Vietnam War ~ 1968.01 Tet Offensive

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive

Background
United States
During fall 1967, the question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South
Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of
President Lyndon B. Johnson. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could
be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military
operations exceeded those recruited or replaced, the Americans would win the war. There
was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of Viet Cong guerrilla forces
within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services
and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used
by the administration to gauge U.S. success in the conflict.

Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and
Junction City, the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas,
irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined
Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more
than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions
of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength
was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's
chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian, the new figures "would create a
political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had
the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition".

In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC
militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists
used for information collection. The agency responded that such a notion was
ridiculous since the militias were directly responsible for half of the casualties inflicted
on U.S. forces. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA deputy director for
Vietnamese affairs, was asked to mediate the dispute. In September, Carver devised
a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final
tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the
agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's
capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. He believed that
"it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want the agency ... contravening the
policy interest of the administration."

During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both
inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its
Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans
who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had
risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend was
fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty
figures, raising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight.
A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy,
exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved
in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out."
This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "Success Offensive", a concerted
effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate
and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding.
Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, the news media then
was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism.

Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village
pacification, was fed to the press and to the Congress. "We are beginning to win this
struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC's Today show in
mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are
making steady progress."[31] At the end of November, the campaign reached its
climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador,
Ellsworth Bunker, to Washington, D.C., for what was billed as a "high-level policy
review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of
success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS
pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight
percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon
while only seventeen percent was under the control of the VC.[32] General Bruce
Palmer Jr., one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the
Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He
has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast
to try to survive in the mountains."

Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National
Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists
were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965
the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important
point when the end begins to come into view."[31] By the end of the year the
administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early
January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still
disapproved of the President's handling of the war.[34] The American public, "more
confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see
attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland
defied the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something becaus
e we are looking for a fight."

North Vietnam
Party politics
Planning in Hanoi for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967
and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there
has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the
decision-making process that led to the General Offensive General Uprising, even
decades after the event.[37] In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch
the Tet Offensive was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to
win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North
Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S.
The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated.

The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North
Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates
believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a
massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of
peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction
were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp. The militant
faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the People's
Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that
no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by
Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early
to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam.
General Nguyễn Chí Thanh the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN),
headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the
Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main
force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong.

By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield,
and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing, there was a dawning
realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources
necessary to affect the military situation in the South.[41] As a result, there were more
strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that
a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated
conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in
error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of
"fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that
Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his
strategy.

During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the
centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh, Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy
Trinh, who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967, a very
public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh
and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily
guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that
Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina
War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past
experience... mechanically repeating the past."

The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element,
as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and
economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided
by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a
protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw
China in, as had happened in the Korean War. They also resisted the idea of negotiating
with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously
armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese
foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy,
internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving
agendas."

To "break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their
foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia
were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party
Affair. All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice
of tactics and strategy for the proposed General Offensive. This move cemented the
position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment
of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South
Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December.

General Offensive and Uprising
The operational plan for the General Offensive and Uprising had its origin as the "COSVN
proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to
Hanoi the following month. The General was then ordered to the capital to explain his
concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed
the plan to the Politburo.[51] On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin
preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after
drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in a
U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia.

After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning
for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that
the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of
the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population,
which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a
quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South
Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the September
1967 South Vietnamese presidential election (in which the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu/Nguyễn
Cao Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of
1963 and 1966; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous
criticism of the Thiệu government in the southern press.Launching such an
offensive would also finally put an end to what have been described as "dovish calls for
talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet
pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced."

In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again
in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at the 14th Plenary session of the
Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major
blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to
the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the
document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order
to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible."

Contrary to Western belief, General Giáp did not plan or command the offensive himself.
Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy,
Phạm Hùng, and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced
to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during
the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under
duress", he may have found the task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait
accompli. Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was
make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional
military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the Viet Cong.
If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for the
Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of
negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes
of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the
Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory".

The PAVN official history states that the objectives of the Tet Offensive were to: annihilate
and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet"
(South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in
the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop
strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the
American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on the
basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept
defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition,
using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which
were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move
toward achieving peace and national unification.

The operation would involve a preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would
be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces
away from the cities. The General Offensive, General Uprising would then commence with
simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular
emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to
be made against the U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Khe Sanh actions would draw
PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary
in order to protect his supply lines and divert American attention.[60] Attacks on other U.S.
forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main
objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government
through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore, was aimed at influencing the South
Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to
what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the
November presidential election in the U.S.

According to General Trần Văn Trà, the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to
have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be a
countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a
propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese
population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory
was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government
and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these
purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down the enemy and lead
to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III
on 17 August.

Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in
mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including
seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south
on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This logistical effort also involved re-arming the VC with
new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted
them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as
to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh
announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations
if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing campaign
against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic
activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year.

South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South
Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars,
160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops.
They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or
anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six
sapper battalions.

U.S. unpreparedness
Suspicions and diversions
Signs of impending communist action were noticed among the allied intelligence collection
apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and
U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist
strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington
and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year
intelligence agencies had observed signs of a major North Vietnamese military buildup.
In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13, for example, was captured
by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in
October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh
Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total
reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled
Washington that he expected the PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort,
perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time."

Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and
scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with
the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable
course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in the allied
estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious
enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive,
regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the
lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both
South Vietnamese and American. The situation from the U.S. perspective was summed
up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't
have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us."

From early to late 1967, the U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions
initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol
prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the
western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province. For 49 days
during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S.
Marine outpost of Con Thien, just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense
shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation
Neutralize, an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and
just north of the DMZ.

On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé, the capital of Phước Long Province,
came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN
regiment attacked a U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh, in Bình Long Province.
This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry
Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion.

The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October
and November around Dak To, another border outpost in Kon Tum Province. The clashes
there between the four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days.
By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops
had lost their lives. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North
Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery
and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and
strategically, these operations made no sense. What the North Vietnamese had done
was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on
the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal
lowlands and cities.

Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January
1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine
garrison. MACV was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun
the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of
South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half
of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps.

This course of events disturbed Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, commander of
U.S. forces in III Corps, which included the Capital Military District. Weyand, a former
intelligence officer, was suspicious of the pattern of communist activities in his area of
responsibility and notified Westmoreland of his concerns on 10 January. Westmoreland
agreed with his estimate and ordered 15 U.S. battalions to redeploy from positions
near the Cambodian border back to the outskirts of Saigon. When the offensive did
begin, a total of 27 allied maneuver battalions defended the city and the surrounding
area. This redeployment may have been one of the most critical tactical decisions of the
war.

