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Vietnam War ~ 1972.03 Easter Offensive

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Post time 2021-1-18 16:17:57 | Show all posts |Read mode
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter_Offensive

Background
Planning

In the wake of the failed South Vietnamese Operation Lam Son 719, the Hanoi leadership
began discussing a possible offensive during the 19th Plenum of the Central Committee
of the Vietnam Workers' Party in early 1971. Convinced that they had destroyed South
Vietnam's best units during Lam Son 719, by December, the Politburo had decided to
launch a major offensive early in the following year. 1972 would be a U.S. presidential
election year, and the possibility of affecting the outcome was enticing and there was
increasing anti-war sentiment among the population and government of the U.S.
With American troop withdrawals, South Vietnamese forces were stretched to breaking
point along a border of more than 600 miles (966 km) and the poor performance of
ARVN troops in the offensive into Laos promised an easy victory.

This decision marked the end of three years of political infighting between two factions
within the Politburo: those members grouped around Trường Chinh, who favored following
the Chinese model of continued low-intensity guerrilla warfare and rebuilding the north
and the "southern firsters" around Defense Minister Võ Nguyên Giáp, supported by First
Party Secretary Lê Duẩn (both of whom supported the Soviet model of big offensives).
The failure of the Tet Offensive of 1968, had led to a downgrading of Giap's influence
but the victory achieved over South Vietnamese forces during the Laotian incursion, brought
Giap's strategy back into the ascendant. Lê Duẩn was given responsibility for planning the
operation but Giap never rose to his former prominence, dealing chiefly with logistical matters
and the approval of operational planning. The officer entrusted with the conduct of the
offensive was the PAVN chief of staff, General Văn Tiến Dũng.

The central questions then became where and with what forces the offensive would be
launched and what its goals were to be. North Vietnam had used the border regions of
Laos and Cambodia as supply and manpower conduits for a decade and a demilitarized
zone that separated the two Vietnams. There, the line of communication would be
shortest and forces could be concentrated where "the enemy is weakest...violent attacks
will disintegrate enemy forces...making it impossible for him to have enough troops to
deploy elsewhere." This was an important consideration, since the northern thrust would
serve to divert South Vietnamese attention and resources, while two other attacks were
to be launched: one into the central highlands, to cut the country in two and another
eastwards from Cambodia to threaten Saigon.

The offensive was given a title steeped in Vietnamese history. In 1773, the three Tây Sơn
brothers (so-called because of the place of their origin) united a Vietnam divided by civil
war and social unrest. The youngest brother, Nguyễn Huệ, then defeated an invading
Chinese army on the outskirts of Hanoi in 1788.

The campaign eventually employed the equivalent of 14 divisions. There was the distinct
possibility of destroying or at least crippling large elements of the ARVN; possibly deposing
of South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu; convincing the U.S. as to the
hopelessness of continued support to the South and demonstrating the failure of
Vietnamization. The prospect of seizing a South Vietnamese provincial capital, which
could then be proclaimed as the seat of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, was
also enticing. The attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership was illustrated in an article
in a 1972 party journal: "It doesn't matter whether the war is promptly ended or prolonged...
Both are opportunities to sow the seeds; all we have to do is to wait for the time to harvest
the crop."

The northern leadership was taken aback during the summer of 1971, when an
announcement was made that U.S. President Richard Nixon would visit the People's
Republic of China, on a diplomatic mission before May 1972. The Chinese placated the
suspicions of their ally, by reassuring North Vietnam that even more military and
economic aid would be forthcoming in 1972. The Soviet Union, perceiving the growing
antagonism between the People's Republic and North Vietnam, sought to widen the rift
by also agreeing to "additional aid without reimbursement", for North Vietnam's military
forces.

These agreements led to a flood of equipment and supplies necessary for a modern,
conventional army. This included 400 T-34, T-54 and Type 59 (a Chinese version of
the T-54) medium and 200 PT-76 light amphibious tanks, hundreds of anti-aircraft
missiles, including the shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SA-7 Strela (called the Grail in
the West), anti-tank missiles, including the wire-guided AT-3 Sagger and heavy-caliber,
long-range artillery. To man the new equipment, 25,000 North Vietnamese troops
received specialized training abroad, 80 percent of them in the Soviet Union or
Eastern Europe. A contingent of high-level Soviet military personnel also arrived
in Vietnam and stayed until March 1972 in preparation for the offensive.






Miscalculation
During late 1971, U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence estimates of communist
intentions were mixed. An offensive was expected, but intelligence as to its timing,
location, and size were confusing. The communists had mounted the Tet Offensive
in 1968, but it had been conducted mainly by Vietcong (VC) in the initial phase,
which had been destroyed in the process. Without VC support, a large-scale PAVN
offensive was considered highly unlikely. A PAVN thrust across the DMZ was also
considered unlikely. Past infiltration and offensive operations had been conducted
through and from Laotian and Cambodian territory and a DMZ offensive would be a
blatant violation of the Geneva Agreement, which North Vietnam was adamant in defending.

