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Korean War- 1950.09 Battle of Inchon

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Post time 2021-5-15 11:44:50 | Show all posts |Read mode
Korean War- 1950.09 Battle of Inchon


Background
Pusan Perimeter
From the outbreak of the Korean War following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea
on 25 June 1950, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and ground combat
equipment over the ROK and UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from
collapsing. The North Korean strategy was to aggressively pursue UN and ROK
forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them, attacking from the front
and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the defending units, which
allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, forcing it to retreat in
disarray. From their initial 25 June offensive to fighting in July and early August,
the KPA used this tactic to defeat the UN forces they encountered and push it south.
However, with the establishment of the Pusan Perimeter in August, UN forces
held a continuous line which the KPA could not flank. The KPA advantages in numbers
decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies
to the UN forces.

When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on 5 August, they attempted the same
frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter.
Throughout August, they conducted direct assaults resulting in the Battle of Masan,
the Battle of Battle Mountain, the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the Battle of
Taegu, and the Battle of the Bowling Alley. On the east coast of the Korean
Peninsula, the ROK repulsed three KPA divisions at the Battle of P'ohang-dong.The
KPA attacks stalled as UN forces repelled the attack. All along the front, the KPA
reeled from these defeats, the first time in the war North Korean tactics had failed.

By the end of August the KPA had been pushed beyond their limits and many of the original
units were at far reduced strength and effectiveness. Logistic problems wracked the
KPA, and shortages of food, weapons, equipment and replacement soldiers proved
devastating for their units. However, the KPA retained high morale and enough
supply to allow for another large-scale offensive. On 1 September the KPA threw their
entire military into one final bid to break the Pusan Perimeter, the Great Naktong Offensive,
a five-pronged simultaneous attack across the entire perimeter. The attack caught UN
forces by surprise and almost overwhelmed them. KPA troops attacked Kyongju,
surrounded Taegu and Ka-san, recrossed the Naktong Bulge, threatened
Yongsan, and continued their attack at Masan, focusing on Nam River and Haman.
However, despite their efforts, in one of the most brutal fights of the Korean War,
the KPA were unsuccessful. Unable to hold their gains, the KPA retreated from the
offensive a much weaker force, and vulnerable to counterattack.







Planning
Days after the beginning of the war, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the US
Army officer in command of all UN forces in Korea, envisioned an amphibious assault to
retake the Seoul area. The city had fallen in the first days of the war in the First Battle
of Seoul.MacArthur later wrote that he thought the KPA would push the ROK back
far past Seoul. He also said he decided days after the war began that the battered,
demoralized, and under-equipped ROK, many of whom did not support the South Korean
government put in power by the United States, could not hold off the KPA even with
American support. MacArthur felt that he could turn the tide if he made a decisive troop
movement behind KPA lines, and preferred Inchon, over Chumunjin-up or Kunsan
as the landing site. He had originally envisioned such a landing, code-named Operation
Bluehearts, for 22 July, with the US Army's 1st Cavalry Division landing at Inchon.
However, by 10 July the plan was abandoned as it was clear the 1st Cavalry Division
would be needed on the Pusan Perimeter. On 23 July, MacArthur formulated a new
plan, code-named Operation Chromite, calling for an amphibious assault by the US
Army's 2nd Infantry Division and the United States Marine Corps (USMC)'s 5th Marine
Regiment in mid-September 1950. This, too fell through as both units were moved to
the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur decided instead to use the US Army's 7th Infantry
Division, his last reserve unit in East Asia, to conduct the operation as soon as it could
be raised to wartime strength.