Before the offensive
By the beginning of January 1968, the U.S. had deployed 331,098 Army personnel and
78,013 Marines in nine divisions, an armoured cavalry regiment, and two separate
brigades to South Vietnam. They were joined there by the 1st Australian Task Force, a
Royal Thai Army regiment, two South Korean Army infantry divisions, and the Republic
of Korea Marine Corps brigade. South Vietnamese strength totaled 350,000 regulars
in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. They were in turn supported by the
151,000-man South Vietnamese Regional Forces and 149,000-man South Vietnamese
Popular Forces, which were the equivalent of regional and local militias.

In the days immediately preceding the offensive, the preparedness of allied forces was
relatively relaxed. Hanoi had announced in October that it would observe a seven-day
truce from 27 January to 3 February for the Tet holiday, and the South Vietnamese
military made plans to allow recreational leave for approximately half of its forces.
General Westmoreland, who had already cancelled the truce in I Corps, requested that
South Vietnam cancel the upcoming cease-fire, but President Thiệu (who had already
reduced the cease-fire to 36 hours), refused to do so, claiming that it would damage
troop morale and only benefit communist propagandists.

On 28 January, eleven VC cadres were captured in the city of Qui Nhơn while in possession
of two pre-recorded audio tapes whose message appealed to the populace in "already
occupied Saigon, Huế, and Da Nang". The following afternoon, General Cao Văn Viên,
chief of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, ordered his four Corps' commanders
to place their troops on alert. Yet, there was still a lack of a sense of urgency on the part of
the allies. If Westmoreland had a grasp of the potential for danger, he did not communicate
it very well to others. On the evening of 30 January, 200 U.S. officers—all of whom
served on the MACV intelligence staff—attended a pool party at their quarters in Saigon.
According to James Meecham, an analyst at the Combined Intelligence Center who attended
the party: "I had no conception Tet was coming, absolutely zero ... Of the 200-odd officers
present, not one I talked to knew Tet was coming, without exception."

Westmoreland also failed to communicate his concerns adequately to Washington.
Although he had warned the President between 25 and 30 January that "widespread"
communist attacks were in the offing, his admonitions had tended to be so oblique or so
hedged with official optimism that even the administration was unprepared.
No one – in either Washington or Vietnam – was expecting what happened.

Lt. Gen. Weyand invited CBS News Correspondent John Laurence and Washington Post
reporter Don Oberdorfer to his III Corps headquarters in the week before the Tet Offensive
to alert them that a major enemy attack was coming "just before or just after Tet." He said
the Vietnamese had too much respect for the holiday to attack during Tet itself. Weyand
said he had moved 30 U.S. and South Vietnamese battalions closer to Saigon to defend
the city.

Offensive
Whether by accident or design, the first wave of attacks began shortly after midnight on
30 January as all five provincial capitals in II Corps and Da Nang, in I Corps, were attacked.
Nha Trang, headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force, was the first to be hit, followed shortly
by Ban Mê Thuột, Kon Tum, Hội An, Tuy Hòa, Da Nang, Qui Nhơn, and Pleiku. During all
of these operations, the PAVN/VC followed a similar pattern: mortar or rocket attacks were
closely followed by massed ground assaults conducted by battalion-strength elements of
the VC, sometimes supported by PAVN regulars. These forces would join with local cadres
who served as guides to lead the regulars to the most senior South Vietnamese
headquarters and the radio station. The operations, however, were not well coordinated
at the local level. By daylight, almost all communist forces had been driven from their
objectives. General Phillip B. Davidson, the new MACV chief of intelligence, notified
Westmoreland that "This is going to happen in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow
morning."[91] All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert and similar orders were issued
to all ARVN units. The allies, however, still responded without any real sense of urgency.
Orders cancelling leaves either came too late or were disregarded.

At 03:00 on 31 January PAVN/VC forces attacked Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Định in the
Capital Military District; Quảng Trị (again), Huế, Quảng Tín, Tam Kỳ and Quảng Ngãi as
well as U.S. bases at Phú Bài and Chu Lai in I Corps; Phan Thiết, Tuy Hòa and U.S.
installations at Bong Son and An Khê in II Corps; and Cần Thơ and Vĩnh Long in IV
Corps. The following day, Biên Hòa, Long Thanh, Bình Dương in III Corps and Kien
Hoa, Dinh Tuong, Gò Công, Kiên Giang, Vĩnh Bình, Bến Tre, and Kien Tuong in IV
Corps were assaulted. The last attack of the initial operation was launched against
Bạc Liêu in IV Corps on 10 February. A total of approximately 84,000 PAVN/VC
troops participated in the attacks while thousands of others stood by to act as
reinforcements or as blocking forces.[93] PAVN/VC forces also mortared or
rocketed every major allied airfield and attacked 64 district capitals and scores
of smaller towns.

In most cases, the defense was led by the South Vietnamese. Local militia or ARVN
forces, supported by the South Vietnamese National Police, usually drove the
attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours; but heavy
fighting continued several days longer in Kon Tum, Buôn Ma Thuột, Phan Thiết,
Cần Thơ, and Bến Tre. The outcome in each instance was usually dictated
by the ability of local commanders—some were outstanding, others were
cowardly or incompetent. During this crucial crisis, however, no South
Vietnamese unit broke or defected to the communists.

According to Westmoreland, he responded to the news of the attacks with optimism,
both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington. According to closer
observers, however, the General was "stunned that the communists had been able
to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy", and he was "dispirited and deeply
shaken." According to Clark Clifford, at the time of the initial attacks, the reaction
of the U.S. military leadership "approached panic". Although Westmoreland's
appraisal of the military situation was correct, he made himself look foolish by
continuously maintaining his belief that Khe Sanh was the real objective of the
North Vietnamese and that 155 attacks by 84,000 troops was a diversion (a position
he maintained until at least 12 February).Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup
summed up the feelings of his colleagues by asking "How could any effort against Saigon,
especially downtown Saigon, be a diversion?"

Saigon
Although Saigon was the focal point of the offensive, the PAVN/VC did not seek a total
takeover of the city. Rather, they had six primary targets to strike in the downtown area:
the headquarters of the ARVN Joint General Staff, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the
Independence Palace, the US Embassy in Saigon, the Republic of Vietnam Navy
Headquarters and Radio Saigon. Elsewhere in the city or its outskirts, ten VC Local Force
Battalions attacked the central police station and the Artillery Command and the Armored
Command headquarters (both at Gò Vấp). The plan called for all these initial forces to
capture and hold their positions for 48 hours, by which time reinforcements were to have
arrived to relieve them.

