat operations, against approximately 122 serviceable
jet fighters, of which about 50 were used as air superiority fighters and the remainder as
strike aircraft, in Argentina's air forces during the war. Crucially, the British lacked airborne
early warning and control (AEW) aircraft. Planning also considered the Argentine surface
fleet and the threat posed by Exocet-equipped vessels or the two Type 209 submarines.

By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up the airbase of RAF Ascension Island, co-located
with Wideawake Airfield on the mid-Atlantic British overseas territory of Ascension Island,
ncluding a sizeable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2
refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them.
Meanwhile, the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for active
service. A small force had already been sent south to recapture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft
of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. Several of these flights were
intercepted by Sea Harriers outside the British-imposed exclusion zone; the unarmed
707s were not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK
had not yet decided to commit itself to armed force. On 23 April, a Brazilian commercial
Douglas DC-10 from VARIG Airlines en route to South Africa was intercepted by British
Harriers who visually identified the civilian plane.

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on Santa Fe
The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan
RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and
Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for
an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was
the Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by
a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April.

The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with the southern hemisphere
autumn setting in—the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next
day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. On 23 April,
a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with Tidespring being withdrawn
to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed
in to attack.

On 25 April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South Georgia, the submarine ARA
Santa Fe was spotted on the surface by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from
HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth
launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland
Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed the submarine with its
pintle-mounted general purpose machine gun; the Wessex also fired on Santa Fe with
its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from
HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe
was damaged badly enough to prevent her from diving. The crew abandoned the
submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With Tidespring now far out to sea, and the Argentine forces augmented by the
submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make
a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British troops and a
naval bombardment demonstration by two Royal Navy vessels (Antrim and
Plymouth), the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message
sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform
Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia.
God Save the Queen." The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, broke the news to
the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news, and congratulate our forces
and the Marines!"

Black Buck raids
On 1 May British operations on the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack
(of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley. A Vulcan bomber from Ascension flew
on an 8,000-nautical-mile (15,000 km; 9,200 mi) round trip dropping conventional
bombs across the runway at Stanley and back to Ascension. The mission required
repeated refuelling, and required several Victor K2 tanker aircraft operating in concert,
including tanker-to-tanker refuelling. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult
to determine, and the raids consumed precious tanker resources from Ascension,
but also prevented Argentina from stationing fast jets on the islands.

Historian Lawrence Freedman, who was given access to official sources, comments
that the significance of the Vulcan raids remains controversial. Although taking
pressure off the small Sea Harrier force, the raids were costly and used a great deal
of resources. The single hit in the centre of the runway was probably the best that
could have been expected but it did reduce the capability of the runway to operate
fast jets and caused the Argentine air force to deploy Mirage III to defend the capital.
Argentine sources confirm that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw some
of its Mirage IIIs from Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. This
dissuasive effect was watered down when British officials made clear that there would
not be strikes on air bases in Argentina. The raids were later dismissed as
propaganda by Falklands veteran Commander Nigel Ward.

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two
anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation missiles.

Escalation of the air war
The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the
capital, Stanley, and even that was too short to support fast jets (although an arrestor
gear was fitted in April to support Skyhawks). Therefore, the Argentines were forced to
launch their major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their efforts at forward
staging, combat air patrols, and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter
time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly
British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4 Skyhawks, IAI Daggers,
English Electric Canberras, and Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief
that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section
of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences
near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly
boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against
modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late
pop up profile. Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE Sea Harriers
operating from HMS Invincible. A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.

Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron
and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude,
until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder
air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but was damaged and without enough fuel
to return to its mainland air base. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly
fire from the Argentine defenders.

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks
and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs
(without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British
Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadrón
Fénix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing
to attack the fleet. On one of these flights on 7 June, an Air Force Learjet 35A was shot
down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, the
highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.

Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black
Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence)
and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was
defended by a mixture of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (Franco-German Roland
and British Tigercat) and Swiss-built Oerlikon 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. Lockheed
Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted
out the wounded up until the end of the conflict.

The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was
intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when it was searching for the British fleet
north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to
airframe attrition.

Various options to attack the home base of the five Argentine Étendards at Río Grande
were examined and discounted (Operation Mikado), subsequently five Royal Navy
submarines lined up, submerged, on the edge of Argentina's 12-nautical-mile (22 km;
14 mi) territorial limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the British task force.