In December, intelligence became conclusive that PAVN units supporting Khmer Rouge
operations in Cambodia began returning to the border areas. In Laos and Cambodia,
there was also an unusual expansion of infiltration. In North Vietnam, there was a
noticeable increase in military recruitment. In January, Defense Intelligence Agency
officers briefed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to state that PAVN would attack after the
Tết holidays and that the offensive would involve the widespread use of armored forces.
Laird was unconvinced and told the U.S. Congress in late January that a large communist
offensive "was not a serious possibility"

U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence services had no consensus as to communist
intentions, but Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was suspicious and sent
several reconnaissance teams into the Mụ Giạ and Ban Karai Pass areas and discovered
a buildup of PAVN forces and equipment. MACV then decided that the North Vietnamese
were preparing for an offensive in the central highlands and the northern provinces of South
Vietnam. The brunt of an attack would be borne by South Vietnamese forces since the U.S.
strength had been reduced to 69,000 troops, most of whom were in support roles and the
number was to be reduced to 27,000 by 30 November.

The U.S. commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, was convinced an offensive was
likely but was also convinced that the attack would begin during or near the Tết holidays,
at the beginning of the year. He notified Admiral Thomas Moorer, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the North Vietnamese might attempt to "duplicate the effects
of the 1968 offensive, perhaps by a limited operation aimed less at inflicting defeat on
the battlefield than in influencing American public opinion." The consensus at MACV
was that such an offensive would be launched against II Corps, in the Central Highlands.
When the offensive did not occur, he and his headquarters were ridiculed in the American
press for crying wolf. The moment of crisis seemed to have passed, and by the end of
March, allied forces that had been standing by had returned to pacification efforts.
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker left for Nepal, and General Abrams went to Thailand
to spend the Easter holiday with his family.

The ARVN units upon which the initial North Vietnamese attack was to fall included the 1st
and 3rd Divisions in Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên Provinces and the 2nd Division, further
south. The force was supplemented by two brigades of Marines (the 147th and 258th),
the 51st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Ranger Group and Regional and Popular Forces,
approximately 30,000 men. The units were in static defensive positions and lacked adequate
mobile reserves.

Bearing the initial brunt of the attack would be the 3rd Division, which had been created
in October 1971 and was located in an arc of outposts near the DMZ, to replace departing
American troops. To create the new unit, the 1st Division (arguably ARVN's best unit) was
stripped of its 2nd Regiment and the 11th Armored Cavalry was brought up from the I
Corps reserve. Both units were experienced, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led.
The 3rd Division's other two regiments, the 56th and 57th were made up of recaptured
deserters, men released from jail, and regional and provincial forces.[28] It was led by
cast-off officers and sergeants from other units. Like other ARVN units at this stage of
the conflict, the division suffered from a dearth of American advisors, who then served
only at regimental, brigade, and divisional headquarters.

Because of the general belief that the North Vietnamese would not violate the sacrosanct
boundary, the unit was stationed in the relatively "safe" area directly below the DMZ. The
division was commanded by newly-promoted Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, the former
deputy commander of the 1st Division. The I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Hoàng
Xuân Lãm, was an officer who epitomized the indecision and the ineffectiveness of Saigon's
command structure, as had been discovered all too blatantly during Operation Lam Son 719.
Lam concentrated on administrative matters and left tactical decisions to his subordinate
commanders. Considering the circumstances, that was a workable solution only as long as
his division commanders encountered no major difficulties.

U.S. intelligence had been squabbling over a possible PAVN attack across the DMZ attack
during the months preceding the offensive. DIA analysts "cautiously" predicted such a
contingency, but the CIA downplayed the possibility. General Lam's American advisors
agreed with his assessment that a blatant North Vietnamese violation of the Geneva
Accord was unlikely.

When the weekend of Easter 1972 arrived, General Giai had planned to rotate the
operational areas of his 56th Regiment (along the central DMZ) with the 2nd Regiment
(around the artillery base at Camp Carroll in the west). Because of a truck shortage, the
units were moved simultaneously and became hopelessly intermixed and disorganized.
At 11:30 on 30 March, both unit headquarters shut down their radios, for the exchange of
operational areas. With communications fragmented, its units entangled, and the
weather bad enough to prevent aerial operations, the 3rd Division offered the massed
PAVN forces to the north an irresistible target.




Offensive
I Corps – Quảng Trị






The offensive began at noon on 30 March 1972, when an intense artillery barrage rained
down on the northernmost ARVN outposts in Quảng Trị Province.

Two PAVN divisions (the 304th and 308th – approximately 30,000 troops) supported by more
than 100 tanks (in 2 Regiments) then rolled over the Demilitarized Zone to attack I Corps,
the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese 308th Division and
two independent regiments assaulted the "ring of steel", the arc of ARVN firebases just south
of the DMZ

From the west, the 312th, including an armoured regiment, moved out of Laos along Route
9, past Khe Sanh, and into the Quảng Trị River Valley. Significantly, allied intelligence had
failed to predict both the scale of the offensive and the method of attack, giving PAVN "the
inestimable benefit of shock effect, a crucial psychological edge over defenders who had
expected something quite different."

On 1 April, South Vietnamese General Giai, ordered a withdrawal of the 3rd Division south
of the Cửa Việt River in order for his troops to reorganize. The following morning, ARVN
armoured elements held off a PAVN offensive briefly when the crucial Highway QL-1 bridge
over the Cửa Việt River at Đông Hà was blown up by Capt. John Ripley, adviser to the 3rd
Vietnamese Marine Battalion. The initial PAVN units were then joined by the 320B and
325C Divisions.