The defense of the Capital Military District was primarily a South Vietnamese responsibility
and it was initially defended by eight ARVN infantry battalions and the local police force.
By 3 February they had been reinforced by five ARVN Ranger Battalions, five Marine Corps,
and five ARVN Airborne Battalions. U.S. Army units participating in the defense included the
716th Military Police Battalion, seven infantry battalionds (one mechanized), and six artillery
battalions.

At the Armored Command and Artillery Command headquarters on the northern edge of
the city the PAVN planned to use captured tanks and artillery pieces but the tanks had
been moved to another base two months earlier and the breech blocks of the artillery
pieces had been removed, rendering them useless.

One of the most important targets, from a symbolic and propagandistic point of view, was
Radio Saigon. Its troops had brought along a tape recording of Hồ Chi Minh announcing
the liberation of Saigon and calling for a "General Uprising" against the Thiệu government.
They seized the building, held it for six hours and, when running out of ammunition, the last
eight attackers destroyed it and killed themselves using explosive charges, but they were
unable to broadcast due to the cutting off of the audio lines from the main studio to the tower
as soon as the station was seized.

The US Embassy in Saigon, a massive six-floor building situated within a four-acre compound,
had been completed only in September. At 02:45 it was attacked by a 19-man sapper team
that blew a hole in the 8-foot-high (2.4 m) surrounding wall and charged through. With their
officers killed in the initial attack and their attempt to gain access to the building having failed,
the sappers simply occupied the chancery grounds until they were all killed or captured by
U.S. reinforcements that were landed on the roof of the building six hours later. By 09:20 the
embassy and grounds were secured, with the loss of five U.S. personnel.

At 03:00 on 31 January, twelve VC sappers approached the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters
in two civilian cars, killing two guards at a barricade at Me Linh Square and then advanced
towards the base gate. The sound of gunfire alerted base sentries who secured the gate
and sounded the alarm. A .30-caliber machine gun on the second floor of the headquarters
disabled both cars and killed or wounded several sappers while the Navy security force
organized a counterattack. Simultaneously a U.S. Navy advisor contacted the U.S. military
police who soon attacked the VC from adjoining streets, the resulting crossfire ended the
attack, killing eight sappers with two captured.

Small squads of VC fanned out across the city to attack various officers and enlisted men's
billets, homes of ARVN officers, and district police stations. Provided with "blacklists" of
military officers and civil servants, they began to round up and execute any that could be
found.

On 1 February General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, chief of the National Police, publicly executed
VC officer Nguyễn Văn Lém, captured in civilian clothing, in front of photographer Eddie
Adams and a film cameraman. That photography, with the title of Saigon Execution won
the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography and is widely seen as a defining
moment in the Vietnam War for its influence on public opinion in the U.S. about the war,
even being called "the picture that lost the war".

Outside the city proper two VC battalions attacked the U.S. logistical and headquarters
complex at Long Binh Post. Biên Hòa Air Base was struck by a battalion, while the adjacent
ARVN III Corps headquarters was the objective of another. Tan Son Nhut Air Base, in the
northwestern part of the city, was attacked by three battalions. A combat-ready battalion
of ARVN paratroopers, awaiting transport to Da Nang, went instead directly into action
supporting the United States Air Force's 377th Security Police Squadron and the U.S. Army's
3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment in halting the attack. A total of 35 PAVN/VC battalions,
many of whose troops were undercover cadres who had lived and worked within the capital
or its environs for years, had been committed to the Saigon objectives. By dawn most of the
attacks within the city center had been eliminated, but severe fighting between VC and allied
forces erupted in the Chinese neighborhood of Cholon around the Phú Thọ racetrack,
southwest of the city center, which was being used as a staging area and command and
control center by the PAVN/VC. Bitter and destructive house-to-house fighting erupted in
the area. On 4 February, the residents were ordered to leave their homes and the area
was declared a free fire zone. Fighting in the city came to a close only after a fierce
battle between the ARVN Rangers and PAVN forces on 7 March.

On the morning of 2 March 1968, while patrolling 4 miles (6.4 km) north of Tan Son Nhut
Air Base near the small village of Quoi Xuan to locate VC rocket sites, Company C, 4th
Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment walked into an ambush losing 48 killed in just 8 minutes.
U.S. forces claimed they killed 20 VC. Specialist Nicholas J. Cutinha would be posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at Quoi Xuan. General Fillmore K. Mearns would
describe this as "a classic example of a properly executed ambush." The following day as US
troops swept the area they were engaged by VC forces in an 8-hour battle losing 3 dead
while killing 10 VC.

While their attacks on Saigon had been quickly repulsed, in early March, more than 20 VC
battalions remained near Gia Định Province, threatening Saigon. While most of these
units had suffered heavy losses in the offensive, their continued presence applied pressure
on Saigon and prevented the reestablishment of South Vietnamese Government control.
From 11 March to 7 April, Allied forces launched Operation Quyet Thang to pacify the area
around Saigon. The operation was considered a success and the U.S. claimed 2,658 VC
killed and 427 captured. It was followed immediately by Operation Toan Thang I (8 April
- 31 May) which expanded the security operation across III Corps and resulted in a further
7645 VC killed and 1708 captured for South Vietnamese losses of 708 killed, U.S. losses
of 564 killed and other Allied losses of 23 killed.

Huế
At 03:40 on the foggy morning of 31 January, allied defensive positions north of the
Perfume River in the city of Huế were mortared and rocketed and then attacked by two
battalions of the PAVN 6th Regiment. Their target was the ARVN 1st Division
headquarters located in the Citadel, a three-square mile complex of palaces,
parks, and residences, which were surrounded by a moat and a massive earth
and masonry fortress. The undermanned ARVN defenders, led by General
Ngô Quang Trưởng, managed to hold their position, but the majority of the
Citadel fell to the PAVN. On the south bank of the river, the PAVN 4th Regiment
attempted to seize the local MACV headquarters, but was held at bay by a makeshift
force of approximately 200 Americans. The rest of the city was overrun by
PAVN forces which initially totaled approximately 7,500 men. Both sides then rushed
to reinforce and resupply their forces. Lasting 25 days,the battle of Huế
became one of the longest and bloodiest single battles of the Vietnam War.

