Vietnam War ~ 1968.01.21-1968.07.09 Battle of Khe Sanh

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Prelude

The village of Khe Sanh was the seat of government of Hương Hoa district, an area of Bru
Montagnard villages and coffee plantations, situated about 7 miles (11 km) from the Laotian
frontier on Route 9, the northernmost transverse road in South Vietnam. The badly
deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands, and then
crossed the border into Laos. The origin of the combat base lay in the construction by US
Army Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old French fort.
The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups, whose purpose was to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to
protect the local population.

James Marino wrote that in 1964, General Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had
determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a
base for ... operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey
the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual
jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail." In November 1964,
the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh
Combat Base.

During the winter of 1964, Khe Sanh became the location of a launch site for the highly
classified Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (the site
was first established near the village and was later moved to the French fort).From
there, reconnaissance teams were launched into Laos to explore and gather intelligence
on the PAVN logistical system known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail (also known as "Truong Son
Strategic Supply Route" to the North Vietnamese soldiers).

According to Marino, "by 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a
larger strategy". With a view to eventually gaining approval for an advance through Laos to
interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he determined, "it was absolutely essential to hold the base",
and he gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam subsequently began planning for incursion into Laos, and in
October, construction of an airfield at Khe Sanh was completed.

The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines during 1967, when they
established an outpost next to the airstrip. This base was to serve as the western anchor
of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces
of South Vietnam known as I Corps. The Marines' defensive system stretched below
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the coast, along Route 9, to Khe Sanh. During 1966
the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp
down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border.

Background
Border battles
During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the
border regions of South Vietnam. All of these attacks were conducted by regimental-size
PAVN/VC units, but unlike the usual hit-and-run tactics used previously, these were
sustained and bloody affairs.

In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained
artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive
line south of the DMZ in northern Quảng Trị Province. Mortar rounds, artillery shells,
and 122 mm rockets fell randomly, but incessantly, upon the base. The September
bombardments ranged from 100 to 150 rounds per day, with a maximum on 25
September of 1,190 rounds. Westmoreland responded by launching Operation
Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege.
For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs
in nearly 4,000 airstrikes.

On 27 October, a PAVN regiment attacked an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
battalion at Song Be, capital of Phước Long Province. The PAVN fought for several
days, took casualties, and fell back. Two days later, the PAVN 273rd Regiment attacked
a Special Forces camp near the border town of Loc Ninh, in Bình Long Province.
Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division were able to respond quickly. After a ten-day
battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. At least 852 PAVN soldiers
were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese
dead.

The heaviest action took place near Dak To, in the central highlands province of Kon
Tum. There, the presence of the PAVN 1st Division prompted a 22-day battle that
had some of the most intense close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict.
American intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed,
while 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade,
and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action. Nonetheless, three of the four
battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat ineffective
during the battle.

American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by this series of enemy actions. For
them, no logic was apparent behind the sustained PAVN/VC offensives, other than
to inflict casualties on the allied forces. This they accomplished, but the casualties
absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might
have obtained. The border battles did, however, have two significant consequences
that were unappreciated at the time: they fixed the attention of the American
command on the border regions, and they drew American and ARVN forces away
from the coastal lowlands and cities, in preparation for the Tet Offensive.

Hill fights
Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. Even so, Westmoreland insisted
that it not only be occupied by the Marines, but that it also be reinforced. He was
vociferously opposed by General Lewis W. Walt, the Marine commander of I Corps. Walt
argued heatedly that the real target of the American effort should be the pacification and
protection of the population, not chasing the PAVN/VC in the hinterlands. Westmoreland
won out, however, and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment (1/3 Marines) was dispatched
to occupy the camp and airstrip on 29 September. By late January 1967, the 1/3 returned
to Japan and was relieved by Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9 Marines).
A single company was replacing an entire battalion.

