1956 Suez Crisis (Second Arab–Israeli War)

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1956 Suez Crisis
1956 Second Arab–Israeli War

This article is for strategy study purpose, want to use text contents and military
situation maps to increase the understanding of this war.

Text contents are from Wikipedia   (chapter 7 Invasion)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis
Maps are drew by www.warmap.org


Invasion

The Israeli operation Kadesh in Sinai



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Operation Kadesh received its name from ancient Kadesh, located in the northern Sinai
and mentioned several times in the Hebrew Pentateuch. Israeli military planning for
this operation in the Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh,
Arish, Abu Uwayulah (Abu Ageila), and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian blockade of the
Tiran Straits was based at Sharm el-Sheikh and, by capturing the town, Israel would
have access to the Red Sea for the first time since 1953, which would allow it to
restore the trade benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean.

The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to
remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that
Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing
Israeli troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian
flanking attack would present even more of a risk. Arish and Abu Uwayulah were
important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and control
of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai.

Capturing them would deal a deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the
entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means
by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout and fall back into Egypt proper, which
British and French forces would then be able to push up against an Israeli advance,
and crush in a decisive encounter. On 24 October, Dayan ordered a partial mobilization.
When this led to a state of confusion, Dayan ordered full mobilization, and chose to
take the risk that he might alert the Egyptians. As part of an effort to maintain surprise,
Dayan ordered Israeli troops that were to go to the Sinai to be ostentatiously
concentrated near the border with Jordan first, which was intended to fool the
Egyptians into thinking that it was Jordan that the main Israeli blow was to fall on.

On 28 October, Operation Tarnegol was effected, during which an Israeli Gloster
Meteor NF.13 intercepted and destroyed an Egyptian Ilyushin Il-14 carrying Egyptian
officers en route from Syria to Egypt, killing 16 Egyptian officers and journalists and
two crewmen. The Ilyushin was believed to be carrying Field Marshal Abdel Hakim
Amer and the Egyptian General Staff; however this was not the case.


The conflict began on 29 October 1956. At about 3:00 pm, Israeli Air Force Mustangs
launched a series of attacks on Egyptian positions all over the Sinai. Because Israeli
intelligence expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side, Israeli soldiers were
stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier. The Israel Border Police militarized
the Israel-Jordan border, including the Green Line with the West Bank, during the
first few hours of the war. Israeli-Arab villages along the Jordanian border were
placed under curfew. This resulted in the killings of 48 civilians in the Arab village
of Kafr Qasim in an event known as the Kafr Qasim massacre. The border policemen
involved in the killings were later tried and imprisoned, with an Israeli court finding
that the order to shoot civilians was "blatantly illegal". This event had major effects
on Israeli law relating to the ethics in war and more subtle effects on the legal
status of Arab citizens of Israel, who at the time were regarded as a fifth column.

Early actions in Southern Sinai


The IDF chief of staff General Moshe Dayan, first planned to block the vital Mitla Pass.
Dayan planned for the Battalion 890 of the Paratroop Brigade, under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Eitan, a veteran of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and future
head of the IDF, to drop at Parker's Memorial, near one of the defiles of the pass,
Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the command of Colonel Ariel Sharon
would then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their holdings.

On 29 October, Operation Kadesh – the invasion of the Sinai, began when an
Israeli paratrooper battalion was air-dropped into the Sinai Peninsula, east of
the Suez Canal near the Mitla Pass. In conjunction with the para drop, four Israeli
P-51 Mustangs using their wings and propellers, cut all overhead telephone lines
in the Sinai, severely disrupting Egyptian command and control. Due to a
navigation error, the Israeli DC-3 transports landed Eitan's 400 paratroopers
three miles away from Parker's Memorial, their intended target. Eitan marched
his men towards Jebel Heitan, where they dug in while receiving supplies of
weapons dropped by French aircraft.

At the same time, Colonel Sharon's 202nd Paratroop Brigade raced out towards the
Mitla Pass. A major problem for Sharon was vehicle break-down. Dayan's efforts to
maintain strategic surprise bore fruit when the Egyptian commander Field Marshal
Abdel Hakim Amer at first treated the reports of an Israeli inclusion into the Sinai
as a large raid instead of an invasion, and as such Amer did not order a general
alert. By the time that Amer realized his mistake, the Israelis had made significant
advances into the Sinai.


Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central front

As the paratroopers were being dropped into the Sinai, the Israeli 9th Infantry Brigade
captured Ras al-Naqb, an important staging ground for that brigade's later attack
against Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead of attacking the town by a frontal attack, they
enveloped the town in a night attack, and negotiated their way through some of
the natural chokepoints into the rear of the town, surprising the Egyptians
before they could ready themselves to defend. The Egyptians surrendered,
with no Israeli casualties sustained.

The 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured
al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping off point for the assault against
Abu Uwayulah. Colonel Harpaz out-flanked al-Qusaymah with two pincers from
the south-east and north-east in a night attack. In a short battle lasting from
3:00 am to sunrise, the IDF stormed al-Qusaymah.

Battle of Jebel Heitan, paratroop brigade under attack


The portion of the paratroopers under Sharon's command continued to advance
to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed in a dawn attack,
and was able to storm the town with his armor through the Themed Gap.
Sharon routed the Sudanese police company, and captured the settlement.
On his way to the Nakla, Sharon's men came under attack from Egyptian MIG-15s.
On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan near Nakla.

Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but Sharon
decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon sent his lightly
armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians supported by aircraft, tanks and
heavy artillery. Sharon's actions were in response to reports of the arrival of the
1st and 2nd Brigades of the 4th Egyptian Armored Division in the area, which
Sharon believed would annihilate his forces if he did not seize the high ground.
Sharon sent two infantry companies, a mortar battery and some AMX-13 tanks
under the command of Mordechai Gur into the Heitan Defile on the afternoon of
31 October 1956.

The Egyptian forces occupied strong defensive positions and brought down heavy
anti-tank, mortar and machine gun fire on the IDF force. Gur's men were forced to
retreat into the "Saucer", where they were surrounded and came under heavy fire.
Hearing of this, Sharon sent in another task force while Gur's men used the cover
of night to scale the walls of the Heitan Defile. During the ensuing action, the Egyptians
were defeated and forced to retreat. A total of 260 Egyptian and 38 Israeli soldiers
were killed in the battle.

Although the battle was an Israeli victory, the casualties sustained would surround
Sharon with controversy. In particular, Sharon was criticized for ordering the attack
on Jebel Heitan without authorization, and not realizing that with the Israeli Air Force
controlling the skies, his men were in not such danger from the Egyptian tanks as
he believed. Dayan himself maintained that Sharon was correct to order the attack
without orders, and that under the circumstances, Sharon made the right decision;
instead he criticized Sharon for his tactics of attacking the Egyptians head-on,
which Dayan claimed led to unnecessary casualties.


Air operations, first phase

From the outset, the Israeli Air Force flew paratroop drops, supply flights and medevac
sorties. Israel's new French-made Dassault Mystere IV jet fighters provided air cover for
the transport aircraft. In the initial phase of the conflict, the Egyptian Air Force flew attack
missions against advancing Israeli ground forces. The Egyptian tactic was to use their
new Soviet-made MiG-15 jets as fighter escorts, while their older British-made De
Havilland Vampire and Gloster Meteor jets conducted strikes against Israeli troops
and vehicles.

In air combat, Israeli aircraft shot down between seven and nine Egyptian jets with the
loss of one plane, but Egyptian strikes against the ground forces continued through to
1 November. With the attack by the British and French air forces and navies, President
Nasser ordered his pilots to disengage and fly their planes to bases in Southern Egypt.
The Israeli Air Force was then free to strike Egyptian ground forces at will, as Israeli
forces advanced into the Western Sinai.

On 3 November, four Israeli warplanes attacked a British warship, the Black Swan class
sloop HMS Crane as it was patrolling the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba. According
to the IDF, Crane had been identified as an Egyptian warship, and the Israeli General
Staff authorized the attack. Three rockets penetrated the ship's hull and caused significant
internal damage, including severed power mains and a ruptured oil tank. The ship also
sustained some external damage from shrapnel and cannon fire, and three crewmen
were wounded. Crane shot down one Israeli plane and damaged another during the
engagement.


