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1973 Yom Kippur War (Arab–Israeli War)

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Post time 2019-7-26 11:06:34 | Show all posts |Read mode
Yom Kippur War , Ramadan War, or October War, also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War,
was a war fought from October 6 to 25, 1973

This article is for strategy study purpose, want to use text contents and military situation maps to increase the
understanding of this war.


Text contents are from Wikipedia   (chapter 2 combat operations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War
The maps is adapted from Westpoint academy history department
https://westpoint.edu/academics/ ... nts/history/atlases



Sinai Front

The Sinai was once again the arena of conflict between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptians had prepared for an assault
across the canal and deployed five divisions totaling 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 guns and heavy mortars
for the onslaught. Facing them were 450 soldiers of the Jerusalem Brigade, spread out in 16 forts along the length of
the Canal. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of Sinai divided into three armored brigades, and only one of these
was deployed near the Canal when hostilities commenced.

Large bridgeheads were established on the east bank on October 6. Israeli armoured forces launched counterattacks
from October 6 to 8, but they were often piecemeal and inadequately supported and were beaten back principally by
Egyptians using portable anti-tank missiles. Between October 9 and October 12 the American response was a call for
cease-fire in place. The Egyptian units generally would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing the
protection of their surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, which were situated on the west bank of the canal. In the
Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummeled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt (and Syria) had heavily fortified
their side of the ceasefire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union, against which the Israeli Air Force
had no time to execute a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) operation due to the element of surprise.
Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see the
effectiveness of its air force curtailed in the initial phases of the conflict by the SAM presence.

On October 9, the IDF chose to concentrate its reserves and build up its supplies while the Egyptians remained on the
strategic defensive. Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full-scale resupply of arms to Israel. Short of supplies, the Israeli
government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on October 12 but Sadat refused. The Soviets started an
airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt. The American global interest was to prove that Soviet arms could not dictate the
outcome of the fighting, by supplying Israel. With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until Israeli
success on the battlefield might persuade the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end. It was
decided to counterattack once Egyptian armor attempted to expand the bridgehead beyond the protective SAM
umbrella. The riposte, codenamed Operation Gazelle, was launched on October 15. IDF forces spearheaded by Ariel
Sharon's division broke through the Tasa corridor and crossed the Suez Canal to the north of the Great Bitter Lake.

After intense fighting, the IDF progressed towards Cairo and advanced southwards on the east bank of the Great Bitter
Lake and in the southern extent of the canal right up to Port Suez. It was important for the Americans that the fighting
should be ended, when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self-esteem intact.
Hence they indicated an acceptance of Israeli advance while violating the ceasefire, but the U.S. did not permit the
destruction of the Egyptian 3rd army corps. Israeli progress towards Cairo was brought to a halt when the
ceasefire was declared on October 24.

Egyptian attack




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Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack by three armored divisions, the Egyptians had armed their
assault force with large numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons—rocket-propelled grenades and the less numerous
but more advanced Sagger guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks.
Each of the five infantry divisions that was to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43
grenades, and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion, as they would not have any armor support
for nearly 12 hours.

In addition, the Egyptians had built separate ramps at the crossing points, reaching as high as 21 metres (69 ft) to
counter the Israeli sand wall, provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and to counter the first Israeli armored
counterattacks. The scale and effectiveness of the Egyptian strategy of deploying these anti-tank weapons
coupled with the Israelis' inability to disrupt their use with close air support (due to the SAM shield) greatly contributed
to Israeli setbacks early in the war.

The Egyptian Army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of breaching the Israeli defenses. The Israelis
had built large 18 metre (59 foot) high sand walls with a 60 degree slope and reinforced with concrete at the water line.
Egyptian engineers initially experimented with explosive charges and bulldozers to clear the obstacles, before a junior
officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several
high pressure water cannons were imported from Britain and East Germany. The water cannons effectively breached
the sand walls using water from the canal.

At 2:00 pm on October 6, Operation Badr began with a large airstrike. More than 200 Egyptian aircraft conducted
simultaneous strikes against three airbases, Hawk missile batteries, three command centers, artillery positions, and
several radar installations. Airfields at Refidim and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of service, and damage
was inflicted on a Hawk battery at Ophir. The aerial assault was coupled with a barrage from more than 2,000
artillery pieces for a period of 53 minutes against the Bar Lev Line and rear area command posts and concentration
bases.

Author Andrew McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike negated the need for a second planned strike.
Egypt acknowledged the loss of 5 aircraft during the attack. Kenneth Pollack wrote that 18 Egyptian aircraft were
shot down, and that these losses prompted the cancellation of the second planned wave. In one notable
engagement during this period, a pair of Israeli F-4E Phantoms challenged 28 Egyptian MiGs over Sharm
el-Sheikh and within half an hour, shot down seven or eight MiGs with no losses. One of the Egyptian pilots killed
was Captain Atif Sadat, President Sadat's half-brother.

Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian Tupolev Tu-16 bombers attacked Israeli targets in the Sinai with Kelt missiles, while
another two Egyptian Tupolevs fired two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel. One missile was shot
down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter, and the second fell into the sea. The attack was an attempt to warn
Israel that Egypt could retaliate if it bombed targets deep in Egyptian territory.

Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry began crossing the canal in
twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what became known as The Crossing.
The Egyptians prevented Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceeded to attack the Israeli
fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall. The Israeli Air Force conduct
air interdiction operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but took losses from Egyptian SAM
batteries. The air attacks were ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when
hit.

Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was overwhelmed. According to
Shazly, within six hours, fifteen strongpoints had been captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometres
into the Sinai. Shazly's account was disputed by Kenneth Pollack, who noted that for the most part, the forts only
fell to repeated assaults by superior forces or prolonged sieges over many days. The northernmost
fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named 'Fort Budapest', withstood repeated assaults and remained in
Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges were laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable
and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at
20:30.

The Egyptians also attempted to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the
arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt met with disaster as the Israelis shot down up to twenty helicopters, inflicting
heavy casualties. Israeli Major General (res.) Chaim Herzog placed Egyptian helicopter losses at fourteen.
Other sources claim that "several" helicopters were downed with "total loss of life" and that the few commandos that
did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance". Kenneth Pollack asserted that
despite their heavy losses, the Egyptian commandos fought exceptionally hard and created considerable panic,
prompting the Israelis to take precautions that hindered their ability to concentrate on stopping the assault across
the canal.

Egyptian forces advanced approximately 4 to 5 km into the Sinai Desert with two armies (both corps-sized by western
standards, included the 2nd Infantry Division in the northern Second Army). By the following morning, some 850 tanks
had crossed the canal. In his account of the war, Saad El Shazly noted that by the morning of October 7, the
Egyptians had lost 280 soldiers and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed.

Most Israeli soldiers defending the Bar Lev Line were casualties, and some 200 were taken prisoner. In the subsequent
days, some defenders of the Bar Lev Line managed to break through Egyptian encirclement and return to their lines,
or were extracted during Israeli counterattacks that came later on. For the next several days, the Israeli Air Force
(IAF) played a minimal role in the fighting largely because it was needed to deal with the simultaneous, and ultimately
more threatening, Syrian invasion of the Golan Heights.