On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of
unknown size north of Hill 861. This action prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive
aimed at taking Khe Sanh. The PAVN forces were in the process of gaining elevated
terrain before the launching of the main attack. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the
3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB
and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South.
PAVN forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties.
The Marines suffered 155 killed in action and 425 wounded. To prevent PAVN
observation of the main base at the airfield (and their possible use as firebases), the
hills of the surrounding Khe Sanh Valley had to be continuously occupied and defended
by separate Marine elements.

In the wake of the hill fights, a lull in PAVN activity occurred around Khe Sanh. By the end
of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion,
26th Marines. Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. relieved Walt as commander
of III MAF in June.

On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine
Regiment. Sporadic actions were taken in the vicinity during the late summer and early
fall, the most serious of which was the ambush of a supply convoy on Route 9. This
proved to be the last overland attempt at resupply for Khe Sanh until the following
March. During December and early January, numerous sightings of PAVN troops
and activities were made in the Khe Sanh area, but the sector remained relatively
quiet.

Decisions

A decision then had to be made by the American high command: either commit more
of the limited manpower in I Corps to the defense of Khe Sanh or abandon the base.
Westmoreland regarded this choice as quite simple. In his memoirs, he
listed the reasons for a continued effort.

Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route
9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance
planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ;
and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Leading Marine officers, however, were not all of the same opinion. Cushman, the new III
MAF commander, supported Westmoreland (perhaps wanting to mend Army/Marine
relations after the departure of Walt). Other concerns raised included the assertion
that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Quảng Trị City and other urban
areas; that a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration, since PAVN troops could
easily bypass Khe Sanh; that the base was too isolated and that the Marines "had neither the
helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations". Additionally,
Shore argues that the "weather was another critical factor because the poor visibility and low
overcasts attendant to the monsoon season made such operations hazardous." Brigadier
General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense
of the isolated outpost was ludicrous. "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere.
You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing."

As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all he needed to know was that the PAVN
had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Making the prospect even more
enticing was that the base was in an unpopulated area where American firepower could be
fully employed without civilian casualties. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly
elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented
proportions.

Battle
Attacks on the perimeter
First skirmishes

In early December 1967, the PAVN appointed Major General Tran Quy Hai as the local
commander for the actions around Khe Sanh, with Le Quang Dạo as his political commissar.
In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. Two
divisions, the 304th and the 325th, were assigned to the operation: the 325th was given
responsibility for the area around the north, while the 304th was given responsibility for
the southern sector. In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence
confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into
the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. The
324th Division was located in the DMZ area 10–15 miles (16–24 km) north of Khe
Sanh while the 320th Division was within easy reinforcing distance to the northeast.
They were supported logistically from the nearby Ho Chi Minh Trail. As a result
of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 13 December by the 1st Battalion, 9th
Marine Regiment. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the
North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th,
324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five
artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments
(the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus
one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local
force units.
At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (16.561°N 106.632°E),
across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions
from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations.
The PAVN 130 mm and 152 mm artillery pieces, and 122 mm rockets, had a longer
range than the Marine artillery support which consisted of 105 mm and 155 mm
howitzers. This range overmatch was used by the PAVN to avoid counter-battery
fire. They were assisted in their emplacement efforts by the continuing
bad weather of the winter monsoon.

During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen
outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. After failing to
respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth,
although wounded, escaped. This event prompted Cushman to reinforce Lownds
with the rest of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines. This marked the first time that all three
battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment had operated together in combat since the Battle
of Iwo Jima during the Second World War. To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan
River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another
manning  Hill 861A.

On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected  and
laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. Hills 881 South, 861, and the
main base itself would be simultaneously attacked that same evening. At 00:30 on 21
January, Hill 861 was attacked by about 300 PAVN troops, the Marines, however, were
prepared. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate
the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat.