Simultaneously, the 324B Division moved out of the A Sầu Valley and advanced directly
eastward toward Fire Bases Bastogne and Checkmate, which protected the old imperial
capital of Huế from the west.

The North Vietnamese advance had been timed to coincide with the seasonal monsoon,
whose 500 feet (152 m) cloud ceilings negated many U.S. airstrikes. PAVN advance
elements were soon followed by anti-aircraft units armed with new ZSU-57-2 tracked
weapon platforms and man-portable, shoulder-fired Grail missiles, which made
low-level bombing attacks hazardous.

Camp Carroll, an artillery firebase halfway between the Laotian border and the coast,
was the linchpin of the South Vietnamese northern and western defense line and was
the strongest obstacle to the North Vietnamese before Quảng Trị City. On 2 April,
Colonel Pham Van Dinh, commander of the 56th ARVN Regiment, surrendered the
camp and his 1,500 troops with barely a shot being fired. Later in the day, ARVN
troops abandoned Mai Loc, the last western base. This allowed North Vietnamese
forces to cross the Cam Lộ bridge, 11 kilometers to the west of Đông Hà. PAVN then
had almost unrestricted access to western Quảng Trị Province north of the Thạch
Hãn River.

On 21 April, Abrams notified the U.S. Secretary of Defense that
In summary...the pressure is mounting and the battle has become brutal...the senior military
leadership has begun to bend and in some cases to break. In adversity, it is losing its will
and cannot be depended upon to take the measures necessary to stand and fight.

The PAVN advance was slowed by delaying actions for three weeks, and the South
Vietnamese launched several counterattacks, but on the morning of 27 April, the North
Vietnamese came on again, launching multi-pronged attacks against Đông Hà (which
fell on the following day) and advancing to within 1.5 kilometers of Quảng Trị City.
General Giai had planned a staged withdrawal from the city to consolidate south of the
Thạch Hãn, but bewildered by conflicting orders from Lãm and Giai, most ARVN
formations splintered and then collapsed, conceding most of the province north of
the city.

On 29 April, Giai ordered a general retreat to the My Chanh River, thirteen kilometers to
the south. U.S. military advisors in Quảng Trị called for emergency helicopter extraction
and, on 1 May 132 survivors were evacuated from Quảng Trị, including 80 U.S. soldiers.

The exodus of ARVN forces was joined by tens of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians
fleeing from the fighting. As the mass of humanity jostled and shoved its way south on
Highway 1, it presented an inviting target for North Vietnamese artillerists. They were
soon joined by PAVN infantry, who moved by the flank to attack the column. ARVN units,
with no leadership and all unit cohesion gone, could muster no defense. Meanwhile, to
the west, Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate had fallen after staunch ARVN
defense and massive B-52 bomber strikes, which inflicted heavy casualties.

Giai evacuated the last of his forces from Quảng Trị City, which fell to PAVN forces on 2
May. That same day General Lam was summoned to Saigon for a meeting with President
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. He was relieved of command of I Corps and replaced by Lieutenant
General Ngô Quang Trưởng, commander of IV Corps. Trưởng's mission was to defend
Huế, minimize further losses, and retake captured territory. Although saddled with raw
troops and constantly countermanded by his superiors, General Giai had conducted a
reasonably good defense. Even Trưởng pleaded his case with Thiệu, wanting to keep
Giai in command of the 3rd Division. It was in vain. Giai, who was to be made the
scapegoat for the collapse, was tried for "desertion in the face of the enemy", and
sentenced to five years in prison.

I Corps – Huế





Hoping to break the stalemate that was developing on the northern front, Lieutenant General
Trần Văn Quang, commander of the B-4 Front, attacked on 1 April west from the A Shau
Valley toward Huế with the 324B Division. Spoiling attacks by the ARVN 1st Division,
however, threw off the timetable.

On 28 April 29 and 803rd PAVN Regiments seized Firebase Bastogne, the strongest anchor
on Huế's western flank.This made Firebase Checkmate untenable, and it too was evacuated
that night. This exposed Huế to a direct thrust along Route 547. On 2 May PAVN forces south
of Huế tried to surround the city.

The PAVN also attempted to press their attack southward down Highway 1 and across the My
Chanh River to Huế, but, fortunately for the South Vietnamese, after Trưởng took command,
the 1st and Marine Divisions were reinforced by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the Airborne
Division (which now totaled three brigades), and the reorganized 1st Ranger Group, raising
the ARVN manpower total to 35,000. Also fortuitous was a one-week clearing of the weather,
which allowed the application of massive U.S. bombing.

The PAVN advance was halted on 5 May.

I Corps – Counteroffensive
By mid-May, Trưởng felt strong enough to go on the offensive in a series of limited attacks,
feints, and raids codenamed Song Than (Tsunami) that were planned to throw the North
Vietnamese off balance, enlarge the defensive perimeter around Huế, and deny the enemy
time and space to maneuver. Between 15 and 20 May, Firebases Bastogne and Checkmate
were recaptured.

PAVN forces then launched another attempt to take the city on 21 May, losing 18 tanks
and approximately 800 men in the process.