Egyptian forces then consolidated their initial positions. On October 7, the bridgeheads were enlarged an additional
4 km, at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacked the town
of El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya, engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there was conducted at
close quarters, and was sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians were forced to clear the town building by building.
By evening, most of the town was in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah was completely cleared by the next morning.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped on October 6 began encountering Israeli reserves the following
morning. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the commandos were at times successful in delaying the movement
of Israeli reserves to the front. These special operations often led to confusion and anxiety among Israeli commanders,
who commended the Egyptian commandos. This view was contradicted by another source that stated
that few commandos made it to their objectives, and were usually nothing more than a nuisance. According
to Abraham Rabinovich, only the commandos near Baluza and those blocking the road to Fort Budapest had
measurable successes. Of the 1,700 Egyptian commandos inserted behind Israeli lines during the war, 740 were
killed—many in downed helicopters—and 330 taken prisoner.

Failed Israeli counter-attack



On October 7, David Elazar visited Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only taken
the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—and met with Israeli commanders. The Israelis
planned a cautious counterattack for the following day by Abraham Adan's 162nd Armored Division. The same
day, the Israeli Air Force carried out Operation Tagar, aiming to neutralize Egyptian Air Force bases and its missile
defense shield.

Seven Egyptian airbases were damaged with the loss of two A-4 Skyhawks and their pilots. Two more planned
attacks were called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carried out
additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses.
Israeli jets had carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day, but the Egyptian
SAM shield inflicted heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses mounted to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an
unsustainable rate. The Israelis responded by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart Egyptian air defenses.

On October 8, after Elazar had left, Gonen changed the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports.
Adan's division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to
the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade
with an additional 44 tanks. The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints
opposite the city of Ismailia, against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks, which
were met by stiff resistance, the Israelis suffered heavy losses.

That afternoon, Egyptian forces advanced once more to deepen their bridgeheads, and as a result the Israelis lost
several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile. Towards nightfall, an
Egyptian counterattack was repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which
was led by General Ariel Sharon, who had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. Garwych,
citing Egyptian sources, documented Egyptian tank losses up to October 13 at 240.

Temporary stabilization

According to Herzog, by October 9 the front lines had stabilized. The Egyptians were unable to advance further,
and Egyptian armored attacks on October 9 and 10 were repulsed with heavy losses. However, this claim was
disputed by Shazly, who claimed that the Egyptians continued to advance and improve their positions well into
October 10. He pointed to one engagement, which involved elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, attached to
the 19th Division, which captured Ayoun Mousa, south of Suez.

The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launched a failed attack southward along the Gulf of Suez in the direction of
Ras Sudar. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the force was attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy
losses. Shazly cited this experience as a basis to resist pressure by Minister of War, General Ahmad Ismail
Ali to attack eastward toward the Mitla and Gidi Passes.

Between October 10 and 13, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable.
Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines.
Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed
by Israeli troops In one key engagement on October 13, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close
to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.

The Egyptian failed attack







General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover.
He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and
the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now
on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.

The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving
behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800–1,000 tanks
would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with the defense of these forces from
Israeli air attacks. Armored and mechanized units began the attack on October 14 with artillery support. They
were up against 700–750 Israeli tanks.

Preparatory to the tank attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the
Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still
bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were
unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the
armored attack. The Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of
maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli
defenses.

The Egyptian attack was decisively repelled. At least 250 Egyptian tanks and some 200 armored vehicles were
destroyed. Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000. Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit and all but six
of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service, while Israeli casualties numbered
665.

Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on October 14 against an Egyptian signals-intercept
site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during
the engagement.

Israel planned attack considerations








With the situation on the Syrian front stabilizing, the Israeli High Command agreed that the time was ripe for an Israeli
counterattack and strike across the canal.

General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. On October
9, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel Amnon Reshef's Brigade detected a gap between the Egyptian Second
and Third armies in this sector. According to General Gamasy, the gap had been detected by an American SR-71
spy plane. Chief of Staff Elazar and General Chaim Bar-Lev, who had by now replaced Gonen as Chief of Southern
Command, agreed that this was the ideal spot for a crossing. However, given the size of the Egyptian armored reserves,
the Israelis chose to wait for an opportunity that would allow them to reduce Egyptian armored strength before initiating
any crossing.

The opportunity arrived on October 12, when Israeli intelligence detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up
for a major armored thrust. This was precisely the moment the Israelis were waiting for. They could finally
utilize their advantages in speed, maneuver and tank gunnery, areas in which they excelled. Once Egyptian armored
strength was sufficiently degraded, the Israelis would commence their own canal crossing.

Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal







Israeli forces were by now pouring across the canal on two bridges, including one of indigenous design, and
motorized rafts. Israeli engineers under Brigadier-General Dan Even had worked under heavy Egyptian fire to
set up the bridges, and over 100 were killed and hundreds more wounded. The crossing was difficult
because of Egyptian artillery fire, though by 4:00 am, two of Adan's brigades were on the west bank of the
canal. On the morning of October 18, Sharon's forces on the west bank launched an offensive toward Ismailia,
slowly pushing back the Egyptian paratroop brigade occupying the sand rampart northward to enlarge the
bridgehead. Some of his units attempted to move west, but were stopped at the crossroads in Nefalia. Adan's
division rolled south toward Suez City while Magen's division pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya.
On October 19, one of Sharon's brigades continued to push the Egyptian paratroopers north towards Ismailia until
the Israelis were within 8 or 10 km (5 or 6 mi) of the city. Sharon hoped to seize the city and thereby sever the
logistical and supply lines for most of the Egyptian Second Army. Sharon's second brigade began to cross the canal.
The brigade's forward elements moved to the Abu Sultan Camp, from where they moved north to take Orcha,
an Egyptian logistics base defended by a commando battalion. Israeli infantrymen cleared the trenches and bunkers,
often engaging in hand-to-hand combat, as tanks moved alongside them and fired into the trench sections to their front.
The position was secured before nightfall. More than 300 Egyptians were killed and 50 taken prisoner, while the Israelis
lost 18 dead. The fall of Orcha caused the collapse of the Egyptian defensive line, allowing more Israeli troops to get
onto the sand rampart. There, they were able to fire in support of Israeli troops facing Missouri Ridge, an
Egyptian-occupied position on the Bar-Lev Line that could pose a threat to the Israeli crossing. On the same day,
Israeli paratroopers participating in Sharon's drive pushed the Egyptians back far enough for the Israeli bridges to be
out of sight of Egyptian artillery observers, though the Egyptians continued shelling the area.

As the Israelis pushed towards Ismailia, the Egyptians fought a delaying battle, falling into defensive positions further
north as they came under increasing pressure from the Israeli ground offensive, coupled with airstrikes. On October 21,
one of Sharon's brigades was occupying the city's outskirts, but facing fierce resistance from Egyptian paratroopers
and commandos. The same day, Sharon's last remaining unit on the east bank attacked Missouri Ridge. Shmuel Gonen
had demanded Sharon capture the position, and Sharon had reluctantly ordered the attack. The assault was preceded
by an air attack that caused hundreds of Egyptian soldiers to flee and thousands of others to dig in. One battalion then
attacked from the south, destroying 20 tanks and overrunning infantry positions before being halted by Sagger rockets
and minefields. Another battalion attacked from southwest, and was stopped by fortified infantry. The Israelis managed
to occupy one-third of Missouri Ridge. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan countermanded orders from Sharon's superiors
to continue the attack. However, the Israelis continued to expand their holdings on the east bank. According
to the Israelis, the IDF bridgehead was 40 km (25 mi) wide and 32 km (20 mi) deep by the end of October 21.