The main base was then subjected to an intense mortar and rocket barrage. Hundreds of
mortar rounds and 122-mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-
ground structures. One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition
dump. Many of the artillery and mortar rounds stored in the dump  were thrown into
the air and detonated on impact within the base. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of
tear gas, which saturated the entire area. The  fighting and shelling on 21 January
resulted in 14 Marines killed and 43 wounded. Hours after the bombardment ceased,
the base was still in danger. At around  10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of
explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations.

At the same time as the artillery bombardment at KSCB, an attack was launched against
Khe Sanh village, seat of Hướng Hóa District. The village, 3 km south of  the base, was
defended by 160 local Bru troops, plus 15 American advisers. At dawn on 21 January, it
was attacked by a roughly 300-strong PAVN battalion. A platoon from Company D, 1/26
Marines was sent from the base but was withdrawn in the face of the superior PAVN
forces. Reinforcements from the  ARVN 256th Regional Force (RF) company were dispatched
aboard nine UH-1  helicopters of the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, but they were
landed near the abandoned French fort/former FOB-3 which was occupied by the PAVN who
killed many of the RF troops and 4 Americans, including Lieutenant colonel Joseph
Seymoe the deputy adviser for Quang Tri Province and forcing the remaining helicopters
to abandon the mission. On the morning of 22 January Lownds decided to evacuate
the remaining forces in the village with most of the Americans evacuated by helicopter
while two advisers led the surviving local forces overland to the combat base.

To eliminate any threat to their flank, the PAVN attacked Laotian Battalion BV-33, located
at Ban Houei Sane, on Route 9 in Laos. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23
January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. The Laotians were overrun,
and many fled to the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. The Battle of Ban Houei Sane,
not the attack three weeks later at Lang Vei, marked the first time that the PAVN had
committed an armored unit to battle.

PAVN artillery fell on the main base for the first time on 21 January. Several rounds also
landed on Hill 881. Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, SCB was further
reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. Five days later,
the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion,
which was deployed more for political than  tactical reasons. The Marines
and ARVN dug in and hoped that the approaching Tết truce (scheduled for 29–31
January) would provide some respite. On the afternoon of 29 January, however,
the 3rd Marine Division notified Khe Sanh that the truce had been cancelled. The Tet
Offensive was about to begin.

Westmoreland's plan to use nuclear weapons
Nine days before the Tet Offensive broke out, the PAVN opened the battle of Khe Sanh
and attacked the US forces just south of the DMZ. Declassified documents show that in
response, Westmoreland considered using nuclear weapons. In 1970, the Office of Air
Force History published a then "top secret", but now declassified, 106-page report, titled
The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968. Journalist Richard
Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had
warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear
or chemical weapons might have to be used." The report continues to state, "this prompted
Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS
(Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using
low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base."

Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. A secret
memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President
Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. It reveals that the
nuclear option was discounted because of terrain considerations that were unique to South
Vietnam, which would have reduced the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons.
McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in
South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended
there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". McNamara's thinking may have
also been affected by his aide David Morrisroe (later VP at Cal Tech where McNamara later
served as Trustee), whose brother Michael Morrisroe (1960 New York State Chess Champion)
was serving at the base.

Operation Niagara
During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later
renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos,
were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the
northwestern corner of South Vietnam. Due to the nature of these activities, and the
threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense
intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley.

Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara
II, was launched on the 21st, the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage.
The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for
the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. An airborne battlefield command and
control center aboard a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air
control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by
themselves or radioed in by ground units. When weather conditions precluded
FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine
AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77
stations.

Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application
of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". On an average day, 350 tactical fighter-
bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the
skies near the base. Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White
operation to assist in the Marine defense. On 22 January, the first sensor drops
took place, and by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been
dropped in 44 strings. The sensors were implanted by a special naval squadron,
Observation Squadron Sixty-Seven (VO-67). The Marines at KSCB credited 40% of
intelligence available to their fire-support coordination center to the sensors.