In preparation for the invasion, MacArthur activated the US Army's X Corps to act as
the command for the landing forces, and appointed Major General Edward Almond, his
chief of staff, as Corps' commander, anticipating the operation would mean a quick
end to the war. Throughout August, MacArthur faced the challenge of re-equipping
the 7th Infantry Division as it had sent 9,000 of its men to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter
and was far understrength. He also faced the challenge that the USMC, reduced in size
following World War II, had to rebuild the 1st Marine Division, using elements of the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade fighting at Pusan as well as the 1st Marine Regiment and the
7th Marine Regiment, which pulled US Marines from as far away as the Mediterranean
Sea to Korea for the task. MacArthur ordered Korean Augmentation To the United
States Army (KATUSA) troops, ROK conscripts assigned to US Army units, to reinforce
the 7th Infantry Division, while allocating all equipment coming into Korea to X Corps,
despite it being crucially needed by the US Army's Eighth Army on the Pusan Perimeter.

MacArthur decided to use the Joint Strategic and Operations Group (JSPOG) of his United
States Far East Command (FECOM). The initial plan was met with skepticism by the other
generals because Inchon's natural and artificial defenses were formidable. The approaches
to Inchon were two restricted passages, which could be easily blocked by naval mines. The
current of the channels was also dangerously quick—three to eight knots (3.5 to 9.2 mph;
5.5 to 14.8 km/hr)—and tides were so extreme as to prevent immediate follow-on landings.
Finally, the anchorage was small and the harbor was surrounded by tall seawalls. United
States Navy Commander Arlie G. Capps noted that the harbor had "every natural and
geographic handicap." US Navy leaders favored a landing at Kunsan, closer to the
Pusan perimeter and the KPA main axis of supply through Taejon, but MacArthur did
not think landing there would produce a sufficiently decisive victory. He also felt
that the KPA, who also thought the conditions of the Inchon channel would make a
landing impossible, would be surprised and caught off-guard by the attack.

On 23 August, the commanders held a meeting at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo.
Chief of Staff of the United States Army General Joseph Lawton Collins, Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, and United States Air Force (USAF) operations deputy
Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edward all flew from Washington, D.C., to Japan to take part
in the briefing; Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg did
not attend, possibly because he "did not want to legitimize an operation that essentially
belong[ed] to the Navy and the Marines." The Marine Corps staff, who were to be
responsible for leading the landing at Inchon, were not invited, which became a
contentious issue. During the briefing, nine members of the staff of US Navy Admiral
James H. Doyle spoke for nearly 90 minutes on every technical and military aspect of
the landing. MacArthur told the officers that though a landing at Kunsan would bring
a relatively easy linkup with the Eighth Army, it "would be an attempted envelopment
that would not envelop" and would place more troops in a vulnerable pocket of the
Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur won over Sherman by speaking of his affection for the US
Navy and relating the story of how the Navy carried him out of Corregidor to safety in
1942 during World War II. Sherman agreed to support the Inchon operation, leaving
Doyle furious.

MacArthur spent 45 minutes after the briefing explaining his reasons for choosing Inchon.
He said that, because it was so heavily defended, the North Koreans would not expect
an attack there, that victory at Inchon would avoid a brutal winter campaign, and that, by
invading a northern strong point, UN forces could cut off KPA lines of supply and
communication. Sherman and Collins returned to Washington, D.C., and reported
back to Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
MacArthur's plan on 28 August. President Truman also provided his approval.

The landing at Inchon was not the first large-scale amphibious operation since World War
II. That distinction belonged to the UN landing that took place on 18 July 1950 at Pohang,
South Korea. However, that operation was not made in KPA-held territory and was
unopposed.

Admiral Struble's Joint Task Force 7 consisted of Fast Carrier Task Force 77 for fighter
cover, interdiction and ground attack, Admiral Andrewes' Blockade and Covering Task
Force 91, Rear Admiral George R. Henderson's Patrol and Reconnaissance Task Force 99,
Captain Bernard L. Austin's Service Squadron 3 as Task Force 79, Admiral Doyle's invasion
Attack Task Force 90, and the Military Sea Transportation Service. This last service was to
bring in the 7th Division on 18 Sept.


Prelude
Before the main land battle, UN forces landed spies in Inchon and bombarded the city's
defenses via air and sea. Deception operations were also carried out to draw North
Korean attention away from Inchon.