On October 22, Ismailia's Egyptian defenders were occupying their last line of defense, but managed to repel an Israeli
attempt to get behind Ismailia and encircle the city, then push some of Sharon's forward troops back to the Sweetwater
Canal. The Israeli advance on Ismailia had been stopped 10 km south of the city. Both sides had suffered heavy losses.

On the northern front, the Israelis also attacked Port Said, facing Egyptian troops and a 900-strong Tunisian unit, who
fought a defensive battle. The Egyptian government claimed that the city was repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets,
and that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded.

Adan and Magen moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, though they often
encountered determined Egyptian resistance, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Adan advanced
towards the Sweetwater Canal area, planning to break out into the surrounding desert and hit the Geneifa Hills,
where many SAM sites were located. Adan's three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the
Geneifa Hills, another along a parallel road south of them, and the third advancing towards Mina. Adan's brigades
met resistance from dug-in Egyptian forces in the Sweetwater Canal area's greenbelt. Adan's other brigades were
also held by a line of Egyptian military camps and installations. Adan was also harassed by the Egyptian Air Force.
The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. After being denied air support due
to the presence of two SAM batteries that had been brought forward, Adan sent two brigades to attack them. The
brigades slipped past the dug-in Egyptian infantry, moving out from the greenbelt for more than eight kilometres,
and fought off multiple Egyptian counterattacks. From a distance of four kilometres, they shelled and destroyed
the SAMs, allowing the IAF to provide Adan with close air support. Adan's troops advanced through the
greenbelt and fought their way to the Geneifa Hills, clashing with scattered Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and Palestinian
troops. The Israelis clashed with an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft and destroyed multiple SAM sites. Adan
also captured Fayid Airport, which was subsequently prepared by Israeli crews to serve as a supply base and to
fly out wounded soldiers.

16 kilometres (10 mi) west of the Bitter Lake, Colonel Natke Nir's brigade overran an Egyptian artillery brigade
that had been participating in the shelling of the Israeli bridgehead. Scores of Egyptian artillerymen were killed
and many more taken prisoner. Two Israeli soldiers were also killed, including the son of General Moshe Gidron.
Meanwhile, Magen's division moved west and then south, covering Adan's flank and eventually moving south of
Suez City to the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli advance southward reached Port Suez, on the southern boundary
of the Suez Canal.

The ceasefire and further battles


The United Nations Security Council passed (14–0) Resolution 338 calling for a ceasefire, largely negotiated between
the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called upon the belligerents to immediately cease all military activity.
The cease-fire was to come into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 pm Israeli time. Because this was after dark, it
was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed
to stop. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intimated to Prime Minister Meir that he would not object to
offensive action during the night before the ceasefire was to come into effect.

Several minutes before the ceasefire came into effect, three Scud missiles were fired at Israeli targets by either
Egyptian forces or Soviet personnel in Egypt. This was the first combat use of Scud missiles. One Scud targeted
the port of Arish and two targeted the Israeli bridgehead on the Suez Canal. One hit an Israeli supply convoy
and killed seven soldiers.When the time for the ceasefire arrived, Sharon's division had failed to capture
Ismailia and cut off the Second Army's supply lines, but Israeli forces were just a few hundred metres short
of their southern goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez.

Adan's drive south had left Israeli and Egyptian units scattered throughout the battlefield, with no clear lines between
them. As Egyptian and Israeli units tried to regroup, regular firefights broke out. During the night, Elazar reported
that the Egyptians were attacking in an attempt to regain land at various locations, and that nine Israeli tanks had
been destroyed. He asked permission from Dayan to respond to the attacks and Dayan agreed. Israel then resumed
its drive south.

It is unclear which side fired first but Israeli field commanders used the skirmishes as justification to resume
the attacks. When Sadat protested alleged Israeli truce violations, Israel said that Egyptian troops had fired first.
William B. Quandt noted that regardless of who fired the first post-ceasefire shot, it was the Israeli Army that was
advancing beyond the October 22 ceasefire lines.

Adan resumed his attack on October 23. Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the last ancillary road south
of the port of Suez, and encircled the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal. The Israelis then transported
enormous amounts of military equipment across the canal, which Egypt claimed was in violation of the ceasefire.
Egyptian aircraft launched repeated attacks in support of the Third Army, sometimes in groups of up to 30 planes,
but took severe losses.

Israeli armor and paratroopers also entered Suez in an attempt to capture the city, but they were confronted by
Egyptian soldiers and hastily raised local militia forces. They were surrounded, but towards night the Israeli forces
managed to extricate themselves. The Israelis had lost 80 dead and 120 wounded, with an unknown number of
Egyptian casualties, for no tactical gain (see Battle of Suez).

The next morning, October 23, a flurry of diplomatic activity occurred. Soviet reconnaissance flights had confirmed
that Israeli forces were moving south, and the Soviets accused the Israelis of treachery. Kissinger called Meir in an
effort to persuade her to withdraw a few hundred metres and she indicated that Israel's tactical position on the
ground had improved.

Egypt's trapped Third Army

Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter. Kissinger considered that the
situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United
States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the
United States to mediate the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted
tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a
UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their October 22 positions if they did not allow non-military
supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador
that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."

Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up
its defensive positions, to the surprise of many. According to Trevor N. Dupuy, the Israelis, Soviets and
Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and
he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty, and
according to David Elazar chief of Israeli headquarter staff on December 3, 1973: "As for the third army, in spite
of our encircling them they resisted and advanced to occupy in fact a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can
not say that we defeated or conquered them."

David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have
protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient
strength along the rest of the front.This assessment was challenged by Patrick Seale, who stated that the
Third Army was "on the brink of collapse". Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote
that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.

Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and
reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been
achieved within a very brief period. Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and
classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide". He further noted that, "the fate
of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops
every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."

Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with
support from the Israeli Navy. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers
assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third
and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city
was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the
outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders.

Post-war battles

On the morning of October 26, the Egyptian Third Army violated the ceasefire by attempting to break through the
surrounding Israeli forces. The attack was repulsed by Israeli air and ground forces. The Egyptians also made
minor gains in attacks against Sharon's forces in the Ismailia area. The Israelis reacted by bombing and shelling
priority targets in Egypt, including command posts and water reserves. The front was quieter in the Second
Army's sector in the northern canal area, where both sides generally respected the ceasefire.

Though most heavy fighting ended on October 28, the fighting never stopped until January 18, 1974. Israeli Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan stated that "The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not
the only characteristic of the situation between October 24, 1973 and January 18, 1974. This intermediate period
also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break
out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack Israeli units west of the canal from the direction
of Cairo. The other was to cut off the Israeli canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the
east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of Israeli forces, who were not well fortified and who
would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was
most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of
the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an
additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and
at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support."

The IDF acknowledged the loss of 14 soldiers during this postwar period. Egyptian losses were higher, especially in
the sector controlled by General Ariel Sharon, who ordered his troops to respond with massive firepower to any
Egyptian provocation. Some aerial battles took place, and the Israelis also shot down several helicopters
attempting to resupply the Third Army.