On 25 May a second North Vietnamese assault managed to cross the My Chanh River,
but ARVN defenders put up ferocious resistance, forcing their enemy back across on 29
May. This was the last serious assault on the defenses of Huế. Major General Frederick
J. Kroesen, senior U.S. advisor in I Corps, believed that the fall of Quảng Trị should
have heralded the fall of Huế, but the North Vietnamese did not exploit their opportunity
quickly enough. "That he failed completely to take advantage of the moment must be
classed as another great blunder of the Quảng Trị campaign."

By mid-June, clearing weather allowed more accurate aerial bombardment and shelling from
U.S. warships offshore. On the 14th, Trưởng briefed President Thiệu and MACV on his planned
counterattack to retake Quảng Trị Province. Thiệu was not convinced, preferring a smaller-scale
operation. The persistent Trưởng finally convinced the president, emphasizing that such an
effort would be possible "employing the superior firepower of our American ally." Thiệu finally
approved the concept.

Trưởng launched Operation Lam Son 72 on 28 June.

The 1st Division continued its westward push toward Laos while the Airborne and Marine
Divisions, the 1st Ranger Group, and the 7th Armored Cavalry moved north to retake
Quảng Trị. The Airborne Division led the way and, utilizing airmobile end-runs and the North
Vietnamese were slowly levered out of their defensive positions. The division then advanced
to the outskirts of Quảng Trị City within ten days, but then President Thieu intervened in
the operation. Trưởng had planned to bypass the city and push on quickly to the Cua Viet
River, thereby isolating any PAVN defenders.[54] Thiệu, however, now demanded that
Quảng Trị be taken immediately, seeing the city as "a symbol and a challenge" to his
authority.

It was not going to be an easy task for General Trưởng. The ARVN assault bogged down
in the outskirts and the North Vietnamese, apprised of the plans for the offensive, moved
the 304th and 308th Divisions to the west to avoid the U.S. airpower that was about to be
unleashed upon Quảng Trị.

The defense of the city and its walled citadel was left to PAVN replacement units and
militia. One participant recalled : "The new recruits came in at dusk. They were dead
by dawn... No one had time to check where they were from, or who was their commander."
Others described the defense as a "senseless sacrifice" and referred to Quảng Trị as
"Hamburger City". Nevertheless, the PAVN units stationed within the citadel were well
dug in, had the advantage of terrain and mass artillery supports. An ARVN early victory
was denied, and the fighting continue unabated.

On 11 July, the ARVN Airborne Division and South Vietnamese Marines launched a
heli-borne assault supported by U.S. Marine helicopter squadrons HMM-164, HMM-165
and U.S. Army's Troop F, 4th Cavalry north and east of the city which would cut the
last remaining road and force the PAVN to reinforce and resupply across the Thach
Han River, making them vulnerable to air strikes. After a vicious, three-day battle
against the 48th Regiment of the 320B PAVN Division broke and withdrew.

On 27 July, the ARVN Marine Division was ordered to relieve the Airborne units as
the lead element in the battle. But progress was slow, consisting of vicious
house-to-house fighting and incessant artillery barrages by both sides. In September,
the final assault to capture the heavily defended citadel was launched; it was finally
taken on 16 September. Trưởng's forces then advanced to the southern bank of the
Thach Han River, where they halted, exhausted and depleted by heavy casualties
and unable to push on to Đông Hà.

During July, American aircraft flew 5,461 tactical sorties and 2,054 B-52 strikes and
operated 5 aircraft carriers to support the counteroffensive.

III Corps – An Lộc





The initial wave of the offensive was followed on 5 April by a PAVN advance out of Cambodia
into Bình Long Province, northeast of Saigon. Its targets were the towns and airfields at Lộc
Ninh, Quần Lợi, and An Lộc. The possible initial goals of the offensive in III Corps remain
unclear, but probably began as probes that, if successful, could be easily reinforced.

The invasion was launched from Cambodian Base Area 708 by the B-2 Front's 5th PAVN/VC
Division and 203rd Armoured Regiment, which advanced down Highway 9 toward the border
outpost of Loc Ninh. There, the 2,000 men of the ARVN 9th Regiment and a battalion of
Rangers beat back five separate infantry/armor assaults before collapsing under the attack on
7 April. The North Vietnamese then isolated the 25th Division in neighboring Tây Ninh
Province by sending two regiments to attack its forward outposts.

Sensing that the provincial capital of An Lộc would be the next target, the III Corps commander,
Lieutenant General Nguyễn Văn Minh dispatched the 5th Division to hold the town. They were
reinforced by two battalions of the Ranger Group (on 7 April) and by two additional infantry
battalions (on 10 and 11 April). The 21st Division, which had been stationed in the Mekong
Delta, was rushed to Chơn Thành Camp to join a regiment of the 9th Division as a relief
force. All forces in the area were placed under the command of Brigadier General Lê Văn
Hưng, commander of the 5th Division. The move was fortuitous for the South Vietnamese,
since PAVN forces were indeed proceeding eastward toward An Lộc. Simultaneously,
the PAVN 7th Division bypassed the town and moved south along Highway 13 to block
any relief effort launched from Chơn Thành. The North Vietnamese had decided that An
Lộc, with its close proximity to Saigon, would be proclaimed as the capital of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government, but even if they had been able to seize the town, they would never
have been able to hold it. American air power would have made such an eventuality
impossible.