Sinking of ARA General Belgrano
Two British naval task forces (one of surface vessels and one of submarines) and the
Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands and soon came
into conflict. The first naval loss was the Second World War-vintage Argentine light
cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank
General Belgrano on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three members of General
Belgrano's crew died in the incident. More than 700 men were rescued from the open
ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. The losses from General Belgrano totalled
nearly half of the Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict and the loss of the ship
hardened the stance of the Argentine government.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking—including disagreement about the exact
nature of the maritime exclusion zone and whether General Belgrano had been returning
to port at the time of the sinking—it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the
Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of the
diesel-powered submarine ARA San Luis,[70] returned to port and did not leave again
during the fighting. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the
aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct
threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.

However, settling the controversy in 2003, the ship's captain Hector Bonzo confirmed
that General Belgrano had actually been manoeuvering, not "sailing away" from the
exclusion zone, and had orders to sink "any British ship he could find". Further, Captain
Bonzo stated that any suggestion that HMS Conqueror's actions were a "betrayal" was
utterly wrong; rather, the submarine carried out its duties according to the accepted
rules of war.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat,
the ARA Alferez Sobral, that was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force Canberra
light bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy Lynx helicopters fired four Sea Skua
missiles at her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, Alferez Sobral managed to return
to Puerto Deseado two days later. The Canberra's crew were never found.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield
On 4 May, two days after the sinking of General Belgrano, the British lost the Type 42
destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike from the Argentine
2nd Naval Air Fighter/Attack Squadron.

Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range
radar and medium-high altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was
struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members and
severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours later, gutted
and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally
sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May.

The incident is described in detail by Admiral Sandy Woodward in his book One
Hundred Days, in Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding officer
of Sheffield. The destruction of Sheffield (the first Royal Navy ship sunk in action
since the Second World War) had a profound impact on the British public, bringing
home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual
"shooting war".

Diplomatic activity
The tempo of operations increased throughout the first half of May as the United
Nations' attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the Argentines. The final
British negotiating position was presented to Argentina by UN Secretary General
Pérez de Cuéllar on 18 May 1982. In it, the British abandoned their previous
"red-line" that British administration of the islands should be restored on the
withdrawal of Argentine forces, as supported by United Nations Security Council
Resolution 502.

Instead, it proposed a UN administrator should supervise the mutual withdrawal of both
Argentine and British forces, then govern the islands in consultation with the
representative institutions of the islands, including Argentines, although no Argentines
lived there. Reference to "self-determination" of the islanders was dropped and the
British proposed that future negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands should
be conducted by the UN.

Special forces operations
Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Étendard-Exocet combination, plans
were made to use C-130s to fly in some SAS troops to attack the home base of the five
Étendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The operation was codenamed "Mikado".
The operation was later scrapped, after acknowledging that its chances of success were
limited, and replaced with a plan to use the submarine HMS Onyx to drop SAS operatives
several miles offshore at night for them to make their way to the coast aboard rubber
inflatables and proceed to destroy Argentina's remaining Exocet stockpile.

An SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne
infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS
Invincible on the night of 17 May, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km)
from its target and the mission was aborted.[91] The pilot flew to Chile, landed south
of Punta Arenas, and dropped off the SAS team. The helicopter's crew of three then
destroyed the aircraft, surrendered to Chilean police on 25 May, and were repatriated
to the UK after interrogation. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted
considerable international attention. Meanwhile, the SAS team crossed the border
and penetrated into Argentina, but cancelled their mission after the Argentines
suspected an SAS operation and deployed some 2,000 troops to search for
them. The SAS men were able to return to Chile, and took a civilian flight back
to the UK.

On 14 May the SAS carried out a raid on Pebble Island on the Falklands, where the
Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airstrip map for FMA IA 58 Pucará light
ground-attack aircraft and Beechcraft T-34 Mentors, which resulted in the
destruction of several aircraft.

Land battles

San Carlos – Bomb Alley

During the night of 21 May, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command
of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare – COMAW) mounted
Operation Sutton, the amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water,
on the northwestern coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay,
known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by
low-flying Argentine jets.

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd Battalion,
Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando Royal
Marines from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach),
3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3 Para) from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid was
landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness was
landed at Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably, the waves of eight LCUs and eight LCVPs
were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who had commanded the Falklands
detachment NP8901 from March 1978 to 1979. 42 Commando on the ocean liner
SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers,
etc. and armoured reconnaissance vehicles were also put ashore with the landing
craft, the Round Table class LSL and mexeflote barges. Rapier missile launchers were
carried as underslung loads of Sea Kings for rapid deployment.