Maintaining surprise
With men, supplies, and ships obviously concentrating at Pusan and in Japanese ports for
a major amphibious operation and the press in Japan referring to the upcoming landings
as "Operation Common Knowledge," the UN command feared that it would fail to achieve
surprise in the Inchon landings. Exacerbating this fear, the leader of a North Korean-
Japanese spy ring arrested in Japan in early September 1950 had a copy of the plan fo
r Operation Chromite, and the UN forces did not know whether he had managed to
transmit the plan to North Korea before his arrest. US Navy patrol aircraft, surface
warships, and submarines operated in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and the Yellow
Sea to detect any reaction by North Korean, Soviet, or People's Republic of China
military forces, and on 4 September 1950 F4U Corsair fighters of Fighter Squadron
53 (VF-53) operating from the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge shot down a Soviet
Air Force A-20 Havoc bomber after it opened fire on them over the Yellow Sea as it
flew toward the UN naval task force there.

In order to ensure surprise during the landings, UN forces staged an elaborate
deception operation to draw North Korean attention away from Inchon by making
it appear that the landing would take place 105 miles (169 km) to the south at
Kunsan. On 5 September 1950, aircraft of the USAF's Far East Air Forces began
attacks on roads and bridges to isolate Kunsan, typical of the kind of raids expected
prior to an invasion there. A naval bombardment of Kunsan followed on 6
September, and on 11 September USAF B-29 Superfortress bombers joined the
aerial campaign, bombing military installations in the area.

In addition to aerial and naval bombardment, UN forces took other measures to focus
North Korean attention on Kunsan. On the docks at Pusan, USMC officers briefed their
men on an upcoming landing at Kunsan within earshot of many Koreans, and on the
night of 12–13 September 1950 the Royal Navy frigate HMS Whitesand Bay landed US
Army special operations troops and Royal Marine Commandos on the docks at Kunsan,
making sure that North Korean forces noticed their visit.

UN forces conducted a series of drills, tests, and raids elsewhere on the coast of Korea,
where conditions were similar to Inchon, before the actual invasion. These drills were
used to perfect the timing and performance of the landing craft, but also were
intended to confuse the North Koreans further as to the location of the invasion.

Inchon infiltration
Fourteen days before the landing at Inchon, a UN reconnaissance team landed in Inchon
Harbor to obtain information on the conditions there. The team, led by US Navy Lieutenant
Eugene F. Clark, landed at Yonghung-do, an island in the mouth of the harbor. From
there, the team relayed intelligence back to the UN Command. With the help of locals,
Clark gathered information about tides, beach composition, mudflats, and seawalls. A
separate reconnaissance mission codenamed Trudy Jackson, which dispatched Lieutenant
Youn Joung of the Republic of Korea Navy and ROK Colonel Ke In-Ju to Inchon to collect
further intelligence on the area, was mounted by the US military.

The tides at Inchon have an average range of 29 feet (8.8 m) and a maximum observed
range of 36 feet (11 m), making the tidal range there one of the largest in the world and
the littoral maximum in all of Asia. Clark observed the tides at Inchon for two weeks and
discovered that American tidal charts were inaccurate, but that Japanese charts were
quite good. Clark's team provided detailed reports on KPA artillery positions and
fortifications on the island of Wolmido, at Inchon and on nearby islands. During the
extended periods of low tide, Clark's team located and removed some North Korean
naval mines, but, critically to the future success of the invasion, Clark reported that the
North Koreans had not in fact systematically mined the channels.

When the KPA discovered that the agents had landed on the islands near Inchon, they
made multiple attacks, including an attempted raid on Yonghung-do with six junks.
Clark mounted a machine gun on a sampan and sank the attacking junks. In
response, the KPA killed perhaps as many as 50 civilians for helping Clark.