By 13 April, An Lộc was surrounded and under a combined artillery, armored, and infantry attack
by the 9th PAVN/VC Division. PAVN forces advanced on the town through a deluge rockets,
bombs, and napalm delivered by U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft supported by massed
artillery, tank, and small arms fire. Inside the town, the contingent of U.S. advisors became
essential to the defense, serving as a separate staff organizing fire and air support, logistics,
and intelligence. Colonel William Miller, the senior U.S. advisor, was not happy with General
Hung's continuous reluctance to launch counterattacks and his reliance on U.S. air power to
defeat the North Vietnamese. His hesitation and lack of motivation prompted Miller to report
that: "He is tired – unstable – irrational – irritable – inadvisable – and unapproachable."

The attacks persisted and PAVN forces eventually battered their way into the town, seizing
the airfield and reducing the ARVN perimeter to about a square kilometer. During another
assault on the 21st, PAVN tanks actually forced their way through the defense perimeter
but were held at bay and then destroyed by anti-tank weapons and helicopter gunships.
PAVN infantry did, however, manage to seize most of the northern sector of the town,
where they began digging in (often right across the street from the ARVN defenders).
The initial shock of ARVN troops instilled by North Vietnamese armor was soon abated
when they discovered that, because the supporting infantry failed to advance with the
tanks, they became easy prey for anti-tank weapons.[66] On other occasions, the
opposite would occur, with massed infantry assaults moving forward without armored
support. This failure of tactical coordination was one of PAVN's prime weaknesses
during the offensive, and one that the allies were quick to exploit.

As a result of his failure to seize the town quickly, the commander of the 9th Division
was officially reprimanded and local command was handed over the senior officer of
the 5th PAVN/VC Division.[67] Besides the lack of coordination, the major difficulty
for the PAVN was the rain of ordnance delivered upon them by incessant air strikes,
which further reduced manpower and made resupply difficult.

After the failure of the assault on 21 April, the battle devolved into a siege, with the
North Vietnamese pounding An Lộc and its defenders with 1,200 to 2,000 mortar,
rocket, and artillery rounds per day.[68] An Lộc was completely surrounded and
could only be resupplied by air, a situation made more difficult by the loss of the
airfield. Resupply was accomplished, however, by 448 aerial missions which
managed to deliver 2,693 tons of air-dropped food, medical supplies, and
ammunition, supported by the US Army's "549th QM (AD)" (QuarterMaster,
Air Delivery) Rigger Company, which had been rapid-deployed from Okinawa
in early April.

From 22 April to 10 May, the tactical situation remained stable at what the Paris
Match was calling "a Verdun or a Stalingrad" in III Corps.

On the morning of 11 May, another PAVN assault was launched after being preceded by
an artillery bombardment that fired over 8,300 shells into a defense perimeter that had
shrunk to a mere 1,000 yards (910 m) by 1,500 yards (1,400 m) before the day was
over. PAVN forces again forced their way into An Lộc, but the effort collapsed in the
face of tremendous aerial attack, which cost the North Vietnamese 40 tanks and
over 800 men. The reasons for the failure were not hard to discern. Beginning
at 05:30 that morning and continuing for the next 25 hours, the U.S. Air Force
delivered a B-52 strike every 55 minutes to support the defense. For the next
three days, each time PAVN troops assembled to resume the attack, they were
bombed in their assembly areas.

The climactic attack on An Lộc was launched on 14 May, when the North Vietnamese
attacked directly into the teeth of the ARVN defense. The failed assault was described
by Colonel Walt Ulmer, the 5th Division's senior advisor: "they were simply trying to
pile on and pile on and pile on. They frittered away an awful lot of manpower."

A relief effort had been launched by the 21st ARVN Division, but it never arrived at
An Lộc. For three weeks the division crept northward along Highway 13 but it was
held up by constant delaying actions by smaller PAVN forces. Although the division
never reached its goal, it inadvertently supported the beleaguered city by eventually
diverting almost all of the elements of the 7th PAVN Division from the fighting.

Although North Vietnamese forces remained in the area and continued to shell An Lộc
heavily, the impetus of their offensive was over. By 12 June, the last PAVN forces were
driven from the city and its environs and over 1,000 ARVN wounded were evacuated.
Slowly, the decimated North Vietnamese units faded away to the north and west as
others covered their withdrawal. On 18 June, the headquarters of III Corps declared
the siege to be over. The Saigon government claimed that 12,500 South Vietnamese
soldiers had been killed or wounded at An Lộc.[75] American sources claimed that
25,000 PAVN or NLF troops had been killed or wounded during the action, although
those numbers could never be confirmed.

II Corps – Kon Tum






The objective of PAVN forces during the third phase of the Nguyen Hue Offensive was
to seize the cities of Kon Tum and Pleiku, thereby overrunning the Central Highlands.
This would then open the possibility of proceeding east to the coastal plains, splitting
South Vietnam in two. The highlands offensive was preceded by VC diversionary
operations that opened on 5 April in coastal Bình Định Province, which aimed at
closing Highway 1, seizing several ARVN firebases, and diverting South Vietnamese
forces from operations further west. North Vietnamese forces, under the command
of Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao, commander of the B-3 Front, included the
320th and 2nd PAVN Divisions in the highlands and the 3rd PAVN Division in the
lowlands – approximately 50,000 men.