Hedgehog-Abu Uwayulah operations

The village of Abu Uwayulah, 25 km (16 mi) inside Egyptian territory, served as the
road centre for the entire Sinai, and thus was a key Israeli target.To the east of Abu
Uwayulah were several ridges that formed a natural defensive zone known to the
Israelis as the "Hedgehog". Holding the "Hedgehog" were 3,000 Egyptians of the 17th
and 18th battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Sami Yassa.
Yassa's men held a series of well-fortified trenches. The "Hedgehog" could only be
assaulted from the east flank of Umm Qataf ridge and the west flank of Ruafa ridge.

On 30 October, a probing attack by Israeli armour under Major Izhak Ben-Ari turned
into an assault on the Umm Qataf ridge that ended in failure. During the fighting at
Umm Qataf, Colonel Yassa was badly wounded and replaced by Colonel Saadedden
Mutawally. To the south, another unit of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade discovered
the al-Dayyiqa gap in the Jebel Halal ridge of the "Hedgehog". The Israeli forces
stormed and took the al-Dayyiqa gap. Colonel Mutawally failed to appreciate the extent
of the danger to his forces posed by the IDF breakthrough at al-Dayyiqa.

Led by Colonel Avraham Adan, an IDF force entered the al-Dayyiqa and at dawn
on 31 October attacked Abu Uwayulah. After an hour's fighting, Abu Uwayulah fell to
the IDF. At the same time, another IDF battalion attacked the Ruafa ridge.

Concurrently, another attack was launched on the eastern edge of the "Hedgehog"
by the IDF 10th Infantry Brigade (composed mostly of reservists) that ended in
failure. By noon, the Israeli Air Force had carried out a series of punishing airstrikes
on the Egyptian positions, sometimes accidentally hitting IDF ground forces. Such
was the tendency of the IAF to stage "friendly fire" incidents the IAF was arguably
as much as danger to the Israeli troops as to the enemy.

After taking Abu Uwayulah, Adan committed all of his forces against the Ruafa ridge
of the "Hedgehog". Adan began a three-pronged attack with one armored force
striking northeastern edge of Ruafa, a mixed infantry/armored force attacking the
north edge and a feint attack from a neighbouring knoll. During the evening attack
on 31 October, a chaotic battle raged on Ruafa ridge with much hand-to-hand
fighting. Though every IDF tank involved was destroyed, after a night's fighting,
Ruafa had fallen to the IDF. Another IDF assault that night, this time by the 10th
Infantry Brigade on Umm Qataf was less successful with much of the attacking
force getting lost in the darkness, resulting in a series of confused attacks that
ended in failure. Dayan, who had grown impatient with the failure to storm the
"Hedgehog", sacked the 10th Brigade's commander Colonel Shmuel Golinda and
replaced him with Colonel Israel Tal.

On the morning of 1 November, Israeli and French aircraft launched frequent napalm
attacks on the Egyptian troops at Umm Qataf. Joined by the 37th Armored Brigade,
the 10th Brigade again assaulted Umm Qataf, and was again defeated. However, the
ferocity of the IDF assault combined with rapidly dwindling stocks of water and
ammunition caused Colonel Mutawally to order a general retreat from the
"Hedgehog" on the evening of 1 November.


Gaza Strip operations

The city of Rafah was strategically important to Israel because control of that city would
sever the Gaza Strip from the Sinai and provide a way to the main centres of the
northern Sinai, al-Arish and al-Qantarah. Holding the forts outside of Rafah were a
mixture of Egyptian and Palestinian forces in the 5th Infantry Brigade commanded
by Brigadier General Jaafar al-Abd. In Rafah itself the 87th Palestinian Infantry
Brigade was stationed. Assigned to capture Rafah were 1st Infantry Brigade led by
Colonel Benjamin Givli and 27th Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel Haim
Bar-Lev of the IDF. To the south of Rafah were a series of mine-filled sand dunes
and to the north were a series of fortified hills.

Dayan ordered the IDF forces to seize Crossroads 12 in the central Rafah area,
and to focus on breaking through rather than reducing every Egyptian strongpoint.
The IDF assault began with Israeli sappers and engineers clearing a path at night through
the minefields that surrounded Rafah. French warships led by the cruiser Georges
Leygues provided fire support, through Dayan had a low opinion of the French
gunnery, complaining that the French only struck the Egyptian reserves.