Bombardments of Wolmido and Inchon
On 10 September 1950, five days before the Inchon landing, 43 American warplanes flew
over Wolmido, dropping 93 napalm canisters to "burn out" its eastern slope in an attempt
to clear the way for American troops.
The flotilla of ships that landed and supported the amphibious force during the battle was
commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, an expert in amphibious warfare. Struble
had participated in amphibious operations in World War II, including the Normandy
landings and the Battle of Leyte. He got underway for Inchon in his flagship, the
heavy cruiser USS Rochester, on 12 September 1950. Among his ships were the Gunfire
Support Group, consisting of Rochester, the heavy cruiser USS Toledo, the British light
cruisers HMS Jamaica and HMS Kenya, and the six US destroyers of Task Element 90.62,
made up of USS Collett, USS De Haven, USS Gurke, USS Henderson, USS Lyman K.
Swenson, and USS Mansfield. Royal Canadian Navy destroyers HMCS Cayuga,
HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Sioux also participated in the invasion task force.

At 07:00 on 13 September, the US Navy's Destroyer Squadron 9, headed by Mansfield,
steamed up Flying Fish Channel and into Inchon Harbor, where it fired upon KPA gun
emplacements on Wolmido and in Inchon. Between them, 2 British cruisers and 6
American destroyers fired almost a thousand 5-inch (127-mm) shells onto the fortifications.
The attacks tipped off the KPA that a landing might be imminent, and the KPA officer in
command on Wolmido assured his superiors that he would throw their enemies back
into the sea. North Korea's 918th Coastal Artillery Regiment returned fire, hitting
Collett 7 times, Gurke 3 times, and Lyman K. Swenson twice. One sailor was killed,
LTJG David H. Swenson, and 8 wounded on the Lyman K. Swenson.

The American destroyers withdrew after bombarding Wolmido for an hour and Rochester,
Toledo, Jamaica, and Kenya proceeded to bombard the KPA batteries for the next three
hours from the south of the island. Lieutenant Clark and his South Korean squad watched
from hills south of Inchon, plotting locations where KPA machine guns were firing at the
flotilla. They relayed this information to the invasion force via Japan in the afternoon.

During the night of 13–14 September, Struble decided on another day of bombardment, and
the destroyers moved back up the channel off Wolmido on 14 September. They and the
cruisers bombarded the island again that day, and planes from the carrier task force bombed
and strafed it.

At 00:50 on 15 September 1950, Lieutenant Clark and his South Korean squad activated the
lighthouse on the island of Palmido. Later that morning, the ships carrying the amphibious
force followed the destroyers toward Inchon and entered Flying Fish Channel, and the US
Marines of the invasion force got ready to make the first landings on Wolmido.


Naval mine clearance
Within weeks of the outbreak of the Korean War, the Soviet Union had shipped naval mines
to North Korea for use in coastal defense, with Soviet naval mine warfare experts providing
technical instruction in laying and employment of the mines to North Korean personnel.
Some of the mines were shipped to Inchon. The UN forces only became aware of
the presence of mines in North Korean waters in early September 1950, raising fears
that this would interfere with the Inchon invasion. It was too late to reschedule the
landings, but the North Koreans laid relatively few and unsophisticated mines at
Inchon. Destroyers in the assault force visually identified moored contact mines in
the channel at low tide and destroyed them with gunfire. When the invasion force
passed through the channel at high tide to land on the assault beaches, it passed
over any remaining mines without incident.

Battle





Green Beach
At 06:30 on September 15, 1950, the lead elements of X Corps hit "Green Beach" on
the northern side of Wolmido. The landing force consisted of the 3rd Battalion, 5th
Marines, led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Taplett and nine M26 Pershing tanks from
the USMC 1st Tank Battalion.[citation needed] One tank was equipped with a
flamethrower and two others had bulldozer blades. The battle group landed from
tank landing ships (LSTs). The entire island was captured by noon at the cost of
just 14 casualties.