Arrayed against them in II Corps were the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Divisions, two armored
cavalry squadrons, and the 2nd Airborne Brigade, all under the command of Lieutenant
General Ngô Du. It had become evident as early as January that the North Vietnamese
were building up for offensive operations in the tri-border region and numerous B-52
strikes had been conducted in the area in hopes of slowing the build-up. ARVN forces
had also been deployed forward toward the border in order to slow the PAVN advance
and allow the application of airpower to deplete North Vietnamese manpower and
logistics. The Bình Định offensive, however, threw General Du into a panic and
almost convinced him to fall for the North Vietnamese ploy and divert his forces
from the highlands.

John Paul Vann, director of the U.S. Second Regional Assistance Group, reassured Du that
it was only a ruse and to remain ready for the main blow, which he was convinced would
come from western Laos.[78] Vann, although a civilian, had been granted the unique
authority to command all U.S. military advisors within his region.Vann worked day
and night, using his extensive civilian and military contacts to channel U.S. support
(especially air support) to the region. Major General John G. Hill Jr., Du's senior military
advisor, described Vann's extraordinary actions: "The rest of us organized around Vann's
personal efforts and concentrated on getting the resources marshalled to take advantage
of the leadership he was exerting with the Vietnamese."

To counter the possible threat from the west, Du had deployed two regiments of the
22nd Division to Tân Cảnh and Đắk Tô Base Camp and two armored squadrons to
Ben Het.

On 12 April, the 2nd PAVN Division, elements of the 203rd Tank Regiment, and several
independent regiments of the B-3 Front attacked the outpost at Tan Canh and the
nearby Đắk Tô base. When the ARVN armor moved out of Ben Het toward Đắk Tô, it
was ambushed and destroyed. The overwhelmed South Vietnamese defense northwest
of Kon Tum quickly disintegrated, placing the command of III Corps in a quandary.
With the remainder of the 22nd Division covering the coast there were few forces
left to defend the provincial capital of Kon Tum.

The North Vietnamese southern advance inexplicably halted for three crucial weeks. While
the northern crisis waned, however, General Du began to unravel, finding it increasingly
difficult to make decisions. Vann gave up all pretext of South Vietnamese command, took
over himself, and openly issued orders. He placed responsibility for the defense of the city
of Kon Tum on the shoulders of Colonel Ly Tong Ba, commander of the 23rd Division.
Vann then used massive B-52 strikes to hold the North Vietnamese at arm's length and
reduce their numbers while he managed to find additional troops with which to stabilize
the situation.

By 14 May, North Vietnamese forces had reached Kon Tum and launched their main assault.
The 320th PAVN Division, the 1st and 141st Regiments of the 2nd PAVN Division, and
elements of the 203rd Tank Regiment attacked the city from the north, south, and west.
By the time of the assault, the city mustered a defensive force that consisted of the 23rd
Division and several Ranger groups. Their three-week delay cost the North Vietnamese
dearly. By 14 May, the worst of the fighting in I and II Corps was over and a majority
of the B-52s were free to concentrate on the Central Highlands. During the North
Vietnamese attack, the positions of the 44th and 45th ARVN Regiments crumbled and were
overrun, but a well-placed B-52 strike landed directly on the PAVN attackers at the point of
the breakthrough. The next morning, when the South Vietnamese returned to their former
positions unopposed, 400 bodies were discovered, along with seven destroyed tanks.

At Vann's insistence, a personnel shake-up took place in III Corps when President Thieu
replaced Du with Major General Nguyễn Văn Toàn, whose outwardly confident and
assertive nature was the complete opposite of Du's.[85] The actions at Kon Tum for
the following two weeks became characterized by massed PAVN assaults that were
lashed by B-52, tactical air, and helicopter gunship attacks. ARVN troops then
counterattacked over the remains of the attacking wave. On 26 May, four North
Vietnamese regiments supported by armored forces managed to punch a hole
in the defense, but their advance was halted by U.S. helicopters firing the new
TOW missiles. During the following three days of fighting, 24 North Vietnamese
T-54 tanks were destroyed by TOWs and the breach was sealed.

With the aid of the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam Air Forces and despite severe losses,
ARVN managed to hold Kon Tum during the remainder of the battle. Aerial resupply
was supported by the US Army's "549th QM (AD)" (QuarterMaster, Air Delivery)
Rigger Company, which had been rapid-deployed from Okinawa in early April. By
early June, the PAVN faded back to the west, leaving behind over 4,000 dead on the
battlefield. It was estimated by U.S. intelligence that total PAVN casualties in the
Central Highlands during the offensive totaled between 20,000 and 40,000 troops.
John Vann did not have time to savor his victory. While returning to Kon Tum
from a briefing in Saigon on 9 June, he was killed in a helicopter crash.

In late July the ARVN 22nd Division, now commanded by Brigadier General Phan Dinh
Niem, in cooperation with Bình Định Province RF/PF forces, retook Hoài Nhơn and Tam
Quan district towns and reestablished communications on Highway 1 north to the
southern boundary of Quảng Ngãi Province.