Using the two paths cleared through the southern minefields, IDF tanks entered the Rafah
salient. Under Egyptian artillery fire, the IDF force raced ahead and took Crossroads 12
with the loss of 2 killed and 22 wounded. In the north, the Israeli troops fought a confused
series of night actions, but were successful in storming Hills 25, 25A, 27 and 29 with the
loss of six killed. In the morning of 1 November, Israeli AMX-13s encircled and took Hills
34 and 36. At that point, General al-Abd ordered his forces to abandon their posts
outside of Rafah and retreat into the city.

With Rafah more or less cut off and Israeli forces controlling the northern and eastern
roads leading into the city, Dayan ordered the AMX-13s of the 27th Armored Brigade
to strike west and take al-Arish. By this point, Nasser had ordered his forces to fall back
towards the Suez Canal, so at first Bar-Lev and his men met little resistance as they
advanced across the northern Sinai. Hearing of the order to withdraw, General al-Abd
and his men left Rafah on the morning of 1 November through a gap in the Israeli
lines, and headed back towards the canal zone.

Three hours later, the Israelis took Rafah. It was reported that after taking Rafah,
Israeli troops killed 111 people, including 103 refugees, in Rafah's Palestinian refugee
camp. The circumstances of the killings are disputed. Not until the Jeradi Pass in the
northern Sinai did the IDF run into serious opposition. A series of hooking attacks
that out-flanked the Egyptian positions combined with airstrikes led to an Egyptian
defeat at the Jeradi Pass. On 2 November, Bar-Lev's forces took al-Arish.

Meanwhile, the IDF attacked the Egyptian defenses outside of Gaza City late on 1
November. After breaking through the Egyptian lines, the Israeli tanks headed into
Gaza City. Joined by infantry, the armor attacked the al-Muntar fortress outside o
f Gaza City, killing or capturing 3,500 Egyptian National Guard troops. By noon of
2 November, there was no more Egyptian opposition in the Gaza City area. On
3 November, the IDF attacked Egyptian and Palestinian forces at Khan Yunis. After
a fierce battle, the Israeli 37th Armored Brigade's Sherman tanks broke through
the heavily fortified lines outside of Khan Yunis held by the 86th Palestinian Brigade.

After some street-fighting with Egyptian soldiers and Palestinian fedayeen, Khan Yunis
fell to the Israelis. There are claims that after taking Khan Yunis, the IDF committed a
massacre, known as the Khan Yunis killings. Israel maintained that the Palestinians
were killed in street-fighting, while the Palestinians claimed that Israeli troops started
executing unarmed Palestinians after the fall of Khan Yunis.The claims of a massacre
were reported to the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1956 by the Director
of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Henry Labouisse, who reported from
"trustworthy sources" that 275 people were killed in the massacre of which 140
were refugees and 135 local residents.

In both Gaza City and Khan Yunis, street-fighting led to the deaths of "dozens,
perhaps hundreds, of non-combatants". Food and medicine distribution for
refugees in need of assistance was complicated when some Palestinians ransacked
the warehouses belonging to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This
was compounded by a widespread view in Israel that the responsibility for the
care of the Palestinian refugees rested with the UNRWA, not Israel, which led
the Israelis to be slow with providing aid. By noon of 3 November, the Israelis
had control of almost the entire Gaza Strip save for a few isolated strong points,
which were soon attacked and taken. The UN estimated that in total 447 to 550
Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli troops during the first weeks of Israeli
occupation of the strip. The manner that these people were killed is disputed.

Sharm el-Sheikh operations


By 3 November, with the IDF having successfully taken the Gaza Strip, Arish, the
Hedgehog, and Mitla Pass, Sharm el-Sheikh was the last Israeli objective. The main
difficulty faced by Colonel Abraham Yoffe's 9th Infantry Brigade was logistical. There
were no good roads linking Ras an-Naqb to Sharm el-Sheikh. After taking the border
town of Ras an-Naqb on 30 October, Dayan ordered Yoffe to wait until air superiority
was ensured.

To outflank Sharm el-Sheikh, Dayan ordered paratroopers to take the town of Tor
in the western Sinai. The Egyptian forces at Sharm el-Sheikh had the advantage of
holding one of the most strongly fortified positions in the entire Sinai, but had been
subjected to heavy Israeli air attacks from the beginning of the war. Yoffe set out
for Sharm el-Sheikh on 2 November, and his major obstacles were the terrain and
vehicle break-down. Israeli Navy ships provided support to the 9th Division during
its advance.