Final situation on the Egyptian front

By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and
occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal. They had also cut the Cairo-Suez road and encircled
the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Israelis had also taken many prisoners after Egyptian soldiers, including many
officers, began surrendering in masses towards the end of the war. The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the
east bank of the canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometres of the Sinai.One source estimated that the
Egyptians had 70,000 men, 720 tanks and 994 artillery pieces on the east bank of the canal. However, 30,000
to 45,000 of them were now encircled by the Israelis.

Despite Israel's tactical successes west of the canal, the Egyptian military was reformed and organized. Consequently,
according to Gamasy, the Israeli military position became "weak" for different reasons, "One, Israel now had a large
force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or
man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in
supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and
equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to
defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the
Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became
necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed
force-and consequently the country-mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the
ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this in total conflict with its military theories."
For those reasons and according to Dayan, "It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west
bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives." The Egyptian forces didn't pull to the west
and held onto their positions east of the canal controlling both shores of the Suez Canal. None of the Canal's main
cities were occupied by Israel; however, the city of Suez was surrounded.

Egypt wished to end the war when they realized that the IDF canal crossing offensive could result in a catastrophe.
The Egyptians' besieged Third Army could not hold on without supply. The Israeli Army advanced to 100 km
from Cairo, which worried Egypt. The Israeli army had open terrain and no opposition to advance further to
Cairo; had they done so, Sadat's rule might have ended.




Goland Front


Initial Syrian attacks








In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked two Israeli armored brigades, an infantry brigade, two paratrooper
battalions and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions (the 7th, 9th and 5th, with the 1st and 3rd in reserve)
and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, the Israeli brigades of some 3,000 troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery
pieces faced off against three infantry divisions with large armor components comprising 28,000 Syrian troops, 800
tanks and 600 artillery pieces. In addition, the Syrians deployed two armored divisions from the second day onwards.
To fight the opening phase of a possible battle, before reserves arrived, Israeli high command had conforming to
the original plan allocated a single armored brigade, the 188th, accepting a disparity in tank numbers of eighteen to
one. When the warning by King Hussein of an imminent Syrian attack was conveyed, Elazar at first only assigned two
additional tank companies from 7th Armored Brigade: "We'll have one hundred tanks against their eight hundred.
That ought to be enough". Eventually, his deputy, Israel Tal, ordered the entire 7th Armored Brigade to be
brought up. Efforts had been made to improve the Israeli defensive position. The "Purple Line" ran along a series
of low dormant volcanic cones, "tels", in the north and deep ravines in the south. It was covered by a continuous
tank ditch, bunker complexes and dense minefields. Directly west of this line a series of tank ramps were constructed:
earthen platforms on which a Centurion tank could position itself with only its upper turret and gun visible, offering a
substantial advantage when duelling the fully exposed enemy tanks.

The Syrians began their attack at 14:00 with an airstrike by about a hundred aircraft and a fifty-minute artillery
barrage. The two forward infantry brigades, with an organic tank battalion, of each of the three infantry divisions
then crossed the cease-fire lines, bypassing United Nations observer posts. They were covered by mobile anti-aircraft
batteries, and equipped with bulldozers to fill-in anti-tank ditches, bridge-layer tanks to overcome obstacles and
mine-clearance vehicles. These engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli tank gunners and took heavy
losses, but Syrian infantry at points demolished the tank ditch, allowing their armor to cross.

At 14:45, two hundred men from the Syrian 82nd Paratrooper Battalion descended on foot from Mount Hermon and
around 17:00 took the Israeli observation base on the southern slope, with its advanced surveillance equipment. A
small force dropped by four helicopters simultaneously placed itself on the access road south of the base.
Specialised intelligence personnel were captured. Made to believe that Israel had fallen, they disclosed much sensitive
information. A first Israeli attempt on 8 October to retake the base from the south was ambushed and beaten off with
heavy losses.

During the afternoon 7th Armored Brigade was still kept in reserve and the 188th Armored Brigade held the frontline
with only two tank battalions, the 74th in the north and the 53rd in the south. The northern battalion waged an
exemplary defensive battle against the forward brigades of the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, destroying fifty-nine
Syrian tanks for minimal losses. The southern battalion destroyed a similar number, but facing four Syrian tank
battalions from two divisions had a dozen of its own tanks knocked out. At bunker complex 111, opposite Kudne
in Syria, the defending company beat off "determined" and "bravely" pressed attacks by the Syrian 9th Infantry
Division; by nightfall it was reduced to three tanks, with only sixty-nine anti-tank rounds between them. Further
successful resistance by the southern battalion was contingent on reinforcements.

Direct operational command of the Golan had at first been given to the 188 AB commander, Yitzhak Ben-Shoham,
who ordered the 7th AB to concentrate at Wasset. The 7th AB commander, Avigdor Ben-Gal, resented obeying
an officer of equal rank and went to the Northern Command headquarters at Nafah, announcing he would place his
force in the northern sector at the "Quneitra Gap", a pass south of the Hermonit peak and the main access to the
Golan Heights from the east. Northern Command was in the process of moving their headquarters to Safed in Galilee
and the senior staff officers were absent at this moment, having expected the Syrian attack to start at 18:00.
Operations officer Lieutenant-Colonel Uri Simhoni therefore improvised an allocation of the tactical reserves,
thereby largely deciding the course of the battle. The Armored School Centurion Tank Battalion (71st TB) was
kept in general reserve. The 77th Tank Battalion of 7th AB was sent to Quneitra. Two companies of the 75th
Mechanised Infantry Battalion, arrived in the morning, of the same brigade were sent to the southern sector.
Also 82nd TB had to reinforce the south. However, Ben-Gal had split off a company of this battalion to serve
as a reserve for his own brigade. Another company, soon after arriving in the south, was ambushed by an
infiltrated Syrian commando force armed with Sagger missiles and almost entirely wiped out. As a result, effective
reinforcement of the southern Golan sector was limited to just a single tank company.

At 16:00, Yitzhak Hofi, head Northern Command, shortly visited Nafah and split command of the Golan front: the
north would be the responsibility of 7th AB, to which 53rd TB would be transferred. Command of 188th AB would
be limited to the south, taking over 82nd TB. The first wave of the Syrian offensive had failed to penetrate,
but at nightfall a second, larger, wave was launched. For this purpose each of the three infantry divisions, also
committing their organic mechanised brigade with forty tanks, had been reinforced by an armored brigade of
about ninety tanks. Two of these brigades were to attack the northern sector, four the southern sector.

Successful defense of the Quneitra Gap by the 7th Armored Brigade

Over four days of fighting, the 7th Armored Brigade in the north under Avigdor Ben-Gal managed to hold the rocky
hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah, inflicting heavy losses on the Syrians. In the
night of 6/7 October, it beat off an attack of the Syrian 78th Armoured Brigade, attached to the 7th Infantry Division.
On 7 October, 7th AB had to send part of its reserves to the collapsing southern sector. Replenishment from the
Nafah matériel stock became impossible. Syrian High Command, understanding that forcing the Quneitra Gap
would ensure a total victory on the Golan, decided to commit its strategic armored reserves. During the night of
7/8 October, the independent 81st Armored Brigade, equipped with modern T-62's and part of the presidential
guard, attacked but was beaten off. After this fight, the Israeli brigade would refer to the gap as the "Valley
of Tears". Syrian Brigadier-General Omar Abrash, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was killed on 8 October
when his command tank was hit as he was preparing an attempt by 121st Mechanised Brigade to bypass the gap
through a more southern route.