Southern Cambodia and IV Corps
On 22 March the PAVN 101D Regiment, 1st Division attacked the ARVN 42nd Ranger
Group outpost at Kompong Trach 15km north of the Cambodia-South Vietnam border.
Fighting continued until the end of April as each side reinforced. The PAVN 1st
Division eventually seized Kompong Trach but had suffered heavy losses which
impacted its later operations in IV Corps.

On 7 April PAVN/VC local main force units, the 18B, 95B, D1 and D2 Regiments
began attacks in the Mekong Delta, initially in Chương Thiện Province. As the
ARVN 21st Division and the 15th Regiment, 9th Division had been deployed to
III Corps to reinforce the fighting at An Lộc, the PAVN/VC were initially able to
have some success against isolated RF/PF outposts.

On 18 May elements of the PAVN 52D and 101D Regiments, 1st Division attacked
Kiên Lương, the fighting continued for ten days before ARVN Rangers and armored
forces succeeded in forcing the PAVN to withdraw towards the Cambodian border.

On 23 May following fighting between the PAVN 207th Regiment and ARVN Ranger and
armored forces in Cambodia, 15km north of Cai Cai, the ARVN captured documents
indicating plans for PAVN infiltration into northern Kiến Tường Province and subsequent
attacks against Mộc Hóa. Subsequent intelligence showed that the PAVN 5th Division which
had been beaten at An Lộc was moving into the Elephant's Foot (10.87°N 105.9°E) area of
Cambodia and would then move into Base Area 470 in the Plain of Reeds. The ARVN 7th
Division deployed to the Elephant's Foot area to engage PAVN forces and with strong U.S.
air support inflicted severe losses on the PAVN units there. However despite their losses two
regiments from the PAVN 5th Division and the 24th and Z18 Regiments pushed towards
Base Area 470 and by early July six PAVN regiments were located in northern Định Tường
Province.

In late June after 22 days of fighting the ARVN 7th Division recaptured Kompong Trabek
and cleared Route QL-1 (Cambodia) to Neak Loeung, however the PAVN recaptured the
area when the 7th Division was withdrawn back into IV Corps in July to counter the
PAVN/VC threat to Route QL-4, the vital supply line between the Delta's ricebowl and
Saigon. With the return of the ARVN 21st Division and 15th Regiment, 9th Division to IV
Corps and continuous pounding from the air by U.S. tactical air and B-52's, the ARVN
was able to mount a series of operations in Định Tường Province and Base Area 470 that
forced the PAVN/VC to reduce their operations and disperse into smaller units or
withdraw into Cambodia.

While not as dramatic as the fighting on the other fronts of the Easter Offensive, IV
Corps had managed to prevent the PAVN/VC from cutting Route QL-4 or seriously
disrupting pacification efforts in the Mekong Delta while sharing nearly half of its
forces with III Corps and I Corps.

Air support, Freedom Train, and Linebacker
The North Vietnamese had timed their offensive well by having it coincide with the end
of the annual winter monsoon when low cloud cover and rain provided a blanket under
which the offensive could proceed without interference by allied aerial attack. Air strikes
were possible only by all-weather fighters or bombers, which could deliver their ordnance
accurately through the cloud cover by radar direction or LORAN.

These missions were conducted by aircraft assigned to the U.S. Seventh Air Force and
Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force in South Vietnam and Thailand or by the U.S. Navy's Task
Force 77, offshore in the South China Sea. Besides the weather the most serious problem
facing the Americans was that the drawdown of U.S. forces during the previous four years
had included valuable ground support aircraft and their maintenance crews. By the spring
of 1972, the U.S. Air Force had only three squadrons of F-4 Phantoms and one of A-37
Dragonflys available in the Republic of Vietnam, a total of 76 aircraft. Another 114
fighter-bombers were stationed at various bases in Thailand. 83 B-52 Stratofortress
heavy bombers were located at U-Tapao RTAFB and at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
Task Force 77 had four carriers assigned to it, but only two, Coral Sea and Hancock were
on station at the onset of the offensive. Their air wings totaled 140 strike aircraft.

To rectify the aircraft shortage, from 7 April to 13 May 176 F-4s and 12 F-105 Thunderchiefs
were transferred from air bases in the Republic of Korea and the continental U.S. to
Thailand during Operation Constant Guard I-IV.[100] Between 5 February and 23 May,
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) reinforced Guam during Operation Bullet Shot with a
further 124 bombers, bringing the total available in-theater to 209. The Seventh
Fleet was also beefed up by the addition of five aircraft carrier groups, including those
of the Kitty Hawk, Constellation, Midway, America, and Saratoga. This made five carriers
available at any one time to conduct aerial operations. The Republic of Vietnam Air
Force (VNAF) at this time consisted of nine squadrons of A-1 Skyraiders, A-37s, and F-5
Freedom Fighters, a total of 119 strike aircraft. There were also two squadrons of AC-47
or AC-119 fixed-wing gunships, totaling of 28 aircraft.

The weather conditions made early ground support haphazard, and these difficulties were
compounded by North Vietnamese anti-aircraft units, which advanced behind the front
line elements. PAVN moved 85 and 100 mm radar-directed batteries south of the DMZ
and, on 17 February 81 SA-2 Guideline missiles were launched from the DMZ area,
downing three F-4s. This heralded the farthest southern advance of SA-2 units thus far
during the conflict. This classic high-low anti-aircraft coverage made aerial attacks
extremely hazardous, especially when it was enhanced by the new shoulder-fired Grail.