By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223
tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. Marine Corps aviators had flown 7,098
missions and released 17,015 tons. Naval aircrews, many of whom were redirected from
Operation Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped
7,941 tons of ordnance in the area. Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared
that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering
what those consequences could be: a political disaster."

Meanwhile, an interservice political struggle took place in the headquarters at Phu Bai
Combat Base, Saigon, and the Pentagon over who should control aviation assets
supporting the entire American effort in Southeast Asia.

Westmoreland had given his deputy commander for air operations, Air Force General William
W. Momyer, the responsibility for coordinating all air assets during the operation to support
KSCB. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation
squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. The Marines were
extremely reluctant to relinquish authority over their aircraft to an Air Force general.
The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air
Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. One headquarters
would allocate and coordinate all air assets, distributing them wherever they were considered
most necessary, and then transferring them as the situation required. The Marines, whose
aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control.
On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of
command to CINCPAC in Honolulu.

Heated debate arose among Westmoreland, Commandant of the Marine Corps Leonard F.
Chapman, Jr., and Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson. Johnson backed the Marine
position due to his concern over protecting the Army's air assets from Air Force co-option.

Westmoreland was so obsessed with the tactical situation that he threatened to resign
if his wishes were not obeyed. As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the
Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager.
Westmoreland insisted for several months that the entire Tet Offensive was a diversion,
including, famously, attacks on downtown Saigon and obsessively affirming that the true
objective of the North Vietnamese was Khe Sanh.

Fall of Lang Vei
The Tet Offensive was launched prematurely in some areas on 30 January. On the following
night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere
except Khe Sanh. The launching of the largest enemy offensive thus far in the conflict did
not shift Westmoreland's focus away from Khe Sanh. A press release prepared on the following
day (but never issued), at the height of Tet, showed that he was not about to be distracted.
"The enemy is attempting to confuse the issue ... I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's
attention away from the greatest area of threat, the northern part of I Corps. Let me caution
everyone not to be confused."

Not much activity (with the exception of patrolling) had occurred thus far during the battle
for the Special Forces of Detachment A-101 and their four companies of Bru CIDGs
stationed at Lang Vei. Then, on the morning of 6 February, the PAVN fired mortars into
the Lang Vei compound, wounding eight Camp Strike Force soldiers.At 18:10 hours,
the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152 mm
howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. The strike wounded two more Strike Force
soldiers and damaged two bunkers.

The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. The Americans
had forewarning of PAVN armor in the area from Laotian refugees from camp BV-33. SOG
Reconnaissance teams also reported finding tank tracks in the area surrounding Co Roc
mountain. Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had
not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered
it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial
reconnaissance.

It still came as a shock to the Special Forces troopers at Lang Vei when 12 tanks attacked
their camp. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks of the 203rd Armored Regiment
churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 7th Battalion, 66th
Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment, both elements of the 304th Division.
The ground troops had been specially equipped for the attack with satchel charges, tear
gas, and flame throwers. Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13
minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and
Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks.

The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just
such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it.
Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors.
During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman
accepted Lownds' decision. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Ladd (commander, 5th
Special Forces Group), who had just flown in from Khe Sanh, was reportedly, "astounded
that the Marines, who prided themselves on leaving no man behind, were willing to
write off all of the Green Berets and simply ignore the fall of Lang Vei."

Ladd and the commander of the SOG compound (whose men and camp had been
incorporated into the defenses of KSCB) proposed that, if the Marines would provide the
helicopters, the SOG reconnaissance men would go in themselves to pick up any
survivors. The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland
actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow the rescue operation to proceed.
The relief effort was not launched until 15:00, and it was successful. Of the
500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more
were wounded. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11
wounded.

Lownds infuriated the Special Forces personnel even further when the indigenous
survivors of Lang Vei, their families, civilian refugees from the area, and Laotian
survivors from the camp at Ban Houei Sane arrived at the gate of KSCB. Lownds
feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000,
and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Overnight, they were moved
to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there,
some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned
around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos.