During the first days of the North Vietnamese occupation, U.S. intelligence vastly
underestimated the number of PAVN troops and little appreciated the effort that
was going to be necessary to evict them. General Westmoreland informed the Joint
Chiefs that "the enemy has approximately three companies in the Huế Citadel and
the marines have sent a battalion into the area to clear them out." A later
assessment ultimately noted three Marine and 11 Vietnamese battalions engaged
at least 8 PAVN/VC battalions of the PAVN 6th Regiment, not including the large
number of forces outside the city.

Since there were no U.S. formations stationed in Huế, relief forces had to move up from
Phu Bai Combat Base,[128] eight kilometers to the southeast. In a misty drizzle, U.S.
Marines of the 1st Marine Division and soldiers of the 1st ARVN Division and Marine
Corps cleared the city street by street and house by house,[129] a deadly and
destructive form of urban combat that the U.S. military had not engaged in since
the Battle of Seoul during the Korean War, and for which neither side were trained.
Because of poor weather conditions, logistics problems and the historical and cultural
significance of the city, American forces did not immediately apply air and artillery strikes
as widely as they had in other cities.

VC forces around Huế included six main-force battalions, while two PAVN regiments
operated in the area. As the battle unfolded three more PAVN regiments redeployed
from Khe Sanh arrived as reinforcements. The North Vietnamese plan of attack on
Huế involved intensive preparation and reconnaissance. Over 190 targets, including
every government and military installation on both sides of the river would be hit on
January 31 by a force of five thousand. Other forces would block American and ARVN
reinforcement routes, mainly Highway 1. Over half of the ARVN 1st Division was on
holiday leave and PAVN commanders believed the population of Huế would join the
fight as a part of the General Uprising.

Outside Huế, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division
fought to seal PAVN access and cut off their lines of supply and reinforcement. By this
point in the battle 16 to 18 PAVN battalions (8,000-11,000 men) were taking part in the
fighting for the city itself or the approaches to the city.[134] Two of the PAVN regiments
had made a forced march from the vicinity of Khe Sanh to Huế in order to participate.
During most of February, the allies gradually fought their way towards the Citadel, which
was taken only after twenty-five days of intense struggle. The city was not declared
recaptured by U.S. and ARVN forces until 25 February, when members of the
ARVN 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division raised the South Vietnamese flag over
the Palace of Perfect Peace.

During the intense action, the allies estimated that PAVN forces had between 1,042 and
5,000 killed and 89 captured in the city and in the surrounding area. 216 U.S. Marines
and soldiers had been killed during the fighting and 1,609 were wounded. 421 ARVN
troops were killed, another 2,123 were wounded, and 31 were missing. More than 5,800
civilians had lost their lives during the battle and 116,000 were left homeless out of an
original population of 140,000. 40-50% of Huế was destroyed by the end of the battle.

In the aftermath of the recapture of the city, the discovery of several mass graves (the
last of which were uncovered in 1970) of South Vietnamese citizens of Huế sparked a
controversy that has not diminished with time. The victims had either been
clubbed or shot to death or simply buried alive. The official allied explanation
was that during their initial occupation of the city, the PAVN had quickly begun to
systematically round up (under the guise of re-education) and then execute as many
as 2,800 South Vietnamese civilians that they believed to be potentially hostile to
communist control.[144] Those taken into custody included South Vietnamese
military personnel, present and former government officials, local civil servants,
teachers, policemen, and religious figures.Historian Gunther Lewy
claimed that a captured VC document stated that the communists had "eliminated
1,892 administrative personnel, 38 policemen, 790 tyrants." The North Vietnamese
officer, Bùi Tín, later further muddied the waters by stating that their forces had indeed
rounded up "reactionary" captives for transport to the North, but that local commanders,
under battlefield exigencies, had executed them for expediency's sake.

General Trưởng believed that the captives had been executed by the communists in order
to protect the identities of members of the local VC infrastructure, whose covers had been
blown. The exact circumstances leading to the deaths of those citizens of Huế discovered
in the mass graves may never be known exactly, but most of the victims were killed as a
result of PAVN and VC executions, considering evidence from captured documents and
witness testimonies among other things.

Khe Sanh
The attack on Khe Sanh, which began on 21 January before the other offensives, probably
served two purposes—as a real attempt to seize the position or as a diversion to draw
American attention and forces away from the population centers in the lowlands, a deception
that was "both plausible and easy to orchestrate." In Westmoreland's view, the
purpose of the base was to provoke the North Vietnamese into a focused and prolonged
confrontation in a confined geographic area, one which would allow the application of
massive U.S. artillery and air strikes that would inflict heavy casualties in a relatively
unpopulated region.By the end of 1967, MACV had moved nearly half of its
manoeuvre battalions to I Corps in anticipation of just such a battle.

Westmoreland—and the American media, which covered the action extensively—often
made inevitable comparisons between the actions at Khe Sanh and the Battle of Điện
Biên Phủ, where a French base had been besieged and ultimately overrun by Viet
Minh forces under the command of General Giáp during the First Indochina War.
Westmoreland, who knew of Nguyen Chi Thanh's penchant for large-scale operations
—but not of his death—believed that this was going to be an attempt to replicate that
victory. He intended to stage his own "Dien Bien Phu in reverse."

Khe Sanh and its 6,000 U.S. Marine Corps, Army and ARVN defenders was surrounded
by two to three PAVN divisions, totaling approximately 20,000 men. Throughout the
siege, which lasted until 8 April, the allies were subjected to heavy mortar, rocket, and
artillery bombardment, combined with sporadic small-scale infantry attacks on outlying
positions. With the exception of the overrunning of the U.S. Special Forces camp at Lang
Vei, however, there was never a major ground assault on the base and the battle became
largely a duel between American and North Vietnamese artillerists, combined with
massive air strikes conducted by U.S. aircraft. By the end of the siege, U.S. Air Force,
Marine Corps, and Navy aircraft had dropped 39,179 tons of ordnance in the defense of
the base.

The overland supply route to the base had been cut off, and airborne resupply by cargo
aircraft became extremely dangerous due to heavy PAVN antiaircraft fire. Thanks to
innovative high-speed "Super Gaggles", which utilized fighter-bombers in combination
with large numbers of supply helicopters, and the Air Force's utilization of C-130 Hercules
cargo aircraft employing the innovative LAPES delivery method, aerial resupply was never
halted.