The loss of the northern firebases early in the offensive in I Corps made U.S. naval
gunfire the primary source of artillery support in that area. U.S. Marine Corps gunfire
observers were then assigned to fly with forward air controllers, providing coordinates
for shore targets. At the height of the offensive three U.S. cruisers and 38 destroyers
were providing naval gunfire support.

With clearing weather the number of aircraft sorties soared. Between April and June
there were 18,000 combat sorties flown to support the ARVN defense, 45 percent
by the U.S. Air Force, 30 percent by the Navy and Marine Corps, and 25 percent by
the VNAF. B-52s flew an additional 2,724 sorties. Ten U.S. and six VNAF aircraft were
lost to SAM or anti-aircraft fire.

On 4 April, reacting to the fierceness of the offensive, President Nixon authorized tactical
airstrikes from the DMZ north to the 18th parallel, the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.
This supply interdiction effort was the first systematic bombing carried out in North Vietnam
proper since the end of Operation Rolling Thunder in November 1968. Airstrikes north of the
20th parallel were authorized on 5 April under the cover name Operation Freedom Train.
The first B-52 strike of the new operation was conducted on 10 April. President Nixon
then decided to up the ante by targeting Hanoi and Haiphong. Between 1 May and 30 June,
B-52s, fighter-bombers, and fixed-wing gunships had carried out 18,000 sorties over North
Vietnam and suffered 29 aircraft losses.

On 8 May Nixon authorized the launching of Operation Pocket Money, the aerial mining of
Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports. Nixon had taken a gamble that the Soviet
Union, with which he was conducting negotiations for a strategic arms limitation treaty
(SALT I), would withhold a negative reaction in return for improved relations with the
West. He was correct. The People's Republic of China also muted any overt response
to the escalatory measures for the same reason. Emboldened, Nixon decided to launch
Operation Linebacker a systematic aerial assault on North Vietnam's transportation,
storage, and air defense systems on 10 May. During Linebacker, the U.S. Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps lost 104 aircraft in combat while their North Vietnamese
opponents lost 63.

Aftermath
At the conclusion of the ARVN counteroffensive, both sides were exhausted but considered
their efforts to have been successful. The South Vietnamese and the Americans believed the
policy of Vietnamization to have been validated, the internal weaknesses of the South
Vietnamese command structure, which had been rectified somewhat during the emergency,
reappeared once it had passed. During the operations, more than 25,000 South Vietnamese
civilians had been killed and almost a million became refugees, 600,000 of whom were
living in camps under government care. American casualties in combat for all of 1972 totaled
only 300 killed, most during the offensive.

Hanoi had committed 14 divisions and 26 independent regiments to the offensive and had
suffered approximately 100,000 casualties and lost almost all of its armored forces committed
(134 T-54s, 56 PT-76s and 60 T-34s). In return, it had gained permanent control of half of
the four northernmost provinces (Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên, Quảng Nam, and Quảng Tín) as
well as the western fringes of the II and III Corps sectors, around 10% of the country. It
is believed that the North Vietnamese leadership had both underestimated the fighting
ability of the ARVN, which, by 1972, had become one of the best-equipped armies in the
world, and failed to grasp the destructiveness of American air power against an enemy
fighting a conventional battle. Combined with these strategic errors, PAVN commanders
had also thrown away their local numerical superiority by making frontal attacks into
heavy defensive fire and suffered massive casualties as a consequence. However, by
its own estimate, the PAVN had also dealt the most severe blow in the entire war, with
over 200,000 ARVN casualties, a third of the South's entire armed forces. That also allowed
Viet Cong irregulars and political agents to make a return through the gaps in the defensive
lines, which had been torn open during the offensive. Hanoi wasted no time in making use
of what it had gained. The North Vietnamese immediately began to extend their supply
corridors from Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam. The PAVN rapidly expanded port
facilities at the captured town of Đông Hà, and within a year, over 20 percent of the
materiel destined for the southern battlefield was flowing across its docks.

In all of 1972, the PAVN suffered over 100,000 dead, according to The Official History of
the People's Army of Vietnam. The ARVN suffered 39,587 dead in the same period,
while American military deaths that year were 759, per U.S. military records.
For the PAVN, the offensive was very costly. General Tran Van Tra, writing about the
offensive ten years after the fact, stated, "Our troops were exhausted and their units
in disarray. We had not been able to make up losses. We were short of manpower as
well as food and ammunition."

In Paris, the peace negotiations continued, but this time, both sides were willing to make
concessions. The chief American negotiator, Henry Kissinger, offered a ceasefire, recognition
of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam by the Saigon
government, and the total American withdrawal from South Vietnam as incentives. The terms
were enough to meet the criteria for victory that Hanoi's leaders had established before the
offensive. The only obstacle to a settlement was Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, whose government
would have to assent to any agreement. The intransigence of Thiệu and his demand for the
U.S. not to abandon his nation after any agreement, as well as new demands by Hanoi, caused
the stalling of peace talks in December. That led Nixon to launch Operation Linebacker II,
a bombing campaign aimed at North Vietnam's transport network, especially around Hanoi and
Haiphong. The Paris Peace Accords, signed in January 1973, confirmed that North Vietnamese
troops would remain in South Vietnam in the areas that they occupied.
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