The Lao troops were eventually flown back to their homeland, but not before the Laotian
regional commander remarked that his army had to "consider the South Vietnamese as
enemy because of their conduct." The Bru were excluded from evacuation from the
highlands by an order from the ARVN I Corps commander, who ruled that no Bru be
allowed to move into the lowlands. Ladd, back on the scene, reported that the
Marines stated, "they couldn't trust any gooks in their damn camp." There had been
a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General
Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces
soldiers as "hopped up ... wretches ... [who] were a law unto themselves." At the
end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500
meters from the Combat Base. Regardless, the SOG reconnaissance teams kept
patrolling, providing the only human intelligence available in the battle area. This,
however, did not prevent the Marine tanks within the perimeter from training their
guns on the SOG camp.

Logistics and supporting fire
On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved
into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost just outside the Combat Base held by
66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. At 04:15 on 8 February under cover of fog
and a mortar barrage, the PAVN penetrated the perimeter, overrunning most of the position
and pushing the remaining 30 defenders into the southwestern portion of the defenses.
For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the
pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. At 07:40, a relief
force from Company A, 2nd Platoon set out from the main base and attacked through the
PAVN, pushing them into supporting tank and artillery fire. By 11:00, the battle was over,
Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the
position, which was then abandoned.

On 23 February, KSCB received its worst bombardment of the entire battle. During one 8-hour
period, the base was rocked by 1,307 rounds, most of which came from 130-mm (used for the
first time on the battlefield) and 152-mm artillery pieces located in Laos. Casualties from
the bombardment were 10 killed and 51 wounded. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN
trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter. The majority of these
were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a
system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they
were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-
off points close to the perimeter. These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against
the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery
placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions.

Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from
Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's
perimeter to test the PAVN strength. The Marines pursued three enemy scouts, who led them
into an ambush. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead,
24 missing, and one taken prisoner.

In late February, ground sensors detected the 66th Regiment, 304th Division preparing to
mount an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter.
On the night of 28 February, the combat base unleashed artillery and airstrikes on
possible PAVN staging areas and routes of advance. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it
was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery
rounds and air strikes. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN
finally withdrew. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. Five more
attacks against their sector were launched during March.

By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe
Sanh sector. The 325C Divisional Headquarters was the first to leave, followed by
the 95C and 101D Regiments, all of which relocated to the west. At the same time, the
304th Division withdrew to the southwest. That did not mean, however, that battle was
over. On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again,
the ammunition dump was detonated.

On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of
the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. Following a
rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two
PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed
patrol. The Marines claimed 115 PAVN killed, while their own casualties amounted to 10
dead, 100 wounded, and two missing. At 08:00 the following day, Operation Scotland
was officially terminated. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the
US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus.

Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967,
were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. These
figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed
or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting
the base aboard aircraft. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were
counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the
operation. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops
were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN
force. The PAVN acknowledged 2,500 men killed in action. They also reported
1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 we
re sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north.

President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs
The fighting at Khe Sanh was so volatile that the Joint Chiefs and MACV commanders
were uncertain that the base could be held by the Marines. In the US, the media following
the battle drew comparisons with the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which proved
disastrous for the French. Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President
Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'".
He subsequently ordered the US military to hold Khe Sanh at all costs. As a result, "B-52
Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding
Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of
Vietnam in late March 1968.

Relief and retreat from Khe Sanh
Operation Pegasus (1–14 April 1968)
Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when
Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to
prepare a contingency plan. Route 9, the only practical overland route from the east, was
impassable due to its poor state of repair and the presence of PAVN troops. Tolson was
not happy with the assignment, since he believed that the best course of action, after Tet,
was to use his division in an attack into the A Shau Valley. Westmoreland, however, was
already planning ahead. Khe Sanh would be relieved and then used as the jump-off point
for a "hot pursuit" of enemy forces into Laos.