Having practiced on the Golan Heights numerous times, Israeli gunners made effective use of mobile artillery.
During night attacks, the Syrian tanks had the advantage of active illumination infrared night vision equipment,
which was not a standard Israeli equipment. The close distances during night engagements, negated the usual
Israeli superiority in long-range duels. 77th Tank Battalion commander Avigdor Kahalani in the Quneitra Gap
generally managed to hold a second tank ramp line.

In the afternoon of October 9, Syrian command committed the Republican Guard independent 70th Armored
Brigade, equipped with T-62's and BMP-1s. To hold the gap, 7th AB could by now muster only some two
dozen tanks, elements from the 77th, 74th, 82nd and 71st Tank Battalion. Israeli command had directed all reserves
to the threatened southern sector, trusting that the northern sector was secure. Fighting in daylight proved to be
advantageous to the Syrians: the better armored T-62's were hard to destroy at long range and their high-velocity
115 mm smoothbore guns were quite accurate at medium ranges, despite the lack of a rangefinder. Taking losses
and hit by an intense artillery barrage, the Israeli Centurions withdrew from their tank ramps. The situation was restored
by an ad hoc force of thirteen tanks formed by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan from repaired vehicles and stray crews.
The Syrians abandoned their last breakthrough attempt, having lost since 6 October some 260 tanks in the Quneitra
Gap.

Syrian breakthrough in the southern Golan

In the southern sector, the Israeli Barak Armored Brigade had to defend a much flatter terrain. It also faced
two-thirds of the Syrian second wave, while fielding at this time less than a third of the operational Israeli tanks.
Beside these objective draw-backs, it suffered from ineffective command. Ben-Shoham initially still had his headquarters
in Nafah, far from his sector. He did not realise a full war was in progress and tended to spread the 53rd TB platoons
along the entire line, to stop any Syrian incursion. Also, he failed to coordinate the deployment of 82nd TB and 53rd TB.
The commander of 53rd TB, Lieutenant-Colonel Oded Eres, sent the two arriving companies of 82nd TB to his right flank
and centre.No further reinforcement materialising, he urgently ordered the southern company to the north again;
it was ambushed on the way. His left flank at Kudne remained unreinforced, although the defending company had
increased the number of operational tanks to eight. This was the main axis of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division and its
commander, Colonel Hassan Tourkmani, ordered the remnants of an organic tank battalion to be sacrificed forcing the
minefield belt. Subsequently, the Syrian 51st Armored Brigade bypassed bunker complex 111 after dark. It then overran
the Israeli supply compound at the Hushniya cross-roads.Parts of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion had been
concentrated at Hushniya, but they did not consist of its two organic tank companies; they were M-113 units. Lacking
modern antitank weapons, Israeli infantry was ineffective at stopping Syrian armor. The 51st AB passing through
the Kudne/Rafid Gap turned northwest to move along the Petroleum Road or "Tapline Road", which provided a diagonal
route across the heights, running straight from Hushniya to Nafah, the Israeli Golan headquarters, in the rear of the
Quneitra Gap.

Israeli command was initially slow to realise that a breakthrough had taken place. Their main concern was that the
Syrians would occupy some forward bunker complex or settlement. The fact that the defending tank platoons
were still intact was seen as proof that the line had not been broken. Ben-Shoham around 18:30 moved his headquarters
to the south. Reports of Syrian radio traffic at Hushniya, of Israeli reserve tanks passing columns of Syrian tanks in the
dark and of enemy tanks moving at the rear of the observation post on Tel Saki, were dismissed by him as misidentifications.
Only when two tanks parked in the dark near his staff vehicles and were recognised for T-55s when hastily driving away
upon being hailed, he understood that a large Syrian tank unit had infiltrated his lines.

As a result, no regular units were directed to block a Syrian advance to Nafah. Ben-Shoham had ordered Lieutenant Zvika
Greengold, who, about to be trained as a tank company commander, had arrived at Nafah unattached to any combat unit,
to gather some crews and follow him to the south with a few tanks to take command of the bunker complex 111 and 112
tank forces which had lost all officers. Three miles south of Nafah base, Greengold was warned by a truck convoy that there
were Syrian tanks ahead. These belonged to the 452st Tank Battalion, hurrying north to surprise Nafah. Confronted at
short range with a first group of three T-55's, Greengold's Centurion destroyed them in quick succession. He then moved
parallel to the road to the south, hitting advancing Syrian tanks in the flank and destroying another ten until he approached
Hushniya. From this the commander of 452st TB, Major Farouk Ismail, concluded that he had been ambushed by a strong
Israeli tank unit and concentrated his remaining vehicles in a defensive position at Hushniya. Greengold decided not to
reveal how precarious the Israeli situation was, in radio contact with Ben-Shoham hiding the fact that his "Force Zvika"
consisted of only a single tank.

The next 9th Infantry Division unit to participate in the second wave, the 43rd Mechanised Infantry Brigade, entered the
Golan at Kudne, but then sharply turned to the right advancing over the lateral "Reshet" road behind the Purple Line in
the direction of Quneitra. Israeli 1st Infantry Brigade elements warned 7th Armored Brigade of the danger. Ben Gal then
released the 82nd TB company he had held back, commanded by Captain Meir "Tiger" Zamir, and sent it to the south to
cover his flank. Zamir ambushed the Syrian brigade; directing their fire with the xenon light projector on one of his tanks
his company destroyed a dozen vehicles. At dawn he surprised the enemy column from the rear and dispersed the
remnants of 43 MIB, having knocked-out all of its forty tanks.

Israeli strategic response


Around midnight, Hofi, at Safed, began to understand the magnitude of the Syrian breakthrough. He warned
chief-of-staff Elazar that the entire Golan might be lost. Overhearing this message, an alarmed Dayan decided to
personally visit the Northern Command headquarters. In the late night, Hofi informed Dayan that an estimated
three hundred Syrian tanks had entered the southern Golan. No reserves were available to stop a Syrian incursion
into Galilee. Visibly shaken by this news, the Israeli minister of defence ordered the Jordan bridges to be prepared for
detonation. Next, he contacted Benjamin Peled, commander of the Israeli Air Force. He shocked Peled by
announcing that the Third Temple was about to fall. The IAF had just made a successful start with Operation Tagar,
a very complex plan to neutralise the Egyptian AA-missile belt. Overruling objections by Peled, Dayan ordered to
immediately carry out Operation Doogman 5 instead, the destruction of the Syrian SAM-belt, to allow the IAF to halt
the Syrian advance. As there was no time to obtain recent information on the location of the batteries,
the attempt was a costly failure. The Israelis destroyed only one Syrian missile battery but lost six Phantom II aircraft.
As a result, the IAF was unable to make a significant contribution to the defensive battle on the Golan. Over both fronts
together, on 7 October only 129 bombardment sorties were flown. It also proved impossible to restart Tagar,
curtailing IAF operations on the Sinai front for the duration of the war.