When the Tet Offensive began, feelings ran high at MACV that the base was in for a serious
attack. In I Corps, the Tet Truce had been cancelled in apprehension of a communist
assault that never happened. The offensive passed Khe Sanh by and the intermittent
battle continued. Westmoreland's fixation upon the base continued even as the battle
raged around him in Saigon. On 1 February, as the offensive reached its height, he
wrote a memo for his staff—which was never delivered—stating: "The enemy is
attempting to confuse the issue ... I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's
attention from the area of greatest threat, the northern part of I Corps. Let me
caution everyone not to be confused."

In the end, a major allied relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) launched by all three
brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division reached Khe Sanh on 8 April, but PAVN forces
were already withdrawing from the area. Both sides claimed that the battle had
served its intended purpose. MACV estimated that 5,500 PAVN troops had been killed
and considerably more wounded. During the entire battle from 1 November 1967 to
14 April 1968, 730 U.S. personnel were killed and another 2,642 wounded. Khe Sanh
Base was later closed on 5 July 1968 because the base was seen as having less of
a strategic importance than before.

Aftermath
Except at Huế and mopping-up operations in and around Saigon, the first surge of the
offensive was over by the second week of February. The U.S. estimated that during the
first phase (30 January – 8 April) approximately 45,000 PAVN/VC soldiers were killed
and an unknown number were wounded. For years this figure has been held as
excessively optimistic, as it represented more than half the forces involved in this
battle. Stanley Karnow claims he confirmed this figure in Hanoi in 1981.
Westmoreland himself claimed a smaller number of enemies disabled, estimating
that during the same period 32,000 PAVN troops were killed and another 5,800
captured.The South Vietnamese suffered 2,788 killed, 8,299 wounded, and 587
missing in action. U.S. and other allied forces suffered 1,536 killed, 7,764
wounded, and 11 missing.

North Vietnam
The leadership in Hanoi was despondent at the outcome of their offensive.Their first and
most ambitious goal, producing a general uprising, had ended in a dismal failure. In total,
about 85,000–100,000 PAVN/VC troops had participated in the initial onslaught and in the
follow-up phases. Overall, during the "Border Battles" of 1967 and the nine-month winter
-spring campaign, 45,267 PAVN/VC troops had been killed in action.

Hanoi had underestimated the strategic mobility of the allied forces, which allowed them
to redeploy at will to threatened areas; their battle plan was too complex and difficult
to coordinate, which was amply demonstrated by the 30 January attacks; their violation
of the principle of mass, attacking everywhere instead of concentrating their forces
on a few specific targets, allowed their forces to be defeated piecemeal; the launching
of massed attacks headlong into the teeth of vastly superior firepower; and last, but
not least, the incorrect assumptions upon which the entire campaign was based.
According to General Tran Van Tra: "We did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of
forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had
considerable capabilities, and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements
that were beyond our actual strength.

The PAVN/VC effort to regain control of the countryside was somewhat more successful.
According to the U.S. State Department the VC "made pacification virtually inoperative.
In the Mekong Delta the Viet Cong was stronger now than ever and in other regions
the countryside belongs to the VC." General Wheeler reported that the offensive
had brought counterinsurgency programs to a halt and "that to a large extent, the VC
now controlled the countryside". This state of affairs did not last; heavy
casualties and the backlash of the South Vietnamese and Americans resulted in
more territorial losses and heavy casualties.

The heavy losses inflicted on VC units struck into the heart of the infrastructure that had
been built up for over a decade. MACV estimated that 181,149 PAVN/VC troops had been
killed during 1968.According to General Tran Van Tra, 45,267 PAVN/VC troops had
been killed during 1968 From this point forward, Hanoi was forced to fill nearly 70%
of the VC's ranks with PAVN regulars. PRG Justice Minister Trương Như Tảng said
that the Tet Offensive had wiped out half of the VC's strength, while the official
Vietnamese war history notes that by 1969, very little communist-held territory
("liberated zones") existed in South Vietnam. Following the Tet Offensive
and subsequent U.S.-South Vietnamese "search and hold" operations in the
countryside throughout the rest of 1968, the VC's recruiting base was more
or less wiped out; the official Vietnamese war history later noted that "we
could not maintain the level of local recruitment we had maintained in previous
years. In 1969 we were only able to recruit 1,700 new soldiers in Region 5
(compared with 8,000 in 1968), and in the lowlands of Cochin China we recruited
only 100 new soldiers (compared with 16,000 in 1968)." As also noted by the
official history, "because our armed local forces had suffered severe losses, guerrilla
operations had declined." However, this change had little effect on the overall
result of the war, since in contrast to the VC, the PAVN had little difficulty making up
the casualties inflicted by the offensive. Some Western historians have come to
believe that one insidious ulterior motive for the campaign was the elimination of
competing southern members of the Party, thereby allowing the northerners more
control once the war was won.

It was not until after the conclusion of the first phase of the offensive that Hanoi realized
that its sacrifices might not have been in vain. General Tran Do, PAVN commander at the
battle of Huế, gave some insight into how defeat was translated into victory:
In all honesty, we didn't achieve our main objective, which was to spur uprisings throughout
the South. Still, we inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans and their puppets, and this
was a big gain for us. As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our
intention—but it turned out to be a fortunate result.

On 5 May Trường Chinh rose to address a congress of Party members and proceeded to
castigate the Party militants and their bid for quick victory. His "faction-bashing" tirade
sparked a serious debate within the party leadership which lasted for four months. As
the leader of the "main force war" and "quick victory" faction, Lê Duẩn also came under
severe criticism. In August, Chinh's report on the situation was accepted in toto,
published, and broadcast via Radio Hanoi. He had single-handedly shifted the nation's
war strategy and restored himself to prominence as the Party's ideological conscience.
Meanwhile, the VC proclaimed itself the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam, and took part in future peace negotiations under this
title.

The Lê Duẩn faction, which favoured quick, decisive offensives meant to paralyse South
Vietnam-United States responses, was replaced by Giáp and Trường Chinh, who favoured
a strategy of more protracted, drawn-out conventional warfare. High-intensity,
conventional big-unit battles were replaced with smaller-scale, quick attack and quick
withdrawal operations to continually put pressure on the allied forces at the same time
that mechanised and combined-arms capabilities were being built. The plan for a
popular uprising or people's war was abandoned for a greater combination of guerrilla
and conventional warfare.[180] During this period, the PAVN would undergo a
significant strategic re-structuring, being built into a combined-arms capable force
while continually applying pressure on the U.S./ARVN with lighter infantry units.
In line with the revamped strategy of Hanoi, on April 5, 1969, COSVN issued
Directive 55 to all of its subordinate units: "Never again and under no circumstances
are we going to risk our entire military force for just such an offensive. On the
contrary, we should endeavor to preserve our military potential for future campaigns."