The KPA defenders were outnumbered by more than six to one by the UN troops. KPA
casualties included over 200 killed and 136 captured, primarily from the 918th Artillery
Regiment and the 226th Independent Marine Regiment. The forces on Green Beach
had to wait until 19:50 for the tide to rise, allowing another group to land. During this
time, extensive shelling and bombing, along with anti-tank mines placed on the only
bridge, kept the small KPA force from launching a significant counterattack.
The second wave came ashore at "Red Beach" and "Blue Beach".

The North Koreans had not been expecting an invasion at Inchon. After the storming
of Green Beach, the KPA assumed (probably because of deliberate American disinformation)
that the main invasion would happen at Kunsan.[citation needed] As a result, only a small
force was diverted to Inchon. Even those forces were too late, and they arrived after the
UN forces had taken Blue Beach and Red Beach. The troops already stationed at Inchon
had been weakened by Clark's guerrillas, and napalm bombing runs had destroyed key
ammunition dumps. In total, 261 ships took part.

For Red Beach and Blue Beach, Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander of an Amphibious
ready group, announced that H-Hour, time of landing, would be 17:30.

The KPA 22nd Infantry Regiment had moved to Inchon before dawn on September 15, 1950,
but retreated to Seoul after the main landing that evening.

Red Beach
The Red Beach forces, made up of the Regimental Combat Team 5, which included the 3rd
Battalion of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC), used ladders to scale the sea
walls. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, serving as Commanding Officer of the 5th
Marines, had the mission of seizing an area 3,000 yards (2,700 m) long and 1,000 yards
(910 m) deep, extending from Cemetery Hill (northern) at the top down to the Inner Tidal
Basin (near Tidal Basin at the bottom) and including the promontory in the middle called
Observatory Hill. (See Map) The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines would be on the left, against
Cemetery Hill and northern half of Observatory Hill. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines would
take the southern half of Observatory Hill and Inner Basin.

Late on the afternoon of September 15, the LSTs approached Red Beach and as the lead
ships, they came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from KPA defenders on
Cemetery Hill. Despite the concentrated fire, they disembarked assault troops and unloaded
vital support equipment. In addition, their guns wiped out KPA batteries on the right flank
of Red Beach. Three (USS King County, USS Lafayette County, and LST 973) of the eight
LSTs took some hits from mortar and machine gun fire, which killed a sailor and injured
a few others. The LSTs completed unloading and cleared the beach at high tide early
on 16 September.

After neutralizing KPA defenses at Inchon on the night of September 15, units from Red
Beach opened the causeway to Wolmi-do, allowing the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and
the tanks from Green Beach to enter the battle for Inchon.

Blue Beach
The 1st Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller, landed at
Blue Beach, 2.5 miles (4.0 km) southeast of Red and Green beaches. Their mission, once
the beach was secure, was to capture the suburb of Yongdungpo, cross the Han River, and
form the right flank of the attack on Seoul itself. As the 1st Marine Regiment approached
the coast, the combined fire from several KPA gun emplacements sank one LST. Destroyer
fire and bombing runs silenced the KPA defenses. When the Blue Beach forces finally arrived,
the KPA forces at Inchon had already surrendered, so they met little opposition and suffered
few additional casualties. The 1st Marine Regiment spent much of its time strengthening the
beachhead and preparing for the move inland.

Immediately after KPA resistance was extinguished in Inchon, the supply and reinforcement
process began. Seabees and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) that had arrived with
the US Marines constructed a pontoon dock on Green Beach and cleared debris from the
water. The dock was then used to unload the remainder of the LSTs. Early that morning
of September 16, Lieutenant Colonel Murray and Colonel Puller had their operational
orders from 1st Marine Division commander General Oliver P. Smith. The 1st Marines
and 5th Marines began moving along the Inchon-Seoul road.