After numerous skirmishes on the outskirts of Sharm el-Sheikh, Yoffe ordered an
attack on the port around midnight on 4 November. After four hours of heavy
fighting, Yoffe ordered his men to retreat. On the morning of 5 November, Israeli
forces launched a massive artillery barrage and napalm strikes against Egyptian forces
defending Sharm el-Sheikh. At 9:30 am on 5 November, the Egyptian commander,
Colonel Raouf Mahfouz Zaki, surrendered Sharm el-Sheikh. The Israelis had lost 10
killed and 32 wounded, while the Egyptians had lost about 100 killed and 31
wounded. Another 864 Egyptian soldiers were taken prisoner.

Anglo-French Canal invasion

To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by
Britain and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on
Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to
be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded
with RAF Bomber Command aircraft.

The British deployed the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle, Albion and Bulwark and France had
the battleship Jean Bart and aircraft carriers Arromanches and La Fayette on station.
In addition, HMS Ocean and Theseus acted as jumping-off points for Britain's
helicopter-borne assault (the world's first).

The combined fleet was shadowed and even harassed by the United States Sixth Fleet,
commanded by Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown. The fleet was led by the carriers USS
Coral Sea and USS Randolph, later reinforced by USS Forrestal.


Revise: Phases I and II

In the morning of 30 October Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel.
They initiated Operation Musketeer on 31 October, with a bombing campaign. Nasser
responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal closing it to all shipping—shipping
would not move again until early 1957. Despite the risk of an invasion in the canal zone,
Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered Egyptian troops in the Sinai to stay put, as Amer
confidently assured Nasser that the Egyptians could defeat the Israelis in the Sinai and the
defeat France and British.


Amer also advised Nasser to send more troops into the Sinai to inflict his promised defeat
on Israel, even though the risk of their being cut off if the canal zone were seized by
Anglo-French forces was enormous. Not until late on 31 October did Nasser disregard
Amer's rosy assessment and ordered his forces to disengage in the Sinai and to
retreat back to the canal zone to face the expected Anglo-French invasion.
Eden and Mollet ordered Phase I of Operation Revise to begin 13 hours after the
Anglo-French ultimatum.

British bombers based in Cyprus and Malta took off to Cairo with the aim of destroying
Cairo airport, only to be personally ordered back by Eden when he learned that American
civilians were being evacuated at Cairo airport. Fearful of the backlash that might
result if American civilians were killed in a British bombing attack, Eden sent the
Valiant bombers back to Malta while the Canberra's were ordered to hit Almaza
airbase outside of Cairo. British night bombing proved ineffective.

Starting on the morning of 1 November, carrier-based de Havilland Sea Venoms,
Chance-Vought Corsairs and Hawker Sea Hawks began a series of daytime strikes on
Egypt. By the night of 1 November the Egyptian Air Force had lost 200 planes. With
the destruction of Egypt's air force, Keightley ordered the beginning of Revise Phase
II. As part of Revise Phase II, a wide-ranging interdiction campaign began. On 3
November F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the
French carriers Arromanches and La Fayette, attacked the aerodrome at Cairo.

The very aggressive French General Beaufre suggested at once that Anglo-French
forces seize the canal zone with airborne landings instead of waiting the planned
ten days for Revise II to be worked through, and that the risk of sending in
paratroopers without the prospect of sea-borne landings for several days be
taken. By 3 November, Beaufre finally convinced Keightley and Stockwell of
the merits of his approach, and gained the approval for Operation Telescope as
Beaufre had code-named the airborne assault on the canal zone.

On 2 November 1956 the First Sea Lord Admiral Mountbatten sent a letter to Eden
telling him to stop the invasion before troops landed in the canal zone as the operation
had already proved to be too costly politically. The next day, Mountbatten made a
desperate phone call to Eden asking for permission to stop the invasion before it began,
only to be refused. Mountbatten's views led to clash of personalities with the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, General Gerald Templer who supported the invasion.
In response to Mountbatten's call to cancel the invasion, Templer penned a memo,
which read:

               Some people in England today say that what we're [sic?] done in the
               Middle East will have terrible effects in the future. ... The reality is that
               we have checked a drift. With a bit of luck we're not only stopped a big
               war in the Middle East, but we're halted the march of Russia through the
               Middle East and on to the African  continent.