By dawn the next day, they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct
offensive operations. From there, Brigadier Julian Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin
and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley. Now, with the British troops on the
ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using
Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (14 June).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the
sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 24 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyor
(struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters,
runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters
being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistical perspective.

Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS
Broadsword after being ordered to act as a decoy to draw away Argentine aircraft from
other ships at San Carlos Bay.[95] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged.
However, many British ships escaped being sunk because of weaknesses of the Argentine
pilots' bombing tactics described below.

To avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots released
ordnance from very low altitude, and hence their bomb fuzes did not have sufficient
time to arm before impact. The low release of the retarded bombs (some of which
the British had sold to the Argentines years earlier) meant that many never exploded,
as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves.

A simple free-fall bomb in a low-altitude release impacts almost directly below the aircraft,
which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone of the explosion. A retarded bomb has
a small parachute or air brake that opens to reduce the speed of the bomb to produce
a safe horizontal separation between the bomb and the aircraft. The fuze for a retarded
bomb requires that the retarder be open a minimum time to ensure safe separation. The
pilots would have been aware of this—but due to the high concentration required to
avoid SAMs, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), and British Sea Harriers, many failed to climb to
the necessary release point. The Argentine forces solved the problem by fitting improvised
retarding devices, allowing the pilots to effectively employ low-level bombing attacks on
8 June.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blamed the
BBC World Service for disclosing information that led the Argentines to change the
retarding devices on the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations
after receiving a briefing on the matter from a Ministry of Defence official. He describes
the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with
the lives of British servicemen.[96] Colonel 'H'. Jones levelled similar accusations
against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green
by 2 Para.

Thirteen bombs hit British ships without detonating. Lord Craig, the retired
Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better fuses and
we would have lost" although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite
the failure of bombs to explode. The fuzes were functioning correctly, and the
bombs were simply released from too low an altitude. The Argentines
lost 22 aircraft in the attacks.

Goose Green
From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para (approximately 500 men), with naval gunfire
support from HMS Arrow[100] and artillery support from 8 Commando Battery, Royal
Artillery, approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green, which was held by the
Argentine 12th Infantry Regiment. After a tough struggle that lasted all night and into
the next day, the British won the battle; in all, 17 British and 47 Argentine soldiers were
killed. A total of 961 Argentine troops (including 202 Argentine Air Force personnel of
the Condor airfield) were taken prisoner.

The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it
had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones,
the commanding officer of 2 Para, was killed at the head of his battalion while charging
into the well-prepared Argentine positions. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria
Cross.

With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were
now able to break out of the San Carlos beachhead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and
3 Para started a loaded march across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of
Teal Inlet.

Special forces on Mount Kent
Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent.
Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down
the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 and 28 May they sent transport
aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd Command
o Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley. This
operation was known as Autoimpuesta ("Self-determination initiative").

For the next week, the SAS and the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) of 3
Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd
Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally second in Command of the 22nd
Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active
over Mount Kent. One of them, Harrier XZ963, flown by Squadron Leader Jerry Pook—in
responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes,
and that led to its loss through small-arms fire. Pook was subsequently awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross.

The Argentine Navy used their last AM39 Exocet missile attempting to attack HMS Invincible
on 30 May. There are Argentine claims that the missile struck; however, the British
have denied this, some citing that HMS Avenger shot it down. When Invincible
returned to the UK after the war, she showed no signs of missile damage.

On 31 May, the M&AWC defeated Argentine Special Forces at the skirmish at Top Malo
House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain José Vercesi's 1st
Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's
house at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and
then took refuge in a stream bed 200 metres (700 ft) from the burning house.
Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell
for 45 minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender.

Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side, there were two dead,
including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were posthumously
decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British
mopped up Top Malo House, Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol came down from
Malo Hill, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio
Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's
position.

601st Commando tried to move forward to rescue 602nd Commando Company on
Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando, they were engaged with L16 81mm
mortars and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. The leader of 602nd
Commando Company on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become
untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal.

The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position
and extract patrols; the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties.
At about 11:00 am on 30 May, an Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma helicopter was brought
down by a shoulder-launched FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the
SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent. Six Argentine National Gendarmerie Special Forces
were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.

As Brigadier Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views
expressed by Northwood HQ that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of
42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine
Special Forces would have caught the Commando before de-planing and, in the
darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on
men and helicopters."

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy
By 1 June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade,
the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient
force to start planning an offensive against Stanley. During this build-up, the Argentine
air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. Of the dead, 32 were from
the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram on 8 June. According to
Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men
suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon
Weston.