Early morning on September 16, the 5th Marines (from Red and Green Beaches) started
generally east along the Inchon-Seoul road, intending to link up with the left of the 1st
Marine Regiment so both regiments could move on Seoul. Six solitary T-34 tanks moving
west towards Inchon appeared as the advancing 5th Marines reached the village of
Kansong-ni. A strike force of eight Marine F4U Corsairs from VMF-214 attacked the tanks,
destroying two and driving the others off. M26 Pershing tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion
destroyed the three more KPA tanks shortly thereafter. South of the 5th Marines, the
1st Marines, having spent most of the day consolidating its scattered units, did not
move east until about 16:00 hrs.

Just before dawn on September 17, two companies of the 5th Marines, supported by
artillery and M-26 tanks, defeated a counterattack by a column of six T-34 tanks and
two hundred infantry, inflicting heavy casualties on the North Koreans.

Air attack on USS Rochester and HMS Jamaica
Just before daylight at 05:50 on 17 September, two Soviet-made North Korean aircraft
—probably Yakovlev Yak-9s—were seen overhead from Jamaica, and while trying to
identify them any doubts about their allegiance and intentions were resolved by the
explosion of a bomb close to the port side of Rochester. Four bombs were dropped,
one hitting and denting Rochester's crane but not exploding. There were no American
casualties. As the aircraft turned away Jamaica opened fire with her port 4-inch battery
on the leading aircraft. The second aircraft then turned to port to strafe Jamaica scoring
several hits: one armor-piercing round entering Y turret through the armor at the back
of the gun house and wounding a man in the leg; one chipping the side armor of the
ship; one exploding round burst on the plate surrounding the loaders of a quadruple
pom-pom, wounding three men (one of whom died later of his wounds after being
transferred to the hospital ship USS Consolation); and one on the foremast at the
level of the gun direction platform scattering small splinters. Every close range weapon
available opened fire on this aircraft, which was disintegrating as it went over the
ship, crashing close on the starboard side of Jamaica.

Breakthrough
Kimpo Airfield
The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines flared off to the left (north) on September 17th to secure
Kimpo airfield, west of Seoul

Kimpo airfield was the largest and most important in Korea. On September 17, General
MacArthur was extremely urgent in his request for the early capture of Kimpo airfield. Once
it was secured, the Fifth Air Force and USMC aviation units could bring fighters and bombers
over from Japan to operate more easily against North Korea. The attack on Kimpo
airfield was carried out by 2nd Battalion 5th Marines. The night of September 17–18 at
Kimpo, the KPA unsuccessfully attempted to recapture Kimpo with those forces that had
not already fled across the Han River, under the command of Brigadier General Wan Yong
(the commander of the North Korean Air Force). The counterattacks were repelled by
entrenched Marine Corps infantry, armor and artillery.

By morning the North Koreans were all gone, and Kimpo airfield was securely in the hands
of the Marines. Kimpo airfield was in excellent shape; the North Koreans had not had time
to do any major demolition. In fact, several North Korean planes were still on the field.
Kimpo would now become the center of UN land-based air operations.

On September 19, US engineers repaired the local railroad up to 8 miles (13 km) inland.
After the capture of Kimpo airfield, transport planes began flying in gasoline and
ordnance for the aircraft stationed there. The Marines continued unloading supplies
and reinforcements. By September 22, they had unloaded 6,629 vehicles and 53,882
troops, along with 25,512 tons (23,000 tonnes) of supplies.

Battle of Seoul
In contrast to the quick victory at Inchon, the advance on Seoul was slow and bloody. The
KPA launched another T-34 attack, which was trapped and destroyed and a Yak bombing
run in Inchon harbor, which did little damage. The KPA attempted to stall the UN offensive
to allow time to reinforce Seoul and withdraw troops from the south.
Though warned that the process of taking Seoul would allow remaining KPA forces in the
south to escape, MacArthur felt that he was bound to honor promises given to the South
Korean government to retake the capital as soon as possible.