The PAVN official history describes the first phase of the Tet Offensive as a "great strategic
victory" that "killed or dispersed 150,000 enemy soldiers including 43,000 Americans,
destroyed 34 percent of the American war reserve supplies in Vietnam, destroyed 4,200
strategic hamlets and liberated an additional 1.4 million people."

South Vietnam
South Vietnam was a nation in turmoil both during and in the aftermath of the offensive.
Tragedy had compounded tragedy as the conflict reached into the nation's cities for the
first time. As government troops pulled back to defend the urban areas, the VC moved
in to fill the vacuum in the countryside. The violence and destruction witnessed during the
offensive left a deep psychological scar on the South Vietnamese civilian population.
Confidence in the government was shaken, since the offensive seemed to reveal that
even with massive American support, the government could not protect its citizens.

The human and material cost to South Vietnam was staggering. The number of civilian dead
was estimated by the government at 14,300 with an additional 24,000 wounded. 630,000
new refugees had been generated, joining the nearly 800,000 others already displaced by
the war. By the end of 1968, one of every twelve South Vietnamese was living in a refugee
camp. More than 70,000 homes had been destroyed in the fighting and perhaps 30,000 more
were heavily damaged and the nation's infrastructure had been virtually destroyed. The South
Vietnamese military, although it had performed better than the Americans had expected,
suffered from lowered morale, with desertion rates rising from 10.5 per thousand before Tet to
16.5 per thousand by July. 1968 became the deadliest year of the war to date for the ARVN
with 27,915 men killed.

Moreover, in addition to the heavy civilian casualties inflicted in the battle by U.S. forces to
retake the cities from the PAVN/VC, the presence of VC fighters in the villages exposed their
rural bases to attack. Writes Marilyn B. Young:
In Long An province, for example, local guerrillas taking part in the May—June offensive had
been divided into several sections. Only 775 out of 2,018 in one section survived; another
lost all but 640 out of 1,430. The province itself was subjected to what one historian has
called a "My Lai from the Sky" – non-stop B-52 bombing.

In the wake of the offensive, however, fresh determination was exhibited by the Thiệu
government. On 1 February Thiệu declared a state of martial law, and on 15 June, the
National Assembly passed his request for a general mobilization of the population and
the induction of 200,000 draftees into the armed forces by the end of the year (a decree
that had failed to pass only five months previously due to strong political opposition).
This increase would bring South Vietnam's troop strength to more than 900,000 men.
Military mobilization, anti-corruption campaigns, demonstrations of political unity, and
administrative reforms were quickly carried out. Thiệu also established a National
Recovery Committee to oversee food distribution, resettlement, and housing construction
for the new refugees. Both the government and the Americans were encouraged
by a new determination that was exhibited among the ordinary citizens of South Vietnam.
Many urban dwellers were indignant that the communists had launched their attacks during
Tet, and it drove many who had been previously apathetic into active support of the
government. Journalists, political figures, and religious leaders alike—even the militant
Buddhists—professed confidence in the government's plans.

Thiệu saw an opportunity to consolidate his personal power and he took it. His only real
political rival was Vice President Kỳ, the former Air Force commander, who had been
outmaneuvered by Thiệu in the presidential election of 1967. In the aftermath of Tet,
Kỳ supporters in the military and the administration were quickly removed from power,
arrested, or exiled. A crack-down on the South Vietnamese press also ensued and there
was a worrisome return of former President Ngô Đình Diệm's Cần Lao Party members to
high positions in the government and military. By the summer of 1968, the President had
earned a less exalted sobriquet among the South Vietnamese population, who had begun
to call him "the little dictator."

Thiệu had also become very suspicious of his American allies, unwilling to believe (as did
many South Vietnamese) that the U.S. had been caught by surprise by the offensive. "Now
that it's all over", he queried a visiting Washington official, "you really knew it was coming,
didn't you?" Lyndon Johnson's unilateral decision on 31 March to curtail the bombing of
North Vietnam only confirmed what Thiệu already feared, that the Americans were going
to abandon South Vietnam to the communists. For Thiệu, the bombing halt and the beginning
of negotiations with the North brought not the hope of an end to the war, but "an abiding
fear of peace." He was only mollified after an 18 July meeting with Johnson in Honolulu,
where Johnson affirmed that Saigon would be a full partner in all negotiations and that the
U.S. would not "support the imposition of a coalition government, or any other form of
government, on the people of South Vietnam."

United States
The Tet Offensive created a crisis within the Johnson administration, which became
increasingly unable to convince the American public that it had been a major defeat for
the communists. The optimistic assessments made prior to the offensive by the
administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility
gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm.

At the time of the Tet Offensive, the majority of the American public perceived that the war
was not being won by the United States and its allies, despite assurances from the President
and military leaders that such was the case. No matter that the PAVN/VC lost about
30,000 of their best troops in the fighting at Tet, they were capable of replacing those lost
with new recruits from North Vietnam. In 1969, the year after the Tet battles, the US suffered
11,780 killed, the second highest annual total in the war. This was a clear indication that
the North Vietnamese were capable of ongoing offensive actions, despite their losses at Tet.
Most Americans were tired of suffering so many casualties without evidence that they were
going to stop anytime in the foreseeable future. Walter Cronkite, anchorman of the CBS Evening
News and a World War II combat veteran, argued for negotiations as an honorable way out
in a Special Report based on his journalism in Vietnam broadcast on CBS TV in March.

The shocks that reverberated from the battlefield continued to widen: On 18 February 1968
MACV posted the highest U.S. casualty figures for a single week during the entire war: 543
killed and 2,547 wounded. As a result of the heavy fighting, 1968 went on to become the
deadliest year of the war for the US forces with 16,592 soldiers killed. On 23 February the
U.S. Selective Service System announced a new draft call for 48,000 men, the second highest
of the war. On 28 February Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who had overseen
the escalation of the war in 1964–1965, but who had eventually turned against it, stepped
down from office.

Troop request
During the first two weeks of February, Generals Westmoreland and Wheeler communicated
as to the necessity for reinforcements or troop increases in Vietnam. Westmoreland insisted
that he only needed those forces either in-country or already scheduled for deployment and
he was puzzled by the sense of unwarranted urgency in Wheeler's queries. Westmoreland
was tempted, however, when Wheeler emphasized that the White House might loosen restraints
and allow operations in Laos, Cambodia, or possibly even North Vietnam itself. On 8 February,
Westmoreland responded that he could use another division "if operations in Laos are
authorized". Wheeler responded by challenging Westmoreland's assessment of the situation,
pointing out dangers that his on-the-spot commander did not consider palpable, concluding:
"In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them."