On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational
plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the
conflict. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would
launch a ground assault from Ca Lu Combat Base (16 km east of Khe Sanh) and head
west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would
air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover
the Marine advance. The advance would be supported by 102 pieces of artillery.
The Marines would be accompanied by their 11th Engineer Battalion, which would repair
the road as the advance moved forward. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne
Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation.

Westmoreland's planned relief effort infuriated the Marines, who had not wanted to hold
Khe Sanh in the first place and who had been roundly criticized for not defending it well.
The Marines had constantly argued that technically, Khe Sanh had never been under
siege, since it had never truly been isolated from resupply or reinforcement. Cushman was
appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces."


Regardless, on 1 April, Operation Pegasus began. Opposition from the North
Vietnamese was light and the primary problem that hampered the advance was
continual heavy morning cloud cover that slowed the pace of helicopter operations.
As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their
positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. Things heated
up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN
blocking force and fought a day-long engagement.

On the following day, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry captured the old French fort
near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. The link-up between the relief force and
the Marines at KSCB took place at 08:00 on 8 April, when the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry
Regiment entered the camp. The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic
on 11 April. On that day, Tolson ordered his unit to immediately make preparations for
Operation Delaware, an air assault into the A Shau Valley. At 08:00 on 15 April,
Operation Pegasus was officially terminated. Total US casualties during the operation
were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed
and 187 were wounded. Because of the close proximity of the enemy and their high
concentration, the massive B-52 bombings, tactical airstrikes, and vast use of artillery,
PAVN casualties were estimated by MACV as being between 10,000 and 15,000 men.

Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the
1st Marine Regiment. He made his final appearance in the story of Khe Sanh on 23 May,
when his regimental sergeant major and he stood before President Johnson and were
presented with a Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the 26th Marines.

Operation Scotland II
On 15 April, the 3rd Marine Division resumed responsibility for KSCB, Operation Pegasus
ended, and Operation Scotland II began with the Marines seeking out the PAVN in the
surrounding area. Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969
resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed.

Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland
II through the end of June 1968". He goes on to state that a further 72 were killed
as part Operation Scotland II throughout the remainder of the year, but that these
deaths are not included in the official US casualty lists for the Battle of Khe Sanh.
Twenty-five USAF personnel who were killed are also not included.

Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base
The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. Useful
equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. A limited attack
was made by a PAVN company on 1 July, falling on a company from the 3rd Battalion,
4th Marines, who were holding a position 3 km to the southeast of the base. Casualties
were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending
Marines lost two men. The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting,
which had killed five more Marines. The withdrawal of the last Marines under the cover
of darkness was hampered by the shelling of a bridge along Route 9, which had to be
repaired before the withdrawal could be completed.

Following the closure of the base, a small force of Marines remained around Hill 689
carrying out mopping-up operations.Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss
of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from
the area on 11 July. According to Brush, it was "the only occasion in which Americans
abandoned a major combat base due to enemy pressure" and in the aftermath, the
North Vietnamese began a strong propaganda campaign, seeking to exploit the US
withdrawal and to promote the message that the withdrawal had not been by choice.

The PAVN claim that they began attacking the withdrawing Americans on 26 June 1968
prolonging the withdrawal, killing 1,300 Americans and shooting down 34 aircraft before
"liberating" Khe Sanh on 15 July. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they
"eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft.

Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of
communication extended further into South Vietnam. Once the news of the closure of
KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the
reasoning behind its abandonment. They asked what had changed in six months so that
American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. The explanations given
out by the Saigon command were that "the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced
his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had
enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no
longer necessary."

While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau,
including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 5–19 October 1968 with minimal
opposition. On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed
west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the
9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by
the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation
found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. From 12
June to 6 July 1969, Task Force Guadalcanal comprising 1/9 Marines, 1st Battalion,
5th Infantry Regiment and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd ARVN Regiment occupied
the Khe Sanh area in Operation Utah Mesa. The Marines occupied Hill 950
overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was
handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base
until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. The gradual withdrawal of
US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969,
"although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war
would soon be relegated to a defensive stance."