Telescope modified: the paratroops land

On late 5 November, an advance element of the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute
Regiment dropped on El Gamil Airfield, a narrow strip of land, led by Brigadier M.A.H.
Butler. The "Red Devils" could not return Egyptian fire while landing, but once the
paratroopers landed, they used their Sten guns, three-inch mortars and anti-tank
weapons with great effect. Having taken the airfield with a dozen casualties, the
remainder of the battalion flew in by helicopter. The Battalion then secured the
area around the airfield.

During the ensuing street fighting, the Egyptian forces engaged in methodical tactics,
fighting on the defense while inflicting maximum casualties and retreating only when
overwhelming force was brought to bear.  In particular, the SU-100 tank destroyers
proved to be a formidable weapon in urban combat. The British forces moved up
towards Port Said with air support before digging in at 13:00 to hold until the beach
assault. With close support from carrier-based Westland Wyverns, the British
paratroopers took Port Said's sewage works and the cemetery while becoming
engaged in a pitched battle for the Coast Guard barracks.

At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chateau-Jobert landed with a force
of the 2nd RPC at Raswa. Raswa imposed the problem of a small drop zone surrounded
by water, but General Jacques Massu of the 10th Parachute Division assured Beaufre
that this was not an insolvable problem for his men. 500 heavily armed paratroopers
of the French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from
combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Nord Noratlas 2501
transports of the Escadrille de Transport (ET) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some
combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company.

The paratroopers swiftly secured the western bridge at the cost of two soldiers, and F4U
Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions,
destroying several SU-100s. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which
went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next
several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed,
while others were abandoned with little resistance. The French paratroopers stormed and
took Port Said's waterworks that morning, an important objective to control in a city in
the desert. Chateau-Jobert followed up this success by beginning an attack on Port Fuad.
Derek Varble, the American military historian, later wrote "Air support and fierce French
assaults transformed the fighting at Port Fuad into a rout". During the fighting in the
canal zone, the French paratroopers often practiced their "no-prisoners'" code
and executed Egyptian POWs.

The Egyptian commander at Port Said, General Salahedin Moguy then proposed a truce.
His offer was taken up, and in the ensuring meeting with General Butler, Chateau-Jobert
and General Massu, was offered the terms of surrendering the city and marching his
men to the Gamil airfield to be taken off to prisoner-of-war camps in Cyprus. Moguy
had no interest in surrendering and had only made the truce offer to buy time for his
men to dig in; when fighting began again vans with loudspeakers traveled through the
city encouraging resistance against the invaders, by announcing that London and Paris
had been bombed by the Russians and that World War III had started. As the
paratroopers alone were not enough, Beaufre and British Admiral Manley Laurence
Power urged that the sea-borne landings be accelerated and that Allied forces
land the very next day.

Stockwell and Knightley, who wished to stick with the original plan, opposed this.
Stockwell was always in favour of rigidly following already agreed to plans, and was
most reluctant to see any changes, whereas Beaufre was all for changing plans to
match with changed circumstances. The differences between Stockwell and Beaufre
were summarized by the American historian Derek Varble as: "Stockwell favored
existing plans; their methodical construction and underlying staff work reduced
risks. Beaufre, by contrast an opportunist, saw plans merely a means to an end,
without much inherent value. For him, altered circumstances or assumptions provided
adequate justification to jettison part or all of the original plan".

Royal Marines come ashore at Port Said

At first light on 6 November, commandos of No. 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines
stormed the beaches, using landing craft of World War II vintage (Landing Craft Assault
and Landing Vehicle Tracked). The battle group standing offshore opened fire, giving
covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries
and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to
be alight.

The men of 42 Commando as much as possible chose to by-pass Egyptian positions
and focused on trying to break through inland. The Royal Marines of 40 Commando
had the advantage of being supported by Centurion tanks as they landed on Sierra
Red beach. Upon entering downtown Port Said, the Marines became engaged in fierce
urban combat as the Egyptians used the Casino Palace Hotel and other strongpoints
as fortresses.

Nasser proclaimed the Suez War to be a "people's war". As such, Egyptian troops
were ordered to don civilian clothes while guns were freely handed out to Egyptian
civilians. From Nasser's point of view, a "people's war" presented the British and
French with an unsolvable dilemma. If the Allies reacted aggressively to the
"people's war", then that would result in the deaths of innocent civilians and thus
bring world sympathy to his cause while weakening morale on the home front
in Britain and France. If the Allies reacted cautiously to the "people's war", than
that would result in Allied forces becoming bogged down by sniper attacks, who
had the advantage of attacking "with near impunity by hiding among crowds of
apparent non-combatants".