Wheeler's promptings were influenced by the severe strain imposed upon the U.S. military by
the Vietnam commitment, one which had been undertaken without the mobilization of its
reserve forces. The Joint Chiefs had repeatedly requested national mobilization, not only to
prepare for a possible intensification of the war, but also to ensure that the nation's strategic
reserve did not become depleted. By obliquely ordering Westmoreland to demand more forces,
Wheeler was attempting to solve two pressing problems. In comparison with MACV's previous
communications, which had been full of confidence, optimism, and resolve, Westmoreland's
12 February request for 10,500 troops was much more urgent: "which I desperately need ...
time is of the essence". On 13 February, 10,500 previously authorized U.S. airborne troops
and marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs then played their hand, advising
President Johnson to turn down MACV's requested division-sized reinforcement unless he
called up some 1,234,001 marine and army reservists.

Johnson dispatched Wheeler to Saigon on 20 February to determine military requirements in
response to the offensive. Both Wheeler and Westmoreland were elated that in only eight
days McNamara would be replaced by the hawkish Clark Clifford and that the military might
finally obtain permission to widen the war. Wheeler's written report of the trip, however,
contained no mention of any new contingencies, strategies, or the building up the strategic
reserve. It was couched in grave language that suggested that the 206,756-man request it
proposed was a matter of vital military necessity. Westmoreland wrote in his memoir that
Wheeler had deliberately concealed the truth of the matter in order to force the issue of
the strategic reserve upon the President.

On 27 February, Johnson and McNamara discussed the proposed troop increase. To fulfill
it would require an increase in overall military strength of about 400,000 men and the
expenditure of an additional $10 billion during fiscal 1969 and another $15 billion in 1970.
These monetary concerns were pressing. Throughout the fall of 1967 and the spring of
1968, the U.S. was struggling with "one of the most severe monetary crises" of the
period. Without a new tax bill and budgetary cuts, the nation would face even higher
inflation "and the possible collapse of the monetary system". Johnson's friend Clifford
was concerned about what the American public would think of the escalation: "How
do we avoid creating the feeling that we are pounding troops down a rathole?"

According to the Pentagon Papers, "A fork in the road had been reached and the
alternatives stood out in stark reality." To meet Wheeler's request would mean a total
U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam. "To deny it, or to attempt to cut it to a
size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely
signify that an upper limit to the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam had been
reached."

Reassessment
To evaluate Westmoreland's request and its possible impact on domestic politics, Johnson
convened the "Clifford Group" on 28 February and tasked its members with a complete
policy reassessment. Some of the members argued that the offensive represented an
opportunity to defeat the North Vietnamese on American terms while others pointed out
that neither side could win militarily, that North Vietnam could match any troop increase,
that the bombing of the North be halted, and that a change in strategy was required that
would seek not victory, but the staying power required to reach a negotiated settlement.
This would require a less aggressive strategy that was designed to protect the population
of South Vietnam. The divided group's final report, issued on 4 March, "failed to seize the
opportunity to change directions... and seemed to recommend that we continue rather
haltingly down the same road."

On 1 March, Clifford had succeeded McNamara as Secretary of Defense. During the month,
Clifford, who had entered office as a staunch supporter of the Vietnam commitment and
who had opposed McNamara's de-escalatory views, turned against the war. According to
Clifford: "The simple truth was that the military failed to sustain a respectable argument
for their position." Between the results of Tet and the meetings of the group that bore his
name, he became convinced that deescalation was the only solution for the United States.
He believed that the troop increase would lead only to a more violent stalemate and sought
out others in the administration to assist him in convincing the President to reverse the
escalation, to cap force levels at 550,000 men, to seek negotiations with Hanoi, and turn
responsibility for the fighting over to the South Vietnamese. Clifford quietly sought allies and
was assisted in his effort by the so-called "8:30 Group" – Nitze, Warnke, Phil G. Goulding
(Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs), George Elsey and Air Force Colonel Robert
E. Pursely.

On 27 February, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had proposed that a partial bombing halt be
implemented in North Vietnam and that an offer to negotiate be extended to Hanoi.
On 4 March, Rusk reiterated the proposal, explaining that, during the rainy season in the
North, bombing was less effective and that no military sacrifice would thus occur. This
was purely a political ploy, however, since the North Vietnamese would probably again
refuse to negotiate, casting the onus on them and "thus freeing our hand after a short
period...putting the monkey firmly upon Hanoi's back for what was to follow."

While this was being deliberated, the troop request was leaked to the press and published
in The New York Times on 10 March. The article also revealed that the request had begun
a serious debate within the administration. According to it, many high-level officials believed
that the U.S. troop increase would be matched by the communists and would simply maintain
a stalemate at a higher level of violence. It went on to state that officials were saying in
private that "widespread and deep changes in attitudes, a sense that a watershed has been
reached."

A great deal has been said by historians concerning how the news media made Tet the
"turning point" in the public's perception of the war. Popular CBS anchor Walter Cronkite
stated during a news broadcast on February 27, "We have been too often disappointed
by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith
any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds" and added that, "we are
mired in a stalemate that could only be ended by negotiation, not victory." Far from
suffering a loss of morale, however, the majority of Americans had rallied to the side
of the president. A Gallup poll in January 1968 revealed that 56 percent polled considered
themselves hawks on the war and 27 percent doves, with 17 percent offering no opinion.
By early February, at the height of the first phase of the offensive, 61 percent declared
themselves hawks, 23 percent doves, and 16 percent held no opinion. Johnson, however,
made few comments to the press during or immediately after the offensive, leaving an
impression of indecision on the public. It was this lack of communication that caused
a rising disapproval rating for his conduct of the war. By the end of February, his
approval rating had fallen from 63 percent to 47 percent. By the end of March the
percentage of Americans that expressed confidence in U.S. military policies in Southeast
Asia had fallen from 74 to 54 percent.