According to military historian Ronald Spector, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe
Sanh as an American victory is impossible. With the abandonment of the base,
according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans
as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S.
war effort in Vietnam".


Aftermath
Termination of the McNamara Line
Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the
DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. Known as the McNamara Line,
it was initially codenamed "Project Nine" before being renamed "Dye Marker" by MACV
in September 1967. This occurred just as the PAVN began the first phase of their offensive,
launching attacks against Marine-held positions across the DMZ. These attacks hindered
the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified,
vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere
to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. Construction on the line was ultimately
abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile
strategy.

Assessment
The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most
intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. According to Gordon Rottman, even
the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue.
This question, known among American historians as the "riddle of Khe Sanh" has been
summed up by John Prados and Ray Stubbe: "Either the Tet Offensive was a diversion
intended to facilitate PAVN/VC preparations for a war-winning battle at Khe Sanh, or Khe
Sanh was a diversion to mesmerize Westmoreland in the days before Tet." In
assessing North Vietnamese intentions, Peter Brush cites the Vietnamese theater
commander, Võ Nguyên Giáp's claim "that Khe Sanh itself was not of importance, but only
a diversion to draw U.S. forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam".
This has led other observers to conclude that the siege served a wider PAVN strategy;
it diverted 30,000 US troops away from the cities that were the main targets of the Tet
Offensive.

Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh and whether the battle was an
attempt to replicate the Việt Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien
Phu has long been a point of contention. Westmoreland believed that the latter was the
case and this belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse".
Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists as to why
Hanoi would have committed so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for
the Tet Offensive. The fact that the North Vietnamese only committed about half of their
available forces to the offensive (60–70,000), the majority of whom were VC, is cited in
favor of Westmoreland's argument. Other theories argued that the forces around Khe
Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area, or that they were
serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the
American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. However, North Vietnamese sources
claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh, but they were forced to
retreat to avoid destruction. The PAVN claimed that Khe Sanh was "a stinging defeat from
both the military and political points of view": Westmoreland was replaced two months
after the end of the battle and his successor explained the retreat in different ways.

General Creighton Abrams has also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been
planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. He believed that the PAVN's actions during Tet proved
it. He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese
at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there (
although the PAVN did commit three regiments to the fighting from the Khe Sanh sector),
instead of dividing their forces.

Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends
against the middle. This strategy has come to be known as the Option Play. If the PAVN
could take Khe Sanh, all well and good for them. If they could not, they would occupy the
attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as they could to
facilitate the Tet Offensive. This view was supported by a captured (in 1969) North
Vietnamese study of the battle. According to it, the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if
they could, but the price they were willing to pay had limits. Their main objectives were
to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions.

Another theory is that the actions around Khe Sanh (and the other border battles) were
simply a feint, a ruse meant to focus American attention (and forces) on the border.
General and historian Dave Palmer accepts this rationale: "General Giap never had any
intention of capturing Khe Sanh ... [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. And it had
accomplished its purpose magnificently."

Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, has pointed
out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the
base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. Had they
simply contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the
Marines. Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was
never a serious intention to take the base by also arguing that neither the water supply
nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN.

One argument leveled by Westmoreland at the time (and often quoted by historians of the
battle) was that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh compared with
several PAVN divisions. At the time Hanoi made the decision to move in around the
base, though, Khe Sanh was held by only two (or even just one) American battalions.
Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN
divisions was debatable. Yet, even if Westmoreland believed his statement, his argument
never moved on to the next logical level. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half
of all US combat troops—nearly 50 maneuver battalions—to I Corps.

Use during Operation Lam Son 719
On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II,
which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying
of KSCB as a forward supply base for Operation Lam Son 719. On 8 February 1971,
the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US
ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. US logistical, aerial,
and artillery support was provided to the operation. Following the ARVN
defeat in Laos, the newly re-opened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and
artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.