On the second day, vessels carrying the 7th Infantry Division arrived in Inchon Harbor.
Almond was eager to get the division into position to block a possible KPA movement
from the south of Seoul. On the morning of September 18, the division's 2nd Battalion,
32nd Infantry Regiment landed at Inchon and the remainder of the regiment went
ashore later in the day. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion moved up to relieve a
Marine battalion occupying positions on the right flank south of Seoul. Meanwhile,
the 7th Division's 31st Infantry Regiment came ashore at Inchon. Responsibility for
the zone south of Seoul highway passed to the 7th Division at 18:00 on September
19. The 7th Infantry Division then engaged in heavy fighting with KPA forces on
the outskirts of Seoul.

Before the battle, North Korea had just one understrength division in the city, with the
majority of its forces south of the capital. MacArthur personally oversaw the 1st
Marine Regiment as it fought through KPA positions on the road to Seoul. Control of
Operation Chromite was then given to Almond,, the X Corps commander. Almond
was in an enormous hurry to capture Seoul by September 25, exactly three months
after the North Korean assault across the 38th Parallel. On September 22, the
Marines entered Seoul to find it fortified. Casualties mounted as the forces engaged
in house-to-house fighting. On September 26, the Hotel Bando (which had served
as the US Embassy) was cleared by E Company of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines.
During this fight several Marines were wounded.

Almond declared Seoul liberated the evening of September 25, a claim repeated by
MacArthur the following day. However, at the time of Almond's declaration, US
Marines were still engaged in house-to-house combat as the KPA remained in most
of the city. It was not until September 28 that the last of the KPA elements were
driven out or destroyed.

Pusan Perimeter breakout
While the 5th Marines came ashore at Inchon, the last KPA troops in South Korea still
fighting were defeated when Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan
Perimeter started on 16 September, joining the Army's X Corps in a coordinated attack
on KPA forces. By 22 September the KPA forces around the Perimeter were in full retreat
and the Eighth Army and ROK forces began a full counteroffensive to pursue the KPA
on 23 September. Of the 70,000 KPA troops around Pusan, in the aftermath of the Pusan
Perimeter battle, KPA casualties from September 1 to September 15 ranged from 36,000
to 41,000 killed and captured, with an unknown total number of wounded. However,
because UN forces had concentrated on taking Seoul rather than cutting off the KPA's
withdrawal north, the remaining 30,000 KPA soldiers escaped to the north, where they
were soon reconstituted as a cadre for the formation of new KPA divisions hastily
re-equipped by the Soviet Union. The UN assault continued into North Korea on 30
September.

Analysis
Most military scholars consider the battle one of the most decisive military operations in
modern warfare. Spencer C. Tucker, the American military historian, described the Inchon
landings as "a brilliant success, almost flawlessly executed," which remained "the only
unambiguously successful,  large-scale US combat operation" for the next 40 years.
Commentators have described the  Inchon operation as MacArthur's "greatest success"
and "an example of brilliant generalship  and military genius."

However, Russell Stolfi argues that the landing itself was a strategic masterpiece but it
was followed by an advance to Seoul in ground battle so slow and measured that it
constituted an operational disaster, largely negating the successful landing. He contrasts
the US military's 1950 Inchon-Seoul operation with the German offensive in the Baltic in
1941. American forces achieved a strategic masterpiece in the Inchon landing in September
1950 and then largely negated it by a slow, tentative, 11-day advance on Seoul, only 20
miles (32 km) away. By contrast, in the Baltic region in 1941 the German forces achieved
strategic surprise on the first day of their offensive and then, exhibiting a breakthrough
mentality, pushed forward rapidly, seizing key positions and advancing almost 200 miles
(320 km) in four days. The American advance was characterized by cautious, restrictive
orders, concerns about phase lines, limited reconnaissance and command posts well in
the rear, while the Germans positioned their leaders as far forward as possible, relied on
oral or short written orders, reorganized combat groups to meet immediate circumstances,
and engaged in vigorous reconnaissance. Despite this criticism Inchon was taken
within 24 hours with the loss of only a few dozen U.S. troops and General Walton Walker
refused to go on the offensive in southeastern South Korea unless the Inchon landings
were successful, as shown in the Pusan Perimeter Offensive.


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