The Guards were sent to support an advance along the southern approach to Stanley.
On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of
Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered that
the area was clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the
one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para
ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement on Port
Fitzroy).

his uncoordinated advance caused great difficulties in planning for the commanders
of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with 30 miles (48 km) of
indefensible positions, strung along their southern flank. Support could not be sent by
air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers
could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by
sea.

Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June,
whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried
from San Carlos Water in the Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing
platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid was planned to stay
one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible, leaving the next
evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day,
after which Sir Tristram would be left to unload using a Mexeflote (a powered raft)
for as long as it took to finish.

Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Commodore Clapp to alter
this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but with no suitable beaches to land
on, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated
operation across several nights with Intrepid and her sister ship Fearless sailing half-way
to dispatch their craft was devised.

The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards failed, possibly as they refused
to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and
landed directly at Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed
on the night of 6 June and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June. Anchored 1,200
feet (370 m) apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated
landing point.

The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to that point relatively quickly,
but confusion over the ordered disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going
direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting
that his troops should be ferried the far longer distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff
Cove. The alternative was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff
Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentine combat engineers) to their destination,
a journey of around seven miles (11 km).

On Sir Galahad's stern ramp there was an argument about what to do. The officers on
board were told that they could not sail to Bluff Cove that day. They were told that they
had to get their men off ship and onto the beach as soon as possible as the ships were
vulnerable to enemy aircraft. It would take 20 minutes to transport the men to shore
using the LCU and Mexeflote. They would then have the choice of walking the seven
miles to Bluff Cove or wait until dark to sail there. The officers on board said that they
would remain on board until dark and then sail. They refused to take their men off the
ship. They possibly doubted that the bridge had been repaired due to the presence
on board Sir Galahad of the Royal Engineer Troop whose job it was to repair the
bridge. The Welsh Guards were keen to rejoin the rest of their Battalion, who were
potentially facing the enemy without their support. They had also not seen any
enemy aircraft since landing at San Carlos and may have been overconfident in
the air defences. Ewen Southby-Tailyour gave a direct order for the men to leave
the ship and go to the beach; the order was ignored.

The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops directly to Bluff Cove
and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused an enormous
delay in unloading. This had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not
yet established their air defence, and still almost fully laden, the two LSLs in Port
Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentine A-4 Skyhawks.

The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the
world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage
showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning
landing ships.

British casualties were 48 killed and 115 wounded. Three Argentine pilots were
also killed. The air strike delayed the scheduled British ground attack on Stanley by
two days. Argentine General Mario Menéndez, commander of Argentine forces
in the Falklands, was told that 900 British soldiers had died. He expected that the
losses would cause enemy morale to drop and the British assault to stall.

Fall of Stanley
On the night of 11 June, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic
build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended
ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by
naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously attacked in the Battle of
Mount Harriet, Battle of Two Sisters, and Battle of Mount Longdon. Mount Harriet was
taken at a cost of 2 British and 18 Argentine soldiers. At Two Sisters, the British faced
both enemy resistance and friendly fire, but managed to capture their objectives. The
toughest battle was at Mount Longdon. British forces were bogged down by assault rifle,
mortar, machine gun, artillery fire, sniper fire, and ambushes. Despite this, the British
continued their advance.

During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS Glamorgan, straying too close to shore while
returning from the gun line, was struck by an improvised trailer-based Exocet MM38
launcher taken from the destroyer ARA Seguí by Argentine Navy technicians. On
the same day, Sergeant Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade
attack on an Argentine bunker, which earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After
a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The second phase of attacks began on the night of 13 June, and the momentum of
the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para, with light armour support from the Blues
and Royals, captured Wireless Ridge, with the loss of 3 British and 25 Argentine lives,
and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of
Mount Tumbledown, which cost 10 British and 30 Argentine lives.

With the last natural defence line at Mount Tumbledown breached, the Argentine town
defences of Stanley began to falter. In the morning gloom, one company commander
got lost and his junior officers became despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd
Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in
the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", but the entire company did nothing of
the kind.

A ceasefire was declared on 14 June and the commander of the Argentine garrison in
Stanley, Brigade General Mario Menéndez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore
the same day.

Recapture of South Sandwich Islands

On 20 June, the British retook the South Sandwich Islands, which involved accepting
the surrender of the Southern Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base, and
declared hostilities over. Argentina had established Corbeta Uruguay in 1976, but
prior to 1982 the United Kingdom had contested the existence of the Argentine
base only through diplomatic channels.