Less pessimistic than Dayan, Elazar was not ready yet to abandon the Golan Heights. Israeli High Command
had a strategic reserve, consisting of the 146th Ugda that was earmarked for Central Command, controlling the
eastern border with Jordan. In the evening of 6 October, Elazar had considered sending this division to the collapsing
Sinai front in view of the initial defensive success at the Golan. The unexpected crisis led to an about-face. Priority
was given to the north because of its proximity to Israeli population centers as Tiberias, Safed, Haifa and Netanya.
Elazar ordered that, after mobilisation, the 146th Ugda was to reconquer the southern Golan. This division
would take some time to deploy. Some smaller units could be quickly mobilised to bolster the defenses. The Syrians
had expected it to take at least twenty-four hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, they began to
join the fight only nine hours after the war began, twelve hours after the start of the mobilisation. The Golan
position had been at only 80% of its planned strength for the defensive phase of a full war with Syria. Northern
Command had a headquarters reserve consisting of a unnumbered rapid deployment Centurion tank battalion. Also,
the 71st Mechanised Infantry Battalion, with two organic tank companies, of the 188th AB had not yet been activated.
During the night of 6/7 October, these two battalions were gradually brought up.

Around 01:00, 7 October, the 36th Ugda was activated as a divisional headquarters under Brigadier Rafael Eitan, to
take direct command of the northern front. The 7th AB did not have this division as its original destination. It
was an elite active General Headquarters reserve, moved from the Sinai to the Golan in reaction to the Syrian build-up.
Under the original mobilisation Plan Gir ("Chalk"), the 36th Ugda was to be expanded by the 179th Armored Brigade.
In the evening of 6 October, it was considered to send this brigade to the Sinai instead but this option was abandoned
after the Syrian breakthrough. To speed up the relocation of 7th AB to the north, this brigade had left its tanks at Tasa,
the main mobilisation complex of the Sinai, and used the stocked vehicles of the 179th AB to rebuild itself at Nafah. In
turn, the 179th AB began to mobilise in eastern Galilee, from the mobilisation complex at the foot of the Golan Heights,
using the stocked vehicles of the 164th Armoured Brigade. This latter brigade was earmarked for the 240th Ugda, a
division to be held in reserve. Assuming that a sustained Syrian offensive would have led to crippling Arab tank losses,
36th Ugda and 240th Ugda were in the prewar planning intended to execute an advance in the direction of Damascus,
Operation Ze'ev Aravot ("Desert Wolf"). All remaining stocked Centurions in the north were eventually used to rebuild
7th and 188th AB in the night of 9/10 October. The 164th AB was ultimately sent to the Sinai, to activate itself using
the old 7th AB matériel. Also the 679th Armored Brigade was intended to join the 240th Ugda and ordered to
mobilise at noon 6 October. Reservists of both brigades arriving at the Galilee army depots were quickly assigned
to tanks and sent to the front, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, machine guns to be
installed, or the tank guns to be calibrated, a time-consuming process known as bore-sighting. Elements of
such larger units were during 7 October fed into the battle piece-meal.

The collapse of the 188th Armored Brigade


The Syrian first and second wave had in total numbered about six hundred tanks, half of which had been lost by the
morning of 7 October. By this time, the Israelis had committed about 250 tanks to battle. Of the initially arriving
reserves, the 71 MIB was used to block an advance by the westernmost elements of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division
towards the Bnot Yaacov Bridge, the crucial connection between Galilee and Nafah. In the late evening of 6 October,
the NCTB advanced from Nafah towards Hushniya, attempting to seal the breakthrough point. The attack,
running into prepared positions occupied by a superior force of T-55s, was a dismal failure, leaving all of its
officers dead or wounded. Greengold incorporated the remnants of the unit into his "Force Zvika".

By the early morning of 7 October, all attempts to patch the breach in the main defensive line of the southern sector
became futile because also the center and right flank of the 188th AB had started to collapse. During the night,
it had largely managed to hold its ground against continuous attacks, inflicting severe losses on the Syrians with
accurate cannon fire, hoping to buy time for reserve forces to reach the front lines. Some tank crews sacrificed
themselves rather than voluntarily give ground. Gradually, the fighting subsided. Dawn revealed that
the Syrian 5th Infantry Division under the cover of darkness had at numerous points bridged the tank ditch and
cleared corridors through the minefield belt. The situation of 188th AB was rendered even more hazardous by the
presence in its rear of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division. It was decided to abandon the southern Golan. In the night,
many artillery and logistic units had already withdrawn, some slipping through the columns of 9th ID, others being
destroyed by them. Civilian Jewish settlements had been evacuated. The same now happened with most
fortifications, except bunker complex 116. Ben-Shoham with his staff outflanked the Syrian penetration
via a western route and reached the north. The 82nd TB company that had reinforced the center, commanded
by Eli Geva, had the previous evening destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks. It now successfully crossed the axis of
9th ID to the north. Of the originally thirty-six tanks of 53rd TB, twelve remained. Eres hid them in the crater of
Tel Faris, where a surveillance base was located. In the late evening of 7 October, he would successfully break out
to the west.

The Syrian 5th ID subsequently occupied the plateau of the southern Golan. Ben-Shoham tried to maintain a
foothold on the access roads by small groups of APCs manned by the 50th Paratrooper Battalion, but
these were easily brushed aside. The Syrian 47th Armored Brigade advanced along the escarpment to the north,
in the direction of the Bnot Yaacov Bridge. The 132nd Mechanised Infantry Brigade positioned itself east of El Al,
on the road along the Jordan border, running to the south of Lake Tiberias. Israeli General Dan Lener in the late
night activated the divisional headquarters of the 210th Ugda to take control over the sector between the lake
and the Bnot Yaacov Bridge but he had no regular units to hold this line. For the moment, he could do
little more than personally halt retreating troops and vehicles on the more southern Arik Bridge and send them
over the River Jordan again. Israeli command feared that the Syrians would quickly exploit this situation by
advancing into Galilee. Dayan in the morning of 7 October called Shalhevet Freier, the director-general of the
Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to a meeting with Golda Meir to discuss the possible arming of nuclear weapons.
Meir rejected this option. The Syrian mechanised brigades in this area did not continue the offensive but
began to entrench themselves in strong defensive positions. They had been forbidden by Al-Assad to approach
the River Jordan, for fear of triggering an Israeli nuclear response.


The original Syrian offensive plan Al-Aouda ("The Return"), devised by Major-General Adul Habeisi, had emphasized
the element of tactical surprise. It was known to the Syrians that the 188th AB normally rotated its two tank battalions
on the Purple Line, so that on any given moment just thirty-three tanks were guarding the tank ditch. Infiltrations by
commando teams armed with Saggers were planned to quickly isolate these ten tank platoons from reinforcement by
tactical reserves. Simultaneously, helicopter-borne commando attacks at the Jordan bridges, landing during
conditions of dusk to avoid the IAF, would isolate the Golan Heights from strategic reinforcements. Night attacks by
the three Syrian infantry divisions would then fragment the weakly-held forward Israeli defensive positions. To conclude
the operation and deter any Israeli attempt to reconquer the Golan, the Syrian 1st and 3rd Armored Division would
advance onto the plateau. This way, it was hoped to take the Golan within thirty hours. Coordination with Egypt
forced a change of plans. The Egyptians wanted hostilities to start at noon; in the end they agreed to a
compromise time of 14:00. The Syrian helicopter attacks were cancelled. Now uncertain of a successful
outcome, the Syrians became less committed to the attack. They decided to keep one armored division as a strategic
reserve, together with the two presidential guard independent armored brigades, which fielded the most modern tank
matériel.