By 22 March, President Johnson had informed Wheeler to "forget the 100,000" men.
The President and his staff were refining a lesser version of the troop increase – a
planned call-up of 62,000 reservists, 13,000 of whom would be sent to Vietnam. Three
days later, at Clifford's suggestion, Johnson called a conclave of the "Wise Men".
With few exceptions, all of the members of the group had formerly been accounted
as hawks on the war. The group was joined by Rusk, Wheeler, Bundy, Rostow, and
Clifford. The final assessment of the majority stupefied the group. According to Clifford,
"few of them were thinking solely of Vietnam anymore". All but four members called
for disengagement from the war, leaving the President "deeply shaken." According to
the Pentagon Papers, the advice of the group was decisive in convincing Johnson to
reduce the bombing of North Vietnam.

Johnson was depressed and despondent at the course of recent events. The New York
Times article had been released just two days before the Democratic Party's New
Hampshire primary, where the President suffered an unexpected setback in the election,
finishing barely ahead of Senator Eugene McCarthy. Soon afterward, Senator Robert F.
Kennedy announced he would join the contest for the Democratic nomination, further
emphasizing the plummeting support for Johnson's administration in the wake of Tet.

The President was to make a televised address to the nation on Vietnam policy on 31
March and was deliberating on both the troop request and his response to the military
situation. By 28 March Clifford was working hard to convince him to tone down his
hard-line speech, maintaining force levels at their present size, and instituting Rusk's
bombing/negotiating proposal. To Clifford's surprise, both Rusk and Rostow (both of
whom had previously been opposed to any form of deescalation) offered no opposition
to Clifford's suggestions. On 31 March, President Johnson announced the unilateral
(although still partial) bombing halt during his television address. He then stunned
the nation by declining to run for a second term in office. To Washington's surprise,
on 3 April Hanoi announced that it would conduct negotiations, which were scheduled
to begin on 13 May in Paris.

On 9 June, President Johnson replaced Westmoreland as commander of MACV with
General Creighton W. Abrams. Although the decision had been made in December
1967 and Westmoreland was made Army Chief of Staff, many saw his relief as
punishment for the entire Tet debacle. Abrams' new strategy was quickly demonstrated
by the closure of the "strategic" Khe Sanh base and the ending of multi-division "search
and destroy" operations. Also gone were discussions of victory over North Vietnam.
Abrams' new "One War" policy centered the American effort on the takeover of the fighting
by the South Vietnamese (through Vietnamization), the pacification of the countryside,
and the destruction of communist logistics. The new administration of President Richard M.
Nixon would oversee the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the continuation of negotiations.

Phase II
To further enhance their political posture at the Paris talks, which opened on 13 May, the North
Vietnamese opened the second phase of the General Offensive in late April. U.S. intelligence
sources estimated between February and May the North Vietnamese dispatched 50,000 men
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to replace losses incurred during the earlier fighting. Some of the
most prolonged and vicious combat of the war opened on 29 April and lasted until 30 May when
the 8,000 men of the PAVN 320th Division, backed by artillery from across the DMZ, threatened
the U.S. logistical base at Đông Hà, in northwestern Quảng Trị Province. In what became known
as the Battle of Dai Do, the PAVN clashed savagely with U.S. Marine, Army and ARVN forces
before withdrawing. The PAVN lost an estimated 2,100 men according to US/ARVN claims, after
inflicting casualties on the allies of 290 killed and 946 wounded.

During the early morning hours of 4 May, PAVN/VC units initiated the second phase of the
offensive (known by the South Vietnamese and Americans as "Mini-Tet") by striking 119
targets throughout South Vietnam, including Saigon. This time, however, allied intelligence
was better prepared, stripping away the element of surprise. Most of the communist forces
were intercepted by allied screening elements before they reached their targets. 13 VC
battalions, however, managed to slip through the cordon and once again plunged the capital
into chaos. Severe fighting occurred at Phu Lam, (where it took two days to root out the VC
267th Local Force Battalion), around the Y-Bridge and at Tan Son Nhut.[248] By 12 May,
however, it was all over. VC forces withdrew from the area leaving behind over 3,000 dead.

The fighting had no sooner died down around Saigon than U.S. forces in Quảng Tín Province
suffered a defeat when the PAVN 2nd Division attacked Kham Duc, the last Special Forces
border surveillance camp in I Corps. 1,800 U.S. and ARVN troops were isolated and under
intense attack when MACV made the decision to avoid a situation reminiscent of that at
Khe Sanh. Kham Duc was evacuated by air while under fire, and abandoned to the North
Vietnamese.

The PAVN/VC returned to Saigon on 25 May and launched a second wave of attacks on
the city. The fighting during this phase differed from Tet Mau Than and "Mini-Tet" in
that no U.S. installations were attacked. During this series of actions, VC forces occupied
six Buddhist pagodas in the mistaken belief that they would be immune from artillery and
air attack. The fiercest fighting once again took place in Cholon. One notable event
occurred on 18 June when 152 members of the VC Quyet Thang Regiment surrendered
to ARVN forces, the largest communist surrender of the war. The actions also brought
more death and suffering to the city's inhabitants. A further 87,000 were made homeless
while more than 500 were killed and another 4,500 were wounded. During part of the
second phase (5 May – 30 May) U.S. casualties amounted to 1,161 killed and 3,954
wounded,


Phase III

Phase III of the offensive began on 17 August and involved attacks in I, II and III Corps.
Significantly, during this series of actions only North Vietnamese forces participated and
targets were military in nature, with less concise attacks against city-targets. The main
offensive was preceded by attacks on the border towns of Tây Ninh, An Lộc, and Loc
Ninh, which were initiated in order to draw defensive forces from the cities. A thrust
against Da Nang was preempted by the U.S. Marines' Operation Allen Brook. Continuing
their border-clearing operations, three PAVN regiments asserted heavy pressure on the
U.S. Special Forces camp at Bu Prang, in Quang Duc Province, five kilometers from the
Cambodian border. The fighting lasted for two days before the PAVN broke contact;
the combat resulted in US/ARVN claiming 776 PAVN/VC casualties, 114 South
Vietnamese and two Americans.

Saigon was struck again during this phase, but the attacks were less sustained and once
again repulsed. As far as MACV was concerned, the August offensive "was a dismal failure".
In five weeks of fighting and after the loss of 20,000 troops, the previous objectives of
spurring an uprising and mass-defection had not been attained during this "final and decisive
phase". Yet, as historian Ronald Spector has pointed out "the communist failures were not
final or decisive either".

The horrendous casualties and suffering endured by PAVN/VC units during these sustained
operations were beginning to tell. The fact that there were no apparent military gains made
that could possibly justify all the blood and effort just exacerbated the situation. During the
first half of 1969, more than 20,000 PAVN/VC troops rallied to allied forces, a threefold
increase over the 1968 figure.