These tactics worked especially well against the British. British leaders, especially
Eden and the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Louis Mountbatten were afraid of being
labelled "murderers and baby killers", and sincerely attempted to limit Egyptian
civilian deaths. Eden frequently interfered with Revise Phase I and II bombing,
striking off various targets that he felt were likely to cause excessive civilian
deaths, and restricted the gun sizes that could be used at the Port Said landings,
again to minimize civilian deaths.

The American historian Derek Varble has commented that the paradox between
Eden's concern for Egyptian civilians and the object of Revise Phase II bombing,
which was intended to terrorize the Egyptian people, was never resolved. Despite
Eden's best efforts, British bombing still killed hundreds of Egyptian civilians during
Revise II, though these deaths were due more to imprecise aiming rather than a
deliberate policy of "area bombing" such as that employed against Germany in World
War II. At Port Said, the heavy fighting in the streets and the resulting fires
destroyed much of the city, killing many civilians.

In the afternoon, 522 additional French paratroopers of the 1er REP (Régiment
Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port
Fouad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale,
which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier La Fayette
developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. The French
were aided by AMX-13 light tanks. While clearing Port Fuad, the 1er Regiment Etranger
Parachutiste killed 100 Egyptians without losing a man in return.

British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff
resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British
carrier-borne aircraft caused casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. The helicopter borne
assault of 45 Commando was the first time helicopters were used by UK forces to lift men
directly into a combat zone. Lieutenant Colonel N.H. Tailyour, who was leading 45
Commando was landed by mistake in a stadium still under Egyptian control resulting in
a very hasty retreat. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from
well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.

Especially fierce fighting took place at the Port Said's Customs House and Navy House.
The Egyptians destroyed Port Said's Inner Harbour, which forced the British to
improvise and use the Fishing Harbour to land their forces.The 2nd Bn of the Parachute
Regiment landed by ship in the harbour. Centurion tanks of the British 6th Royal Tank
Regiment were landed and by 12:00 they had reached the French paratroopers.
While the British were landing at Port Said, the men of the 2 RPC at Raswa fought
off Egyptian counter-attacks featuring SU100 self-propelled guns.

After establishing themselves in a position in downtown Port Said, 42 Commando
headed down the Shari Muhammad Ali, the main north-south road to link up with the
French forces at the Raswa bridge and the Inner Basin lock. While doing so, the Marines
also took Port Said's gasworks. Meanwhile, 40 Commando supported by the Royal Tank
Regiment remained engaged in clearing the downtown of Egyptian snipers. Colonel
Tailyour arranged for more reinforcements to be brought in via helicopter.

Hearing rumours that Moguy wished to surrender, both Stockwell and Beaufre left their
command ship HMS Tyne for Port Said. Upon landing, they learned the rumours were
not true. Instead of returning to the Tyne, both Stockwell and Beaufre spent the day
in Port Said, and were thus cut off from the news. Only late in the day did Beaufre and
Stockwell learn of the acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire. Rather than focusing
on breaking out to take al-Qantarah, the Royal Marines became bogged down in
clearing every building in Port Said of snipers. The Centurions of the Royal Tank
Regiment supported by the paratroopers of 2 RPC began a slow advance down
to al-Qantarah on the night of 6 November.

Egyptian sniper attacks and the need to clear every building led the 3 Para to be
slowed in their attempts to link up with the Royal Marines. When Stockwell learned
of the ceasefire to come into effect in five hours' time at 9:00 pm, he ordered
Colonel Gibbon and his Centurions to race down and take al-Qantarah with all
speed in order to improve the Allied bargaining position. What followed was a
confused series of melee actions down the road to al-Qantarah that ended with
the British forces at al-Cap, a small village four miles north of al-Qantarah at
2:00 am, when the ceasefire came into effect.

MAP Reference:
1. Wikipedia(n.d.), Suze crisis
     reference 01 Jan 2019 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis.

2. 季國興,陳和丰,第二次世界大戰後中東戰爭史.上海:中國社會科學出版社,1987.