Greengold fought running battles in this area with Syrian armor for twenty hours, sometimes with his single tank and
at other times as part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were knocked out. Greengold
suffered burn injuries, but stayed in action and repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected
direction to change the course of a skirmish. For his actions, he received Israel's highest decoration, the
Medal of Valor.

Brigade Commander Colonel Shoham was killed on the second day, along with his second-in-command and operations
officer, as the Syrians desperately tried to advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Nafah. At this point, the Barak Brigade
was no longer a cohesive force, although surviving tanks and crewmen continued fighting independently. The Syrians
were close to reaching the Israeli defenders at Nafah, yet stopped the advance on Nafah's fences at 1700; the pause
lasted all night, allowing Israeli forces to form a defensive line. It is surmised that the Syrians had calculated
estimated advances, and the commanders in the field did not want to diverge from the plan.

Israel retakes the southern Golan


The tide in the Golan began to turn as arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance. Beginning
on October 8, the Israelis began pushing the Syrians back towards the pre-war ceasefire lines, inflicting heavy tank
losses. Another Syrian attack north of Quneitra was repulsed. The tiny Golan Heights were too small to act as an
effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold
and was a crucial key in preventing the Syrians from bombarding the cities below. The Israelis, who had suffered heavy
casualties during the first three days of fighting, also began relying more heavily on artillery to dislodge the Syrians at
long-range.

On October 9, Syrian FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles struck the Israeli Air Force base of Ramat David, killing a
pilot and injuring several soldiers. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements. In retaliation, seven Israeli F-4 Phantoms
flew into Syria and struck the Syrian General Staff Headquarters in Damascus. The jets struck from Lebanese airspace
to avoid the heavily defended regions around the Golan Heights, attacking a Lebanese radar station along the way.
The upper floors of the Syrian GHQ and the Air Force Command were badly damaged. A Soviet cultural center, a
television station, and other nearby structures were also mistakenly hit. One Israeli Phantom was shot down.
The strike prompted the Syrians to transfer air defense units from the Golan Heights to the home front, allowing the
Israeli Air Force greater freedom of action.

On October 9, as the last Syrian units were being driven from the Golan Heights, the Syrians launched a counterattack
north of Quneitra. As part of the operation, they attempted to land heli-borne troops in the vicinity of El Rom. The
counterattack was repulsed, and four Syrian helicopters were shot down with total loss of life. By October 10,
the last Syrian unit in the central sector was pushed back across the Purple Line, the pre-war ceasefire line. After four
days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.

Israeli advance towards Damascus







A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the post-1967 border or to continue advancing into Syrian
territory. The Israeli High Command spent all of October 10 debating well into the night. Some favored disengagement,
which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had taken
place two days earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock
Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would
give Israel a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended.

        It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end
        with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political
        matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line. ... The attack would be launched tomorrow,
        Thursday, October 11.

On October 11, Israeli forces pushed into Syria and advanced towards Damascus along the Quneitra-Damascus road
until October 14, encountering stiff resistance by Syrian reservists in prepared defenses. Three Israeli divisions broke
the first and second defensive lines near Sasa, and conquered a further 50 square kilometres of territory in the Bashan
salient. From there, they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using M107 heavy artillery.

On October 12, Israeli paratroopers from the elite Sayeret Tzanhanim reconnaissance unit launched Operation Gown,
infiltrating deep into Syria and destroying a bridge in the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The operation
disrupted the flow of weapons and troops to Syria. During the operation, the paratroopers destroyed a number of
tank transports and killed several Syrian soldiers. There were no Israeli casualties.

As the Syrian position deteriorated, Jordan sent an expeditionary force into Syria. King Hussein, who had come under
intense pressure to enter the war, told Israel of his intentions through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that Israel would
accept that this was not a casus belli justifying an attack on Jordan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declined to
offer any such assurance, but said that Israel had no intention of opening another front. Iraq also sent an
expeditionary force to Syria, consisting of the 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions, some 30,000 men, 250–500 tanks,
and 700 APCs. Israeli jets attacked Iraqi forces as they arrived in Syria.

The Iraqi divisions were a strategic surprise for the IDF, which had expected 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of
such moves. This turned into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed southern flank of the
advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance units to retreat a few kilometres in order to prevent encirclement.
Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains. However, they were
unable to push the Israelis back from the Bashan salient, and suffered heavy losses in their engagements with
the Israelis. The most effective attack took place on October 20, though Arab forces lost 120 tanks in that
engagement.

The Syrian Air Force attacked Israeli columns, but its operations were highly limited because of Israeli air superiority,
and it suffered heavy losses in dogfights with Israeli jets. On October 23, a large air battle took place near Damascus
during which the Israelis shot down 10 Syrian aircraft. The Syrians claimed a similar toll against Israel. The IDF
also destroyed the Syrian missile defense system. The Israeli Air Force utilized its air superiority to attack strategic
targets throughout Syria, including important power plants, petrol supplies, bridges and main roads. The strikes
weakened the Syrian war effort, disrupted Soviet efforts to airlift military equipment into Syria, and disrupted
normal life inside the country.

On October 22, the Golani Brigade and Sayeret Matkal commandos recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after
a hard-fought battle that involved hand-to-hand combat and Syrian sniper attacks. An unsuccessful attack two weeks
prior had cost the Israelis 23 dead and 55 wounded and the Syrians 29 dead and 11 wounded, while this second attack
cost Israel an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded. An unknown number of Syrians were also killed and some were
taken prisoner. An IDF D9 bulldozer supported by infantry forced its way to the peak. An Israeli paratroop force landing
by helicopter took the corresponding Syrian Hermon outposts on the mountain, killing more than a dozen Syrians while
losing one dead and four wounded. Seven Syrian MiGs and two Syrian helicopters carrying reinforcements were shot
down as they attempted to intercede.

Northern front de-escalation

The Syrians prepared for a massive counteroffensive to drive Israeli forces out of Syria, scheduled for October 23. A
total of five Syrian divisions were to take part, alongside the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces. The Soviets
had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.

However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its ceasefire (following the acquiescence
of both Israel and Egypt). Abraham Rabinovich claimed that "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday
[October 22] created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored.
Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to
continue fighting as well ... Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy
the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might
northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus".

Ultimately, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad decided to cancel the offensive. On October 23, the day the offensive was
to begin, Syria announced that it had accepted the ceasefire, and ordered its troops to cease fire, while the Iraqi
government ordered its forces home.

Following the UN ceasefire, there were constant artillery exchanges and skirmishes, and Israeli forces continued to occupy
positions deep within Syria. According to Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam, Syria's constant artillery attacks
were "part of a deliberate war of attrition designed to paralyse the Israeli economy", and were intended to pressure Israel
into yielding the occupied territory. Some aerial engagements took place, and both sides lost several aircraft. In the
spring of 1974, the Syrians attempted to retake the summit of Mount Hermon. The fighting lasted for more than a month
and saw heavy losses on both sides, but the Israelis held their positions. The situation continued until a May 1974
disengagement agreement.

Jordanian participation

The U.S. pressed King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the war. Though King Hussein of Jordan initially refrained
from entering the conflict, on the night of October 12–13 Jordanian troops deployed to the Jordanian-Syrian frontier
to buttress Syrian troops, and Jordanian forces joined Syrian and Iraqi assaults on Israeli positions on October 16 and
October 19. Hussein sent a second brigade to the Golan front on October 21. According to historian Assaf David,
declassified U.S. documents show that the Jordanian participation was only a token to preserve King Hussein's status in
the Arab world. The documents reveal that Israel and Jordan had a tacit understanding that the Jordanian units
would try to stay out of the fighting and Israel would try to not attack them.

Final situation on the Syrian front


The Israeli Army advanced to a 40 km distance from Damascus from where they were able to shell the outskirts of
Damascus using M107 heavy artillery.

The war at sea

On the first day of the war, Egyptian missile boats bombarded the Sinai Mediterranean coast, targeting Rumana and
Ras Beyron, Ras Masala and Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Egyptian naval frogmen also raided
the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller.

The Battle of Latakia, between the Israeli and Syrian navies, took place on October 7, the second day of the war. Five
Israeli missile boats heading towards the Syrian port of Latakia, sank a Syrian torpedo boat and minesweeper before
encountering five Syrian missile boats. The Israelis used electronic countermeasures and chaff to evade Syrian missiles,
then sank all five Syrian missile boats. This revolutionary engagement, the first between missile boats using
surface-to-surface missiles, proved the potency of small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced ECM packages.
The battle also established the Israeli Navy, long derided as the "black sheep" of the Israeli military, as a formidable
and effective force in its own right. The port of Latakia was the site of another engagement between October 10–11,
when Israeli missile boats fired into the port, targeting two Syrian missile boats spotted maneuvering among merchant
ships. Both Syrian vessels were sunk, and two merchant ships were mistakenly hit and sunk.

October 7 also witnessed the Battle of Marsa Talamat. Two Israeli Dabur class patrol boats patrolling in the Gulf of Suez
encountered two Egyptian Zodiac boats loaded with Egyptian naval commandos as well as a patrol boat that was
backed up by coastal guns. The Israeli patrol boats sank both Zodiacs and the patrol boat, although both suffered
damage during the battle.

The Battle of Baltim, which took place on October 8–9 off the coast of Baltim and Damietta, ended in a decisive Israeli
victory. Six Israeli missile boats heading towards Port Said encountered four Egyptian missile boats coming from
Alexandria. In an engagement lasting about forty minutes, the Israelis evaded Egyptian Styx missiles using electronic
countermeasures and sank three of the Egyptian missile boats with Gabriel missiles and gunfire. The Battles of Latakia
and Baltim "drastically changed the operational situation at sea to Israeli advantage".

Five nights after the Battle of Baltim, five Israeli patrol boats entered the Egyptian anchorage at Ras Ghareb, where
over fifty Egyptian small patrol craft (including armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops,
ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf) were based. In the battle that followed, 19 Egyptian
boats were sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.

The Israeli Navy had control of the Gulf of Suez during the war, which made possible the continued deployment
of an Israeli SAM battery near an Israeli naval base close to the southern end of the Suez Canal, depriving the
Egyptian Third Army of air support and preventing it from moving southward and attempting to capture the
southern Sinai.

Israeli commandos from Shayetet 13, the Israeli Navy's elite special unit, infiltrated the Egyptian port of Hurghada
on the night of October 9–10 and sank a Komar-class missile boat after four previous attempts had failed. After
another infiltration attempt failed, the commandos successfully infiltrated Hurghada again on the night of October
21–22 and heavily damaged a missile boat with M72 LAW rockets. During one of the raids, the commandos also
blew up the port's main docking pier. On October 16, Shayetet 13 commandos infiltrated Port Said in two Hazir
mini-submarines to strike Egyptian naval targets. During the raid, the commandos sank a torpedo boat, a coast
guard boat, a tank landing craft, and a missile boat. Two frogmen went missing during the operation.
On October 18, Israeli frogmen set off an explosion that severed two underwater communications cables off Beirut,
one of which led to Alexandria and the other to Marseilles. As a result, telex and telecommunications between the
West and Syria were severed, and were not restored until the cables were repaired on October 27. The cables had
also been used by the Syrians and Egyptians to communicate with each other in preference to using radio, which
was monitored by Israeli, U.S. and Soviet intelligence. Egypt and Syria resorted to communicating via a Jordanian
radio station in Ajloun, bouncing the signals off a U.S. satellite.

On October 11, Israeli missile boats sank two Syrian missile boats in an engagement off Tartus. During the battle, a
Soviet merchant ship was hit by Israeli missiles and sank.

Having decisively beaten the Egyptian and Syrian navies, the Israeli Navy had the run of the coastlines. Israeli missile
boats utilized their 76 mm cannons and other armaments to strike targets along the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines,
including wharves, oil tank farms, coastal batteries, radar stations, airstrips, and other targets of military value. The
Israeli Navy even attacked some of Egypt's northernmost SAM batteries. The Israeli Navy's attacks were
carried out with minimal support from the Israeli Air Force (only one Arab naval target was destroyed from the air
during the entire war).

The Egyptian Navy managed to enforce a blockade at Bab-el-Mandeb. Eighteen million tons of oil had been transported
yearly from Iran to Israel through the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The blockade was enforced by two Egyptian destroyers
and two submarines, supported by ancillary craft. Shipping destined for Israel through the Gulf of Eilat was halted by the
Egyptians. The Israeli Navy had no means of lifting the blockade due to the long range involved, and the Israeli Air Force,
apparently also incapable of lifting the blockade, did not challenge it. The blockade was lifted on November 1, after Israel
used the surrounded Egyptian Third Army as a bargaining chip. The Egyptians unsuccessfully attempted to blockade the
Israeli Mediterranean coastline, and mined the Gulf of Suez to prevent the transportation of oil from the Bala'eem and
Abu Rudeis oil fields in southwestern Sinai to Eilat in southern Israel. Two oil tankers, of 48,000 ton and 2,000 ton
capacity, sank after hitting mines in the Gulf. According to Admiral Ze'ev Almog, the Israeli Navy escorted
tankers from the Gulf to Eilat throughout the war, and Israeli tankers sailing from Iran were directed to bypass the
Red Sea. As a result of these actions and the failure of Egypt's Mediterranean blockade, the transport of oil, grain and
weapons to Israeli ports was made possible throughout nearly the entire war. A post-war survey found that during the
entire war period, Israel suffered no oil shortages, and even sold oil to third parties affected by the Arab oil embargo.
This claim was disputed by Edgar O'Ballance, who claimed that no oil went to Israel during the blockade, and the
Eilat-Ashdod pipeline was empty by the end of the war.

Israel responded with a counter-blockade of Egypt in the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade was enforced by naval
vessels based at Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sinai coast facing the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade substantially damaged
the Egyptian economy. According to historian Gammal Hammad, Egypt's principal ports, Alexandria and Port Safaga,
remained open to shipping throughout the war. Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy enjoyed complete
command of the seas both in the Mediterranean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez.


During the last week of the war, Egyptian frogmen carried out three or four raids on Eilat. The attacks caused minor
damage, but created some alarm.

According to Israeli and Western sources, the Israelis lost no vessels in the war. Israeli vessels
were "targeted by as many as 52 Soviet-made anti-ship missiles", but none hit their targets. According to
historian Benny Morris, the Egyptians lost seven missile boats and four torpedo boats and coastal defense craft,
while the Syrians lost five missile boats, one minesweeper, and one coastal defense vessel. All together, the
Israeli Navy suffered three dead or missing and seven wounded.


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